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"After the End of the World" is a study of the poetics of experimental writing, 
focusing on the work of W. E. B. Du Bois, Nathaniel Mackey, Suzan-Lori Parks and 
Kamau Brathwaite.  By thinking form as a locus of political and conceptual 
contestation and transformation, I seek methods for conceiving politics in literature 
apart from its references or the identities of authors and characters.  Writing in 
different genres, and with different political investments, each of these authors offers 
resources for re-imagining community as a project, for thinking the constitution of the 
self and political subject, and for conceiving politics and literary studies globally.   
Using a broad conception of literary experimentation as writing that departs 
from conventional forms and conventional thinking, I emphasize time of reading, 
among other times.  Arguing that conceptions of time tend to be at the heart of 
political concerns throughout the sites of the African diaspora, this project challenges 
those notions of black writing that rest on the binary or oppression/resistance.   
I begin with an analysis of Du Bois' writing, especially his notions of double-
consciousness and the veil, which I argue are related to writing and self-narration and 
thus to the problem of political and aesthetic representation.  Parks' work similarly 
makes representation—especially historical representation—into a thematic question 
through which she problematizes the notion of a unitary "black experience."  
 Specifically concerned with poetry, Kamau Brathwaite and Nathaniel Mackey 
specifically confront and contravene the legacy of the lyric voice in both the 
presentation and topics of their work.  Brathwaite invents a shifting system of fonts, 
margins and a capacious first-person singular/plural to articulate a time and a "we" of 
the Caribbean and the diaspora.  Mackey's work uses music, repetition and pronoun 
shifts to de-emphasize the traditional lyric "I" in favor of a poetics concerned with the 
limits of the here and now.  Considering the ways these authors elaborate 
considerations that do not immediately map onto their presumed preoccupations, this 
project generates a means for conceiving the relationship between form and politics.  
It starts from the materiality of language and literature and then proceeds to politics 
and theory. 
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INTRODUCTION 
THE OTHER SIDE OF TIME 
The Instance of Politics 
This dissertation proposes a reconceptualization of the place of politics within 
the literary text.  My effort here concerns neither, on the one hand, analyses of the 
system through which a body of texts comes to be considered literature (or, as part of 
the same system, canonical) nor, on the other hand, those readings that consider the 
literary text itself to be a representation or symptom of underlying social 
contradictions.  Instead, starting from poetics—the conventions, devices and means 
through which a literary text uses language to create its effects—I argue that the 
literary text always exceeds the norms or conventions through which we understand 
the literary.  Pushing against those frameworks that are its conditions of intelligibility, 
every literary text risks becoming unrecognizable, risks that moment where a reader 
may encounter an instance of language and justifiably ask, "what is the author trying 
to say?"  For hermeneutical criticism, such moments could, in a relatively 
straightforward way, either grant such confusion its own signifying function, or simply 
dismiss such moments as anomalous and therefore irrelevant to the "overall" meaning 
of the work "as a whole."  Especially for political readings, where the horizon of the 
political is shaped either by the conflicts the text is supposed to represent or "express," 
the "whole" itself is not a function of the individual volume or author's oeuvre, but the 
ensemble of social forces that mark (and are marked by) the text.  Indeed, the nominal 
urgency of such projects would demand such swiftness, but in the name of an analysis 
of literature the question of the literary, and of reading, is forgotten.   
In the case of black writing—literature from racialized authors from sites 
within the African diaspora—racial difference becomes an analytic (rather than 
descriptive) category.  The black author, it is presumed, represents her experience, 
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challenges the norms and structures of power through which she is constitutively 
(mis)recognized, and proposes a more authentic or just schema of representation.  The 
literature is thus taken to have the task of articulating an identity or responding to a 
particular socio-political configuration; schematically, it reacts against imposed 
(inauthentic) otherness rather than innate (authentic) otherness.  The ambivalence of 
these modes of otherness, whose primary difference rests in whether is subject or 
object of the performative othering, perhaps becomes clear.  This criticism is broadly 
dialectical.  At a given instant, and the givenness of that instant is excluded from 
analysis, the two discourses of otherness are reversible: each presumes the other.  
To valorize work for its celebration of otherness to the extent that it others 
discourses of otherness is to say that this work is something other than some usually 
unnamed "mainstream" literature or ideology, which must nonetheless be maintained 
in its overcoming.  Stated directly, criticism that starts from the instance of difference 
tends to reify the difference it wants to analyze.  Racial or other difference moves 
from being "external" to the text as historical fact, to" internal" as an historically 
necessary theme, then outside the text again as that which the text was "really about," 
re-inscribing the schema social othering it presumably set out to oppose: these texts 
are simply different from other texts.  What begins as a critique or worry over 
presumptions of literature as the transmitter of "neutral" social values, where 
"neutrality" means difference is annulled in the name of articulating a transcendent 
Same, the Other becomes itself merely a counter-transcendent Same oriented against 
the first instance of Sameness.  To valorize one form of otherness as a challenge to 
another form of otherness is to uphold an essential sameness of the two discourses 
subtended by their mutual self-identity, which necessarily assumes and relies on the 
discursive situation it tries to undo.  Difference—racial difference—becomes, to 
borrow Althusser's phrase, "determinant in the last instance," at once limit and 
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transcendent horizon.  In the instance of criticism, this means that the specific 
techniques through which the literary text mobilizes and distributes differences of all 
kinds are not discussed or are treated as more or less incidental.  Narrative anachrony, 
for example, becomes the sign of a trauma or of resistance to the narrative linearity 
(and, by extension, presumed historical linearity or narratives of progress) through 
which peoples are distributed as more or less "modern."  Simultaneously, neither the 
relation of that difference to the literary text nor a thoroughgoing account of the 
emergence of that difference from one epoch to another is possible.  The structuralist 
distinction between diachrony and synchrony is effectively suspended in favor of a 
notion like "the changing same," to borrow a term from Amiri Baraka's famous essay. 
My point here is not that such readings are merely erroneous, or unjustifiable.  
Rather, this set of presumptions shifts concern from politics—i.e., political strategies 
aimed at changing a given situation—to the political—i.e., the conditions under which 
politics might be imagined or carried out.  In Gramsci's terms, there is only war of 
position, no war of maneuver.  As a result, especially salient in the case of discussion 
of black literature but by no means limited to it, almost any engagement with the 
political by a black person becomes, automatically, an instance of politics.  Often this 
is rooted in a particular notion of tradition that discursively relates a certain past to the 
future by making the former term a condition or nomos for the latter.  A recent 
example of this tendency is Fred Moten's ambitious, celebrated work, In the Break: 
The Aesthetics of the Black Radical Tradition.  Moten implicitly revises and extends 
Houston Baker's earlier notion of a "blues matrix"—where a "matrix is a womb, a 
network, … a mat or plate for reproducing print of phonograph records … a point of 
ceaseless input and output, a web of intersecting, crisscrossing impulses always in 
productive transit" and the blues are the "enabling script in which Afro-American 
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cultural discourse in inscribed."1  In its place, Moten puts forward what he variously 
terms "black phonic materiality," "black phonic substance," or occasionally "the 
music," and thus displaces Baker's insistent inscription.  Engaging Marx's articulation 
of commodity fetishism Capital, Volume One in light of slavery where, for Moten, 
slaves simply are commodities, he argues, "the commodity discovers herself, comes to 
know herself, only as a function of having been exchanged, having been embedded in 
a mode of sociality that is shaped by exchange."2
                                                 
1 Houston Baker, Blues, Ideology and Afro-American Literature: A Vernacular Theory (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp.3-4.  Emphasis in original. 
2 Fred Moten, In the Break: The Aesthetics of the Black Radical Tradition (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2003), p. 9. 
  As with Baker's work, a certain 
Hegel is never far from the scene.  The very structure of subjectivity—knowing 
oneself—depends upon the slave's self-understanding as slave, which means, as in 
Baker's argument, as a commodity, and we should emphasize the singular indefinite 
article.  Moten's use of the feminine pronoun anticipates subsequent elaboration of 
Baker's matrix in the direction if the maternity at the heart of "matter."  Citing the 
instance of Aunt Hester's non- or not-yet-linguistic cry in Fredrick Douglass' 1845 
Narrative, Moten goes on to argue for what he calls a "scene of objection"—at once 
her literal objectification and, critically, her objection at having been made an object.  
To the extent that her self-denying or self-effacing awareness of herself as an object is 
the condition of her agency, one cannot yet speak of her agency.  The cry, as the event 
of resistance, is axiomatically political, but agency belongs to the cry itself, which 
represents itself to itself as a movement in and for itself.  The black phonic substance's 
irruption can be understood as the instance or insistence of a past moment—both in 
and prior to time—in the present as an impulse toward human freedom.  It is not 
subject to the decision of any subject, but summons itself as the always prior instance 
of resistance before power.  In this way, it necessarily precludes any moment that does 
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not belong to it, any moment or interval that would hesitate between meaning and non-
meaning: it is the full presence of resistance, a moment of negativity in a greater 
dialectic toward human emancipation.3
This conclusion is the result of a particular synchronic understanding of 
historical experience (or, in Baker's terms, "interpretations of the experiencing of 
experience").
 
4
                                                 
3 One might see here, too, an affinity with Fredric Jameson's arguments for the artwork as an attempt to 
resolve real contradictions by symbolic means, considered here along the axes of race rather than the 
means, mode and relations of production, with a similar impulse to privilege the synchronic as a means 
to think the totality.  Unlike Jameson, however, it is not clear that Moten has any interest in the final 
dialectic moment of finally resolving conflicts in something like the advent of the socialist state, or that 
he sees any difference of intensity or magnitude between one kind of utopian imagining and another. 
4 Blues, Ideology and Afro-American Literature, p. 7. 
  Methodologically, this view of an ontological resistance rooted in a 
particular history (and a particular history of representation) of slavery leaves us 
unable to account for differences—between people classified as "black" within the 
U.S. irrespective of their place of origin, or between the moments of slavery and the 
present.  Simultaneously, it becomes difficult analytically to distinguish between 
systems of power and the exercise of force.  This impasse is in part the result of an 
ambiguity within the institution of slavery that declaring the slave simply to be a 
commodity obscures.  The slave is not one, is not a singular entity, but rather is the 
outcome of a contradictory set of processes whereby a person (which, from the 
standpoint of legal histories is at best a loaded term) comes at certain times and under 
certain conditions to be treated as a commodity – at once an instance of fixed and 
variable capital.  Further, To ask about the slave’s resistance is at once to naturalize 
the category of the person or the human as subject of rights, and to bypass the question 
of resistance’s genesis, the conditions of the emergence of any resistance, objection, of 
any saying, and the different and differential conditions of legibility (or audibility) of 
any cry.  Returning to the considerations of difference with which I began, the 
vacillation between fixed and variable capital, for example, suggests that the “black 
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experience” during slavery is not one.  So, too, for experiences of Africans in the 
United States and elsewhere throughout the diaspora are multiple, and cannot be 
reduced to a single, simple origin, or a simple stance of negativity or resistance to 
overlapping systems of power. 
This has obvious consequences for the ways we think about literature, and the 
overlapping traditions within and against which black authors work.  In privileging the 
analysis of poetics over hermeneutic interpretation, this dissertation seeks instances of 
politics within literary texts by lingering over such conceptual voids and the ways 
literature problematizes the categories through which it is most commonly considered, 
and the categories that mark its emergence.  Methodologically, I insist on time as the 
thinking of change, and as the synthesis of discrete moments within the literary text.  
This also means that I understand the literary text itself to be a contingent unity that 
always threatens to undo itself, in the case of the authors considered here, through 
intertextual citation, seriality or revision.  In my view, it is not literature "itself" that 
becomes co-opted, but ways of reading, especially those that seek to close or 
predetermine the direction of the literary text.  Anticipating my consideration of W. E. 
B. Du Bois in the first chapter, one mechanism through which literature gets recruited 
for different schemes of power or ideology is impatient reading that avoids or reduces 
the insistent materiality of literature, both the words on the page and their formal 
presentation, mark an instance of ideological closure.  For that reason, I do not 
endeavor to find the most lucid or accurate interpretation of literary texts, but to 
analyze the ways literature's stubborn materiality complicates interpretation.   
That complication is the place of politics.  Insisting on the excessive nature of 
literature, and of language, my analyses resist the closure that allows one to say a 
works is "really about" an already thematized otherness, or to reduce the play of texts 
in order to harness writing’s power toward particular political ends that precede the 
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work.  Poetics starts from the text and considers its play of difference and its 
movements, its moments of self-undoing, the ways in which it challenges the 
categories through which we read it.  My term for this productive self-undoing is 
“fugitive articulacy,” which recalls the lure of a certain notion of black history and 
black history, and the “law” of reading whereby one is tempted to order the cultural 
object’s elements in a particular way to define the instance of politics. 
   
How to Go On: After the End 
Though I privilege literature in these pages, this attention to poetics need not 
be limited to the literary text.  Let me briefly consider Sun Ra’s “After the End of the 
World” (the version on the soundtrack for the film Space is the Place) from which I 
take my title.  At the beginning of the song, Sun Ra's organ sounds a drone; June 
Tyson's tart contralto metrically recites the lyric: "after the end of the world. / Don't 
you know that yet?"  Both lines end on an accented syllable, the first being, from the 
point of view of prosody, trisyllabic (dactylic), (After the end of the world), the latter 
disyllabic (trochaic) (Don't you know that yet?).  Abstracting rhythm from the 
semantic content, the two trisyllables followed by two disyllables might recall a 
drummer's marching cadence, insofar as the latter two phrases rhythmically settle the 
phrase into tight regularity.  As the phrase repeats, a staggered male chorus joins, now 
declaring "It's after the end of the world":  the initial phrase "began" after its own 
beginning, the rhythm effectively unchanged by its “it’s,” which as an anacrusis or 
anticipatory syllable is a syllable out of time.  The copula—to be, the conjunction 
between subject and predicate—is absent, multiplying the strange ontology of the 
semantic phrase: what "is" or can be after the end of the world?”  More radically, the 
very question of being, as the antecedent of the conventional "it" of "it is," remains 
outside of the phrase: "it," "there" and "when" all seem beside the point.  These 
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lines—especially considered in conjunction with the organ's harmonically unresolved 
chord and non-punctuated duration (e.g., there is not a break to mark tempo)—yields a 
congeries of overlapping times and rhythms, a call to thinking rooted in the 
performance of the words, the performance that the words are.  One is lead to the 
thinking of time, the staging or mise-en-scène of time.  This time, if it is one, after the 
end of the world—perhaps the "other side of time" Sun Ra occasionally referred to—
asserts itself in the poetics, which suspends time.  What time is this?  What Being is 
approached or voided?   
The voices repeat, chant-like and slightly staggered to break the rhythm's 
regimentation.  The male voices stay within a narrow dynamic and harmonic range, 
while Tyson ranges from piano to fortissimo, inflecting the phrase differently with 
each pass, as if she were an actor rehearsing her lines.  The voices fade, but Sun Ra’s 
minor-key drone continues, and a trumpet improvisation fades in, processed with 
heavy reverb (either added before the performance or after in post-production), its 
sound lagging behind as if searching for the "now" or "then" of June Tyson's "yet."  
The reverberations, the transition and overlap between sections of the song and the 
lines themselves suggest the conjunction of disparate times.5
The accent of the phrase falls most on the preposition after and the adverb yet, 
which point in opposite temporal directions—respectively to the event that has just 
passed and to an event to come, making the present—any now—an open question.  
From another perspective, however, both point in the same direction, toward the 
  A "post" reverberates in 
the present in which one realizes his or her fate too late ("don't you know that yet?"), 
and an impossible time that cannot move forward ("it's after the end of the world") but 
nonetheless will have progressed.  
                                                 
5 It is beyond the scope of my argument here, but it will be necessary to think the status of this 
performance in light of the disparate modes of writing and performance implied by the script, the 
performance and the reading and writing of the recording apparatus itself. 
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future, insofar as one is told of the event because there is some present or future 
obligation.  It's already after the end of the world, and you still haven't….  From this 
second perspective, the present is only important as a critical juncture of time, and the 
question becomes what will become of us, whichever us receives this message or 
warning?  Will the event of the end of the world—the annihilation of any possible 
archive or inscription—repeat?  And precisely which world has ended, if some "we" 
still receives messages and thinks in the wake of its finish?  Accent the definite 
pronoun, however—"after the end of the world"—and the situation is not an absolute 
end, but a catastrophe, an abrupt, discontinuous, radically unexpected turn that disjoins 
what was imagined to be the unidirectional flow of time.  The catastrophe is 
generative—the end marks a beginning, a new situation wherein one does not know 
how to continue (or begin), where, invoking Wittgenstein to underscore the communal 
nature of any uses of language, one does not know his or her way around.  It is a call 
for thinking anew, for thinking transcending its limits, even as the regular rhythmic 
structure the warning falls into implicates the difficulty of such a task.   
Privileging style and literature's active assemblage of elements, both its staging 
and having an estranging encounter with language, I do not wish to purify reading of 
the "merely" personal, the "merely" contingent.  Instead, I want to raise the question of 
the relationship between that time and the time of reading, between a work and its 
time, or of that now to this one.  Above all, I wish to call into question the idea of a 
"neutral" experience of reading, an idealized set of encounters that one "must have 
had" with the text, reducing reading and the reader, a singular placeholder, to a site of 
simple machine-like computations of graphemes and phonemes.  In this sense, my 
focus on poetics is inherently temporal, concerned with the mechanisms through 
which that "really about" is produced.   If literature, taken as material practice, pushes 
against its own limits, it also pushes against any such idealization of "the" reader.   
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Returning to the example of song already considered and recurrent throughout 
these pages, rather than making it the privileged figure of resistance or protest, I 
consider music alternately as reference, theme and compositional principle, arguing 
for music's theatrical and above all indexical density as one element of experimental 
writing to be considered in the context of other effects of literature.  In other words, 
music can function as a spur to creativity or counterpoint, a method—like allusion, 
citationality, or a privileging of the graphic aspect of writing—for interrupting the 
presumed flow of mimesis or representation.  Through this reorientation, I attend to 
the graphic in the most general sense, the mark that is not necessarily linked to the 
voice, while always keeping in mind the necessity of this sound and the interpretation 
of the sound to pass through signification, and thus the possibility of change.   
This possibility marks the definition of experimental in this dissertation: from 
Du Bois to Brathwaite, the emphasis is not on achieving particular goals rooted in 
transhistorical interests, or producing measurable results to be verified or evaluated 
based on those goals in the face of an overarching "method" or tradition.  The 
experimental, which may only be a moment in an otherwise conventional mode of 
writing or representation, marks an moment in the text where one no longer knows 
one's way about, where the norms of understanding or intelligibility falter and one 
faces the demand to think.  In this sense, literature is a modality of thinking whose 
medium is language itself, as concepts are the media of philosophy.   
Experimental writing, often critical of received or sedimented ideas—the 
givenness of the world or language as given—tends toward complicated assemblages 
that do not easily resolve.  The literatures selected for this study tend especially to 
manipulate or layer times drawing attention to grammar and conventions, creating a 
confusion of temporal registers, and producing a uniquely rich body of work for 
thinking the concept of time, and of history as a method for managing time.  Because 
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of its ability to interrogate space and time simultaneously this literature can 
productively interrogate, for example, the linkage of time and space performed 
discursively by the use of the term "African diaspora."  The manipulation of time 
through poiesis has a peculiar political valence, especially from the point of view of 
community or audience, which recur throughout the literature as figures of 
temporalized space as much as spatialized time.  In both instances, however, neither 
community nor audience is a simple gathering of present beings sharing the same time 
as the performance, even where "live" performance is specifically invoked.  
In defining experimentation as broadly as I have, I emphasize the necessity, 
again following Du Bois, of "patient reading" as the means through which the work of 
criticism can renew itself.  I endeavor to catch the positive capacities of literature, or, 
if you will, the literariness of literature, through which it may attempt to affect, rather 
than reflect, change in the world.  The solution is not a "return" to literature as 
somehow "purified" of social or political concerns.  To attend to literariness does not 
require that one ignore all other concerns, but rather that one think those concerns 
from the point of view of the literary, rather than vice-versa, allowing those concerns 
to be transformed by their encounter with the literary as productive, not merely 
expressive.  Proceeding from the question of poiesis—how literature works and what 
it makes, including the specific problems it articulates and elaborates which may 
deviate from concrete states of affairs or historical concerns—this dissertation 
operates on the basis of a supple tradition, a category within which the links between 
the authors are not pre-determined by history or social identity, a category constantly 
undone and reformed on the basis of patient reading.  One asks, in other words about 
style: the use of language beyond what it "says" or signifies, but toward what thinking 
it makes possible, toward an intensive or non-actualized potential in language and 
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literary form.  This orientation serves as a check on those pieties of resistance, that 
rush to closure and interpretation that effectively re-encloses its object.   
 
The Instance of the Instant 
In the years following Space is the Place critics and theorists have increasingly 
argued for the centrality of temporality to the study of literature, from the slogan 
"always historicize" and the work of literary "recovery" to more recent attention to 
spectrality and haunting in post-colonial and African-American literary and cultural 
studies.  Time is of special importance to the study of the African diaspora, insofar as 
the figure of diaspora denotes exilic space, a phantasmatic site of origin, a home 
"foreclosed" except to memory or narrative, and a deferred homecoming, the sign of a 
possible future.  The role of consciousness or self-fashioning is only ever partially in 
one's hand, as one must always contend with competing notions of time, supported by 
different forms of life.   
Diaspora as link of identity and future reconciliation names a utopian longing 
to the extent that it implies an ideal state of community where that which prohibits this 
ideal community has been removed.  It figures an ideal unity, immanent to present 
relations between people, but not actualized in them, as becomes apparent, for 
example, when the son of an African father and American mother cannot be accepted 
as African American, tout court.  It is impossible in the precise sense that the coming 
into being of the unity towards which "diaspora" gestures is impossible in the world as 
it is known, or thought.  Though literature can invoke and pre-script such futural unity, 
this project is more interested in those moments that have nothing to do with an 
explicit or thematic desire to say, which I figure here under the notion of fugitive or 
phantom articulacy.  In my consideration of Nathaniel Mackey, I argue for literature's 
re-writing of this utopian longing as a µtopian longing, the pursuit of a home that has 
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never been, and that can never be as such, rooted in the process of writing as a system 
of differences.  The experimental moment, where the inadequacy of literary 
conventions and their limiting presuppositions, is one where the word must be, so to 
speak, rubbed against itself, cracked and pushed to say more than it wants to say, or to 
say the impossibility of saying more.  It is the moment where simply invoking some 
future harmony is either pat, disingenuous, or made beside the point.   
Diaspora proves to be one catachrestic name for that virtuality that can break 
through any concrete state of affairs, the name for a potential rather than possible 
world, the difference being that the latter is based on a calculation performed within 
existing empirical socio-historical conditions, whereas the former is more radically 
immanent, subject to neither calculation nor perspective.  Thinking diaspora as virtual, 
it no longer features as the destiny of an epoch or the fulfillment of divine promise, but 
a project and a process, both of dispersal and re-articulation.  Thought in these terms, 
the concept of diaspora is not relevant only to those who self-identify as belonging to 
it, but is immanent to every articulation of modernity, or of nation, much in the sense 
that Du Bois speaks of the Negro's "message for the world." 
Temporality proves politically central in another sense, insofar as both the 
designation "modern" and the nation itself, broadly conceived, require the formation 
of an administrative class that exercises control to maintain social relations and 
determine the proper use of time, and that authorizes itself to name a time, or epoch 
(e.g., modernity).  This temporality, as has been widely discussed by theorists, rests on 
narratives subtended by the notion of a single, transhistorical subject (e.g., "man," the 
One) on one hand, and the developmental unfolding from a single, uncontaminated 
origin, on the other, thus instituting a chronology of the human species and along 
which peoples are distributed as relatively modern or backwards.  By contrast, the 
thought of diaspora is necessarily rhizomatic, which means not simply opposed to the 
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totalitarian, "arboreal" root, but also positively invested in multiplicity, in refusing to 
dissolve disparate entities into one identity or contra-modernity.  Alongside the fixity 
of identities and their histories one finds an extension of identities through their 
relation, and their ultimate dissolution in the speculative openness to the coming 
future, beyond the narrow present, underwritten by habit and memory.   
Diasporas, often resulting from the involuntary movements of people due to 
forcible expulsion or other existential threats, are not exclusively matters of resistance 
or transnational solidarity.  Diasporas imply a not only a material nomadism but a 
conceptual one, and as such work in at least two ways.  The nomad, the person who 
does not belong to a space always figures a law from elsewhere that threatens the law 
or nomos of the settled land.  The diasporic subject is from both here and there, center 
and margin, marking a point of non-closure that poses unique problems in 
contemporary capitalist modernity.  This is as much to say that though politics may 
proceed from identity in a certain sense, political struggles are the means through 
which identities are broken down and re-formed. 
Nonetheless, most historical narratives of the African diaspora are structured 
around temporal concerns: the struggle over labor time during and immediately 
following slavery; bureaucracy's slowness; the fragmented national time of civil war 
and forced relocations, "modernization," the non-synchronous times separating the 
peasantry from the urban proletariat, claims by the metropole that the colonies are not 
"politically mature" and so on.  In an influential essay,6
                                                 
6 "Afro-Modernity: Temporality, Politics, and the African Diaspora" in Alternative Modernities ed. 
Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar (Durham: Duke University press, 2001), pp. 272-298.  Hereafter cited 
parenthetically in the text as "Afro-Modernity." 
 Michael Hanchard posits three 
essential features that transect both space and time within the diaspora: "the distinctive 
role of history in Afro-Modernity," "inequalities visited on African and African-
descended populations [which] have often been understood temporally, as impositions 
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of human time" and a "temporal understanding of racial and colonial orders [that] in 
turn [have] affected ideas about freedom, progress, and racial solidarity," especially in 
the historical "epochs of slavery, freedom, and emancipation, and in the post-World 
War II period of civil rights, black nationalist and anticolonial movements" ("Afro-
Modernity" 277, emphasis added).  He goes on to elaborate a notion a notion of "racial 
time," which involves the "appropriation" of time" which involves waiting, concern 
with "the ethico-political relationship between temporality and notions of human 
progress," and "time appropriation" a collective action that involves blacks "seizing 
another's time and making it [their] own" ("Afro-Modernity" 285-296).  This event of 
appropriation implies a rhetoric of authenticity that belongs as much to Heidegger as 
to cultural nationalism, despite the differences between them.7
Though, like many other writers and intellectuals across the African diaspora, 
the authors of the present study have articulated alternative histories as a challenge to 
dominant historiographies in order to challenge specific political exclusions or 
elisions, one must be careful not to assume too quickly that this heterodox 
historiography on its own is politically subversive, or that all subversive acts have the 
  Rather than insisting 
on the binaries human/inhuman or self/other in order to proceed to an understanding of 
diaspora as an ideal community that traverses national boundaries, this dissertation 
attempts to rethink community itself as it relates to what I referred to above as 
literariness, a field of multiplicities, of connections and disconnections wherein 
human, inhuman, self and other can be drawn out to a point of indescernibility.   
                                                 
7 The primary difference between the two is one of accent.  The cultural nationalist version of 
authenticity requires self-conscious fidelity to the norms and truths of one's community or culture, to 
which one has a relationship of identity or fundamental sameness, affirmed by one's acts and attitudes.  
In Being and Time, Heidegger's authenticity refers to a first-person self-perception irreducible to a third-
person perspective—that avoids being lost in the 'they'.  The two senses shade into each other precisely 
around the assumption of self-identity, whether of individual or group, and the importance of a self-
understanding outside of any relation.  Appropriation in Hanchard's article is similarly polyvocal, 
invoking at once an act whereby something like the "means of culturo-temporal production" are seized 
and repurposed, and to the event of that appropriation, which Heidegger called Ereignis.  
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same effectivity.  From my point of view, the value of such acts of ludic subversion is 
to refuse the givenness of the past by demonstrating the past not merely as 
representation, but as presentation, with its own risks and challenges.  Returning to the 
work of Du Bois and his conception of double-consciousness, I draw out the 
conclusions of this non-synchronism, which puts time at the center of questions of the 
political not just as the "object" at the center of concrete political struggles under 
modernity (e.g., concerns over labor-time, due process, and false imprisonment among 
others) but also at the level of the concept of the political, as a central problem for the 
thought—and construction—of racial and other difference.  It is in this sense that I 
refer to a poetics of time—acts of staging time as time unsubordinated to other 
concerns, such as history, and of thus a reworking of the relationship of past, present 
and future.  
Time has another meaning.  Implicitly subtending the concerns of this 
dissertation and experimental poetics more generally is the question of innovation or, 
as the problem is often posed within the writing, of renovation.  Discourses of the new 
occupy two primary discursive levels.  On the one hand, there is concern for newness 
at the level of literary form.  In these discourses, newness breaks through as a 
"definitive break," a deliberately strange use of language that might effect a transition, 
citing Wittgenstein again, from one "language game" or way of using language to 
another, wherein neither author nor reader may initially know his or her way about.  
At this level, my specific inquiries into temporality concern techniques (e.g., the 
baroque or bricolage) wherein dead forms and dead language are rearranged and 
reconfigured to provoke new meanings and new ways of thinking.  Here, the question 
is not one of better or more accurate representation or mimesis, but with the limits of 
organization, tumult, restlessness, in a word the production of new metaphors, 
literature's capacity to bring about a genuine surprise or shock.  Formal 
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experimentation thus opens out to a future as a formal possibility, a multiple futurity 
filled with the unactualized virtualities of this present and other unactualized presents.  
Within this literature, on the other hand, one finds concern for the Event, the 
new as a non-repeatable singularity that escapes present determinations and 
articulations.  One thinks, for example, of Fanon's use of the term "national 
consciousness" in The Wretched of the Earth as a figure for thinking together the 
peoples of Vietnam, Cuba, and other nations undergoing anti-colonial struggle, which 
is always already transnational.  The "native" peoples of the colonies become 
"nationalized" as a result of their resistance to colonial power and through their mutual 
awareness of other sites of struggle.  In this way, "struggle" becomes a sign of 
simultaneity in Fanon's text, linking disparate peoples despite, or even because of their 
difference from one another, much as within a single site anticolonial struggle takes 
different, even contradictory forms depending on the class or group interests.  
"National consciousness," then, like Dien Bien Phu throughout his text, is catachrestic: 
it attempts to name for the future an impossible political organization needed in the 
present.  In other words, it attempts to capture the impossible moment of the event, 
stipulating that this should serve as a model for other revolutionaries even as Wretched 
anticipates and asks 'when did it start to go wrong?'  Implicitly, the question is whether 
the future will come as a repetition of the past, Implicitly, the question is whether the 
future will come as a repetition of the past, "the second time as farce" as Marx puts it 
in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon.  Fanon's analysis makes clear that 
mere repetition—copying or duplicating the strategies of the Vietcong—will neither 
be practically sufficient because of historically specific factors and geographical 
terrain, nor theoretically sufficient.  The new, the event, emerges as a problem in its 
own right, not a question of self-differentiation of some community from capitalist 
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modernity, but a more general question of difference for itself, related to a question of 
repetition. 
The example of Fanon demonstrates two things, which are central concerns of 
this dissertation.  The first, already mentioned, is the problem of the non-synchronicity 
or non-contemporaneity of the contemporaneous.  Merely sharing a common horizon 
of biological time does not guarantee a common good or being-together, even within a 
particular site, even among peoples who putatively share a common identity.  His 
analysis of the urban proletariat versus the rural peasantry demonstrates that, and one 
could go further and stipulate that similar divisions disrupt or short-circuit the self-
identity of those two groups.  Defined in terms of their transhistorical class interests, 
they act according to irrational desire on whose basis they divide themselves into 
groups, even as these contradict their supposedly objective interests.  Thus, 
articulating and maintaining a people is always a problem for politics, since that unity 
cannot be presumed in advance.  Anti-colonial struggle is both punctual and ongoing, 
must be considered plural rather than singular—the mere irruption of decolonizing 
desire, the mere seizure of the apparatuses of the state, are not sufficient on their own 
to effect decolonization itself, which is a process.   
Implicitly, Fanon inverts Marx's temporal ordering that proceeds from tragedy 
to farce without ever abandoning the figure of theatricality.  The decolonial rupture, 
"the farce of national independence," plays on some defect in the mode of the past, in 
the articulations of the past that have actively suppressed the violence of their own 
coming to be and maintenance.  The initial agents of decolonization step outside of 
that time, as it were, not into the time of another through an act of appropriation, but 
into some unknown time.  They disrupt the habits by which the quotidian present 
passively presumes its place between a singular past and future as the repetition of the 
former and the anticipation of the latter.  Their interruption is incomplete however, 
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which leads to a second moment of metamorphosis, a tragic repetition in the form of 
ressentiments and retrenchments, follows; new revolutionary agents find themselves 
unprepared, facing an act too large for them.  "The peasant masses latch onto every 
word and without hesitation ask them a question for which they are not prepared: 
'When do we start?'"8
These "syntheses" of time
  The revolutionaries, not properly a class, present a challenge to 
the new postcolonial leadership on the basis of memory.  Ambivalent terms of 
identification and filiation ("We the blacks, we the Arabs") receive a "sort of 
sacralization" based on the past.  Insofar as, for Fanon, this past is not to be valued in 
itself as an instant of pre-colonial or indigenous culture or epistemology, this past 
must be understood in its most abstract, unattenuated form, as a formal condition for 
the passage of one moment and the arrival of another.  This points to a third repetition 
that Fanon adds to Marx's theatrical schema: the revolutionary moment itself, in which 
the present is nothing more than that which is to be effaced—an opening to the future 
which necessarily excludes the present and dissolves the identities of its agents.  This 
repetition affirms the unconditioned character of the time produced in relation to the 
means of its production, and avoids the arrogance of the initial leaders of national 
independence by asserting the independence of that new time in relation to those most 
responsible for bringing it about.  This is the Event, a differentiating instant that 
shatters the One, the essence, while re-opening onto the multiplicity of a given 
moment or formation.   
9
                                                 
8 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth Trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2005), 27.  
Translation of Les Damnés de la Terre (Paris: François Maspero, 1961), 51.  Translation modified. 
9 I draw this formulation of time as synthetic from the work of Gilles Deleuze, who makes similar 
arguments regarding repetition in Marx's Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon in his elaboration of a 
philosophy of difference.  See Difference and Repetition trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994), pp. 91-96. 
—habit, memory, and a third repetition as the 
Event—subtend this dissertation's elaborations of theatricality.  As I mentioned, the 
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revolutionary for Fanon is not a fixed class or even a self-identical agent.  This is 
especially true following the event of revolution itself, in which all identities are 
dissolved.  The role of revolutionary is, fundamentally, a kind of mask in a larger 
political theatre, a mask that has other functions and performs tasks beyond those of 
the agent him or herself.  The same is true for the terms "blacks" and "Arabs," which 
are irreducible to their historical or immediate meanings in a given social order—the 
unattenuated past that gives these their force is not to be confused with history.   
Likewise, theatricality in my analysis is not reducible to the specific histories 
of the stage, despite the importance of the theater to literature throughout the diaspora 
and postcolonial world.  The concept here concerns presentation rather than 
representation, considering the ways literature develops its own problems or asks 
questions through juxtaposition, elision, deictics, and so on.  Theatricality is a means 
of keeping alive the question of poiesis, of how literature works rather than what it 
means, of avoiding a necessary link between figures in the literary text and figures in 
the world at large.  Further, it provides a lever through which to think the work apart 
from its author, to imagine the author him or herself as another reader.  It isn't that 
questions of representation go away—one must ask, after all, what role a given mask 
or theatrical element plays—but these are no longer the primary or most urgent 
political question.  From the vantage point of theatricality, one can ask questions about 
the status of performance, especially music, understood to have semiotic value within 
a larger field of representation.  Theatricality keeps the question of meaning at a 
distance, allowing a more fundamental interrogation into the literariness of literature—
an expressivity that does not presuppose successful expression as communication—
and an elaboration of the specific questions and problems it poses. 
Another primary pathway of interrogation for "After the End of the World" is 
erotics, which here is not reducible to a dyadic or Oedipal structure.  Instead, it 
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invokes a method, a more supple sense of relation, of possible relations, broken 
relations, chance encounters, and in a word, desire.  The erotic does not name the same 
thing as desire in the sense I have used the term throughout this introduction, but 
rather names a specific modality of desire related to the syntheses of time invoked 
above, whereby pieces of the past can crystallize and resurface involuntarily.  It 
specifies the non-coincidence of the agents of the past, of memory, and the unknown 
being of the agent in the Event.  On the one hand, the erotic figures a being-otherwise, 
or a being outside oneself.  It is a nomadic figure, the catachrestic name for those 
flows, drifts, rearrangements of actors within theatrical space broadly conceived, and 
an openness to what breaks through involuntarily, as a surprise: memory, fancy, 
fixations, the obscure nomos of exile and errantry.  On the other hand, it names that 
through which selves are oriented towards a community, or distributed in an audience 
that is not reducible to One.  Community does not take the form of a singular entity or 
common identity, but a constant movement of differentiation and reconfiguration.  
From this vantage point, my project speaks to utopia or community as an active 
project, if not projection. 
 
"After the End of the World" is divided into four chapters.  The first chapter, " 
Voices Cast Out: Beauty, Voice and the Temporality of Double-Consciousness" treats 
double-consciousness and the related notion of the veil and as fundamentally temporal 
concepts related to the time of transmission, and reading.  Rather than expression, the 
expression of one subject to another, the structure of Du Bois' writing in Souls of 
Black Folk and elsewhere turns around what is not said, moments of theatrical silence.  
It opens with three silences: Du Bois' refusal to answer an unasked question—"How 
does it feel to be a problem"—and a woman's refusal of his visiting-card "with a 
glance."  Throughout later writers, he invokes this putative originary scene under 
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similar silence, saying only that he has already addressed it.  Through a careful the 
opening chapters of Souls I argue that double-consciousness—understood to be the 
impossibility of a subject present-to-itself without a social network that precedes it—is 
the condition of possibility for any experience (or, for reasons I will discuss below, 
narrative), rather than as a heuristic for thinking about experience.  In other words, 
double-consciousness does not refer to the disruption of self-consciousness for black 
people, but obtains in experience as its pre-condition, taking the specific form of a 
non-synchronism such that identities that come about only after the formation of a 
nature are then retroactively understood to have preceded that formation and to 
explain current conditions.  Double-consciousness necessarily interrupts the frames of 
testimony and expression, revealing an unsuturable rift in the scene of 
discourse.  Through such conceptual reorientations and a careful consideration of Du 
Bois' relationship to autobiography and the historical, I articulate the relationship 
between politics and both poetics and reading.  I go on to consider Du Bois' enigmatic 
essay "The Criteria of Negro Art" and his argument that art has the responsibility to 
"let this world be beautiful," which makes Beauty itself redemptive, a demand that 
cannot be fulfilled as such.  The chapter ends with a consideration of the status of the 
musical bars that serve as epigraphs in Souls and epigraphs in Color and Democracy 
as Du Bois' most audacious opening of his text beyond the form of the book, and 
beyond textuality.  With them, he articulates a graphism that is not reducible to the 
representation or recording of speech or thought.  The sheet music, I argue, functions 
as an invitation to community, forwarding a notion of readership that demands active 
participation in the construction of meaning rather than passive absorption. 
 Chapter Two, "Exploding Dimensions of Song: Fugitive Articulacy and Mu-
Topia," considers Nathaniel Mackey's ongoing serial poem The Song of the 
Andoumboulou and his related novel project, From a Broken Bottle Traces of Perfume 
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Still Emanate, both of which further interrogate the relationship between music and 
writing.  For Mackey, this relationship refers both to music referenced (or described) 
on the written page and to poetry recited with musicians.  Arguing that serialism and 
the repetitions and re-staging it implies challenge conceptions of the art object, 
analyze his ongoing serial novel From a Broken Bottle Traces of Perfume Still 
Emanate.  I elaborate the celebrated notions of "the cut" (a reference to rhythm and 
time keeping in reggae) and post-expectancy (the discrepancy between the present and 
the dreams of the past that imagined this chronological present) as chrono-philosophy, 
using these concepts as a heuristic for considering the interplay of the semantic and 
the syntactic in Mackey's writing.  This play, along with the shifting subjective loci of 
the two series (which disrupt traditional lyric's organization of poetic experience) 
leads me to conceptualize what I call μtopia (mu-topia).  Mu-topia is a figure for the 
interaction present and past, mythic and historical, dreamed and real, rendering 
identity in general and subjectivity in particular permeable.  Through the figure of 
μtopia, time proves to be a discontinuous series of experiences linked not through the 
persistence of a subject but through reference to history, which is represented as 
unfinished.  In both the verse and the prose, the generative force of inscription 
constantly opens and troubles the representation of subjectivity.  Likewise, the prose 
series' epistolary structure, like the insistence on records and the temporal dilation of 
the novel's structure, augments the insistence on specific historical referent, illustrating 
the productive limits of history making in the present.   
 Considering reference to historical events and previously published works to 
be a fruitful line of inquiry, my third chapter, "The Then that Will Be: The Work of 
Dead Time and the Problem of Reference," concerns the work of playwright, 
screenwriter and novelist Suzan-Lori Parks.  Heeding her frustration the "no one asks 
me about form," I read those moments of indeterminate or "dead" time, the gap 
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between phenomenon and writing that in her work takes the specific form of Rests or 
Spells, curiously unmarked moments accompanied by no other stage direction—that 
structure one level of time in her works.10
"Words to Refashion Futures: Iconicity, Fragmentation and the Plural Instant" 
the fourth and final chapter, considers the role formal experimentation plays in the 
work of Barbadian poet Kamau Brathwaite, paying special attention to the interplay 
between verbal play and the material presentation of writing.  I devote the bulk of the 
  Reading Imperceptible Mutabilities in the 
Third Kingdom and Venus, I go on to consider the effects of her reference to historical 
events, from the Middle Passage to the life of Saartjie Baartman, the "Hottentot 
Venus," which often irrupt in her plays as text, taking the form of staged "footnotes" 
or performed by the chorus.  These citations, pointing to the unthought within our 
thinking about history, problematize those readings that would accede immediately to 
the "African American Tradition" or "Experience," extending a critique of 
representation already found in Du Bois.  Parks challenges the notions of tradition and 
experience in her theoretical writing.  Her experimentation at once acknowledges the 
demands of history and refuses to grant it final authority, making visible the 
manipulations that form history, and the misfit between the people named in the 
historical account and those who might bear those names in the present.  In her work, 
character becomes a platform for thinking identity a process of self-differentiation, its 
ambivalent location between overdetermination from without by social forces, in 
Fanon's phrase, and overdetermination from within.  Alongside her penchant for 
motivating the inexhaustible energies of language and theatricality, Parks' historical 
tableaux inscribe the endless requirement to rethink community. 
                                                 
10 I draw the concept of "dead time" from the work of Derrida who writes, in an early articulation of the 
notion of spacing, "Arche-writing as spacing cannot occur as such within the phenomenological 
experience of a presence.  It marks the dead time within the presence of the living present, within the 
general form of presence.  The dead time is at work."  See Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 68. 
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chapter to his recent Sycorax Video Style, an assemblage of variable fonts, unusual 
page layout, interpolation of previously published materials (both Brathwaite's and 
"found" materialss) and orthographic variation whose look he develops using an 
"outmoded" Macintosh computer.  Brathwaite's poetry, like Du Bois' writing, insists 
on an autobiographical "I," which is constantly undermined by the disruptions of 
semantic meaning the graphemes—the literal marks on the page—enable.  Through 
dilation, ellipsis, caesurae and montagic juxtapositions that break the habitual links 
between moments, Brathwaite's work creates at once a sense of semantic and other 
drift separate from explicit reference to migrations or diaspora and a tactile sense of 
time.  One has in his work both a poetics of keeping time, the necessity of thinking 
fragmentation alongside questions of the formation of a people, and a bracing 
openness to the future.   
Throughout "After the End of the World," I argue that literature does not 
merely express or reflect its time, but thinks in its time, the time that has preceded it, 
and the undetermined time still to come.  In the spirit of the explicit concerns of 
history and the world to come, this dissertation takes time as its central problematic.  
We must be concerned with the specific historical situations—which are never simple, 
but always overlain with multiple, contradictory desires and multiple spaces of 
enunciation for any individual author or group of authors who collaborate.  But if 
literature is not merely expressive of its milieu, neither is it expressive of the identity 
(or identities) of its author.  Because literature tends to construct shared pasts and 
projected communal futures alongside other problems "native" to it, this dissertation 
operates from the level of poetics—the construction itself.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
VOICES CAST OUT: BEAUTY, VOICE AND THE TEMPORALITY OF 
DOUBLE-CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
Life after life each like it 
 was endlessly yet  
to arrive yet 
  already there…  
–Nathaniel Mackey 
 
Voice and Writing 
Minority literatures tend to be considered in terms of voice—finding a voice, 
or giving voice to the struggles of a people or one's negotiations of identity. The 
literary text is taken as testimony, a memorialization or sounding of the voice, 
metonymically the voice of a–or the—people.  Found voice symbolizes a more general 
voice, the collective voice of shared strivings: it doubles and doubles back on the flow 
of voices from which it is drawn.  The individual voice, understood as a function of a 
more general voice, becomes an iteration of the tradition handed down to it, its 
iteration the vehicle of that handing down.  In this way, contradictions or internal 
differentiations, including those immanent to the "voice," become minor moments of a 
larger dialectic of identity and tradition formation.  These authors—and this is not 
only true for African American and diasporic literature—are read, as it were, through 
an obligatory "grid" or schema of tradition, of historically determined (and 
determinant) identity as a necessary interpretant for literary and cultural productions.   
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In focusing on the language of literature—its semantics or thematics, which 
are most determined by particular historical circumstances and formations—or its 
referential function—that which is most constitutive of historiographies that are in turn 
inscribed within an understanding of history as their horizon of intelligibility—we 
read too quickly.  We avoid or defer the question of the literary in the name of a more 
urgent politics, rarely pausing to think the connections between literature, reduced to a 
singular sense, and politics.  In a word, we start from universals at the precise moment 
when we are most interested in dealing with particularities, with difference.  Focusing 
on poetics or style—which exist in time but cannot be fully explained at the level of 
historical time, or at the level of biological time as we understand it—we can think of 
literature as practice, as a way of thinking and acting in the world.  Insofar as poetics 
describes the working of the work of literature, it is the site of literature's opening 
meaning—references, themes, semantics—to time, to a time beyond or apart from 
itself.  Attention to poetics reveals seams, moments of disfigurations; we catch those 
moments where, for example, identity forms and deforms itself.  Above all, it keeps 
awake to the difficulties, and responsibilities, posed by reading.  Thus, rather than 
attending to the voice as an established fact and locating it within a given historical 
formation, we can do the opposite: attend the construction or birth of voice as style, as 
a sensuous aspect that the text does not have but strains toward, then consider 
historical or political categories in light of the contours of the text or voice. 
However, we also must ask in what is the voice of literature, and in what sense 
it is possible to have a voice.  Who can have one, and why must we conceive of there 
being only one?  The temporality of voicing—where one "finds" or "invents" a voice 
that is one's own, that retroactively produces a self as one's own—suggests that 
selfhood itself is an effect of this transmission.  The voice, as symbolic value, is 
always already inscribed in a network of meanings, though this 'voice' is not the voice, 
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not "as such."  To raise the question of the voice more generally, or the acts or 
practices of voicing without that voice secretly being merely additional content, we 
must interrogate the moment of listening, or anticipated listening.  We must ask who 
listens, and above all what it might mean to listen.  One—let us not yet speak of a 
subject—has no sooner "found" a voice than one must send it out, transmit it without 
knowing how or if it will be received.  In this sense, the voice never belongs to the one 
who uses the voice, but is part of a structure of address.  Simultaneously, this 
grammatical "one" is the residue of this given voice.  The voice is not found for the 
self, but for other selves; at the moment of its transmission, which is its only modality 
of its being, the voice is neither of/from the self nor not of/from the self.  It is ecstatic: 
it speaks to distance.   
Reflecting a history of African American literary theory, we can refer to this 
transmission as a call.  Here, the call is conceived not as a mode of bringing the self 
back to itself, but a dispersal of the self in the voice, the translocation of the voice to 
other locales where it may not be received, and will not be received "as such."  Again 
resisting the lure of the voice as content, this dispersal is not, strictly speaking, a 
matter of intention.  It is the aspirant call that awaits or anticipates a response, without 
there being presumed any present person who waits.  Considering the voice as sound, 
as sound that exceeds or defers communication, there is not a question of selfhood or 
expression, but rather of impartibility, a desire to share or to transmit itself, and in that 
transmission to exceed itself.   
In literature, the voice, if there is one, must be seen as an iteration—at once a 
repetition and a renewal—of some "one" that does not precede but follows from that 
voice.  If inscription is a primary technology for "finding" the voice, and by extension 
a self and an identity, the experimental text that moves through a series of "voices," 
genres, modes and discourses.  The contradictory impulses or strivings of "voices" at 
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odds with each other, clamoring one over the other to be "heard," provides an occasion 
for considering vocality, for imagining the scene of listening, or reading, as anticipated 
in the production of the text.  To hear, to say one has heard, amounts to more than 
having operated according to a certain attunement of listening or transcoding—
"hearing" according to conventions that shape the contours of sound into sense.  
Beyond this sense as sensible, hearing entails the affection of one body by another, an 
intimate touch of the inner ear, beyond anticipation.  I can say that I expect to hear 
such and such notes on a musical recording, or to hear jackhammers at a certain 
intersection, but I can say nothing specific about the experience of that hearing, in 
anticipation or recollection.  
 As metaphor (e.g., "finding one's voice"), the voice in literature opens not only 
onto a question of representation, but onto related questions regarding the 
authorization to represent, and the relation between the act of representation, the 
representer and the represented, and the scene of listening or hearing, the impressions 
of sound.  Voice, rather than being the sign or guarantee of a speaker becomes another 
prop in a larger theatrical scene, a mode of putting in scene and enacting, of staging 
and the conventions through which the staged metonymically displaces its putative 
referent.  Representation is a kind of "language game," a way of using language within 
certain limits which are revealed when we ask about its fidelity or consistency, or 
about the priority of an original over the copy.  This particular "game" encodes 
mechanisms and conventions for filtering out that which does not that which does not 
fit the frame or transmission.  There is always an interval of condensation or 
transcription; the production of identities entails multiple, related acts of naming and 
renaming, and thus the suppression of difference required to make a concept or Idea, 
which then becomes the referent of representation, the subject of the voice.  From this 
perspective it is clear: representation refers not to things "in the world," but to prior 
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inscriptions.  This is as much as to say representation, understood as a perspicuous 
correspondence between sensuous or non-sensuous objects in the world, is impossible.  
It happens as an act or mode of reading, of closing off possibilities of reading in order 
to produce meaning at the expense of the sensuous experience of the work, and its 
complexities.  However, the work of literature is not exhausted in its referential or 
indexical function.  The voice, in the expanded sense of the term that remains attentive 
to the projected scene of listening, is one name for that which breaks the frame of 
reference, shattering it with a force that is not its own: a power, as it were, that stands 
against Power.   
To begin to apprehend literary voice in this sense, as dispersal and anticipated 
sounding or resonance, we need neither an anthropology of reading or hearing nor a 
sociology of literature or of sound to describe the encoded values of the text or access, 
both of which rely on an abstraction: the reader, the listener.  What is needed is a 
concept of the voice, a thinking of voice that does not take it for granted either as a 
given or as immediate.  Insofar as it relates to any possible voicing, the work of W. E. 
B. Du Bois, and especially his early conceptualizations of double-consciousness and 
the Veil provide a necessary example through which to think the place of the literary, 
and 'representation' as both a political and literary problem.  To the extent that we read 
subjective consciousness as Du Bois' primary concern—in a line supposed to follow 
without pause or aporia from the Hegelian dialectic of recognition to the historic-
political subject—we miss the most radical kernel of his thinking.  As I will argue, this 
thinking concerns the partition of time, and the limits of a given social formation, the 
conditions and for subjectivity and its undoing in and through listening, and reading.  
Closely reading his texts—especially The Souls of Black Folk—I consider the function 
of silence or refused speech (rather than the suppressed or unheard voice), both within 
his writing and as an effect of his writing as an index of what could not (or cannot) be 
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"voiced" or thought, but still resonates from the initial sounding.  Of particular 
importance in this regard will be a critical re-reading of Du Bois' formulations of 
double-consciousness as a temporal concept—rather than historical fact—and of the 
privilege he gives to writing.  Following his program of "patient reading" with 
attention to the poetics of his text, political concepts emerge thinking apart from those 
defined by representation or the immediate social context.  Du Bois' does not 
emphasize "finding a voice"—intimately linked to "denying a voice" to that difference 
within the same—so much as the scene of listening, and those ecstatic moments where 
the "voice" is liberated from its referential or representational functions to affect some 
imagined receivers who are constituted as a people, or a community.  Du Bois' name 
for this affection is Beauty. 
Discussing his pre- and interwar activities in Dusk of Dawn, Du Bois writes 
that "it had always been [his] intention to write," and "to seek through the written 
word the expression of my relation to the world and of the world to me."11
                                                 
11 Dusk of Dawn: An Essay Toward an Autobiography of a Race Concept (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 2005), 238.  Hereafter cited parenthetically in the text as Dusk. 
  This is 
more than an incidental chiasmus.  It indicates, on the one hand, that any such relation 
is not automatic, or automatically guaranteed; such relation, while constitutive, is not 
necessarily reciprocal.  On the other hand, it privileges writing—his long ambition—
as his primary mode for thinking, rather than expressing, that relation.  Expression 
becomes the end result, the object, rather than the means.  In what follows, I argue that 
representation for Du Bois is a problem immanent to the structure of the text, and that 
his collage-form text, blending the modes of autobiography, sociology, history, and 
fiction in a densely layered, allusive text is the opening of a rethinking of the 
categories of identity, nation, and so on.  Simultaneously, I consider the ways literary 
form complements and extends his arguments.  Careful attention to his writing as 
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medium will reveal the representation's impossibility, and suggest pathways for 
rethinking the relationship between art and politics, for reimagining both the "strange 
meaning of being black" (refusing any single definition or "black experience") and the 
dawning of the twentieth, now twenty-first, century.  
Promissory Note: An Account of the Self 
In his Autobiography, Du Bois refers to The Souls of Black Folk as 
"memorandum of [his] 25th birthday."12  Simultaneously an injunction to remember 
and an informal inscription of memory, a memory aid that, as such, aids forgetting, 
"memorandum" is an ideal term for this collection—thirteen essays and one allegorical 
short story published as a book in 1903, nine pieces having been previously published 
as early as 1897.  The topics range from his experiences as a teacher in Tennessee, a 
traveler and anthropologist in Georgia, a young man in New England, and so on, with 
these experiences serving as examples through which the "strange meaning of being 
black" might be learned and imparted.  Privileging the essay form, Du Bois does not 
make his observations or revisions responsible for unearthing "timeless truths" (of 
blackness), but rather makes the "transitory eternal" by presenting the transitory, the 
already passed, in the form of a demand.13
The essay is both of its moment and, through the objects it chooses, attempts to 
transcend its moment.  The individual essay, often occasional, relates to the others 
with which it is collected, even when collected in a contingent fashion, reaching after 
understanding it does not have.  The essay is exploratory, produces knowledge, true to 
the literal meaning of its name.  In this way, the essay is the ideal form for the patient 
   
                                                 
12 The Autobiography of W.E.B. Du Bois: A Soliloquy on Viewing My Life from the Last Decade of its 
First Century (Canada: International Publishers Co., Inc., 1968), 13.  Hereafter cited parenthetically in 
the text as Autobiography. 
13 I am drawing here on Theodor Adorno, "The Essay as Form" trans. Bob Hullot-Kentor and Frederic 
Will, New German Critique,No. 32, (Spring - Summer, 1984), 159. 
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study Du Bois calls for in his Forethought.14
It does not seem accidental that he would place authors responsible for 
producing the "cultural treasures" of Western literary culture alongside the "haunting 
melodies" of the "Sorrow Songs."  Indeed, the consistent citations and allusions not 
only supplement his self-professed indifference to mere "meticulous and fastidious 
phrases," but also introduce a notion of bricolage and spectral inheritance, the 
obligation to pay "tributes to Beauty".  No doubt, to claim one "sit[s] with 
  For collection and republication as a 
book, Du Bois added graphic reproductions of sheet music of the antebellum "Sorrow 
Songs" (figuring "echo[es] of haunting melody from the only American music which 
welled up from black souls in the dark past").  He paired these with epigraphic 
citations from the Bible, Goethe, Schiller, Byron, Browning and other figures of a 
legibly "white" European and American tradition (save the final essay, "On the Sorrow 
Songs," which was added upon publisher's request and has as its verbal epigraph lyrics 
from "When I Lay My Body Down").  On the one hand, these juxtapositions can be 
read, facilely, as performing the "two warring ideals in one dark body" Du Bois 
describes as the condition of the Negro in America, offering a model of synthesis or 
syncretism (one that would stop short, however, of showing the mutual co-constitution 
his text otherwise implies).  One may also read these epigraphs (and similar allusions 
throughout the text of the essays) as producing a kind of uncanny doubling that does 
not so much make the so-called Western tradition "speak from the margins" as point to 
the quixotic nature of the quest for "one's own voice," the debt one's originality owes 
to that which has preceded him or her, those "traditions handed down as second-hand 
soul clothes."   
                                                 
14 Though I am following Adorno's distinction between the essay and the scientific treatise, in Du Bois' 
essayistic endeavors it is important to remember his commitment to producing a body of knowledge.  
As he writes in his Autobiography, "people are thinking wrong about race because they do not know," 
with the implication being that "The Negro Problem was… a matter of systematic investigation and 
intelligent understanding," and pedagogy (Autobiography 197). 
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Shakespeare" confers value onto Shakespeare, while in the same gesture declaring 
oneself—an unexpected black "guest"—to be heir and custodian of that culture.  At 
the same time, rather than suggesting subordination to that tradition, this imagined 
encounter further implies that an exchange takes place, that as one takes from 
Shakespeare, one gives to him.  Thus, Du Bois' gesture is not mere "mimicry" of 
Western tradition in the sense of repetition or aesthetic semblance, but a critical, 
performative enactment of tradition, a reiteration of tradition that self-consciously uses 
the non-self-identity of any tradition, the constitutive openness of tradition.  This 
"openness," though multidirectional, is not reciprocal; the relation between two 
traditions, or rather the non-relation that results in the articulation of two distinct 
traditions, is subtended by material relations of exploitation, domination, and 
alienation.  These epigraphs and allusions are more than Du Bois' attempt to inscribe 
his writing within a tradition, or make the observation that the hands of marginalized 
"darker peoples of the world" helped construct that tradition directly and indirectly 
through the free time their un-free labor allowed the nascent middle-class for study 
and writing.  They also mark, as it were, a kind of debt, or a line of credit—these 
things "are not without interest for you."15
This "credit" is not some contingent power or recognition granted by an 
autonomous, fully formed subject to another autonomous fully formed subject, but 
rather is another name for the recognition that one gives to the other in order that s/he 
may have self-consciousness at all.  The "Western Tradition" is treated as if it were 
self-evident and obvious, but also open, and illimitable: it is expanded to include the 
broadest possible range of influences, the broadest possible range of directions.  
"Western Tradition," then, is at once treated as simultaneously extensive—circulating 
  
                                                 
15 Du Bois, Writings ed. Nathan Huggins (New York: The Library of America, 1986), 359.  Emphasis 
added.  Hereafter cited parenthetically in the text as Writings.    
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through certain texts and proper names—and intensive, naming a potentiality yet to be 
realized in any of its works.  If Du Bois sits with Shakespeare, Balzac, Dumas, et al., 
then those people also sit with Du Bois on the basis that each lends identity to the 
other as the implicit "co-signer."  The epigraphs draw attention to this previousness, 
this pre-original contamination that makes a singular, pure origin impossible, and all 
claims to such origin attenuated by the encounters with alterity that spur the creative 
act.  Through this contamination and the specificity of the historical situation Du Bois 
is concerned with, the Euro-American tradition becomes "universal," unless that 
universality be thought in light of the veil, and thus name an impure subject, 
determined as it determines, thought as it thinks.  Du Bois' claim to "sit with" 
emblematic figures of European modernity draws attention to that imprecise, never 
present moment called "beginning" with regard to the work of art, striking at the heart 
of questions of "originality." 
Rather than insist on the provenance of the literature, its belonging to a "white" 
tradition being subverted or opened up by bring brought into contact with the abjected 
or disinherited, a question is opened about the use of literature at all, and the schemas 
through which presumably distinct literary traditions emerge. In Darkwater,16
                                                 
16 Darkwater: Voices Within the Veil (New York: Washington Square Press, 2004),  xxiii.  Hereafter 
cited parenthetically in the text as DW. 
 Du Bois 
"experiments" with "little alightings of what may be poetry," which he calls "tributes 
to Beauty."  In Dusk of Dawn, after he calls "the development of literature and art 
among Negroes through [their] own writing" as "an old ideal and ambition," he 
continues to draw on literature and music as figures for thought, using musical 
citations as postscripts in his Color and Democracy (Dusk 268).  For Du Bois, who 
eventually assigns art the task to "Let this world be Beautiful," Beauty is redemptive, 
an inexhaustible demand that initiates but cannot be fulfilled as such.  Literature, 
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insofar as it privileges a density of references and meanings (rhetorical, semantic), 
offers a space where transformations may be pre-figured, re-figured, or promised.  In 
Du Bois' hands, literature exposes readers to crises—those historical crises on the 
level of events that it represents, and the crises of representation, the 
expressionlessness of the veil itself: it cannot be spoken, but it is that without which 
one cannot speak.   
We return to questions of speaking, of not speaking or refusing to speak, now 
through the visual metaphor of the Veil.  In order to fully grasp the complexity of this 
set of concerns, it will be helpful to consider the status of the autobiographical—of Du 
Bois' irruptive "I"—within his formulations, as a particularly literary problem of his 
thinking.  Insofar as double-consciousness names a temporal structure involved in any 
auto-poiesis and any account of the self, such accounts have a special status in the 
elaboration of the concept, both of double consciousness and of what Du Bois will 
later call his "race concept."  An anthology of previously published essays, Souls self-
consciously negotiates the norms and conventions through which it will become 
legible as unified text, a book, even at the expense of political clarity or consistency.  
Through its varied modes of writing, the text stages the slippages and asymmetries 
between the particularity of individual lives (including Du Bois' own) and the general 
plight of blacks who find themselves a particular instance of the general condition of 
the "darker peoples of the world."  The primary means through which this prismatic 
schema achieves coherence is through the rhetorical figure of prosopopeia, the logic of 
which retroactively creates the presence of the one absent or, as is directly referenced 
in Souls, dead.  Death in Souls is accumulative, self-reproducing, irruptive, and 
ubiquitous, showing itself in the scene of autobiography, heightening the tension 
implicit in the logic of representation so that if Du Bois represents the folk, they 
represent him as well. 
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Part of the difficulty of this "race concept" is race's tendency to congeal into "a 
matter of unreasoning resentment," an over-identification with one's own 
autobiography as globally true about the race with which one identifies (Dusk 132).  
If, following De Man, autobiography is "a figure of reading or of understanding that 
occurs, to some degree, in all texts" whose moment "happens as an alignment between 
the two subjects involved in the process of reading in which they determine each other 
by mutual reflexive substitution," then the process Du Bois describes is one in which 
the "specular structure is interiorized," without the author being able to declare him or 
herself "the subject of his own understanding."17
                                                 
17 Paul De Man "Autobiography as De-Facement" (MLN, Vol. 94, No. 5, (December., 1979), 921.  Also 
relevant is his prior observation: "We assume that life produces the autobiography as an act produces its 
consequences, but can we not suggest, with equal justice, that the autobiographical project may itself 
produce and determine the life and that whatever the writer does is in fact governed by the technical 
demands of self-portraiture and this determined in all its aspects, by the resources of his medium" 
(920)?  Hereafter cited parenthetically in the text as "De-Facement."   
  Insofar as the autobiographical "I" is 
prosopopoeiac, referring at different times to Du Bois and the eponymous black folk, 
its identity is deferred even as it is presented as if it were stable or self-evident; the 
effect becomes the cause.  The instability of reference here—the vacillation between 
metonymic and synecdochical, between contingent and transcendent example, is the 
crux of the political problem Du Bois confronts us with.  Reading the autobiographical 
instances throughout Du Bois' writing reveals the deferred fixing of the identity of 
those souls and the self-referential author, and, by extension, avoids fixing the 
"strange meaning" of blackness.  Such "meaning"—which shifts over time—suggests 
that though "the Negro" is treated as a given, it is only ever a potential value (without 
being merely "pure" or "empty" form or potentiality).  This meaning is always 
produced for and within a community of language users, despite the ways in which the 
English language leads one to assume a fixed and stable referent for each word.  The 
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requirement of patience modifying the activity and pacing of reading suggests the 
need for theoretically endless re-reading. 
While autobiographical reading preserves the importance of writing to Du 
Bois' project, it is slightly misleading, as it implies a myth of interiority.  However, 
here I would like to re-orient the terms of the discussion to ask about the status of Du 
Bois' autobiographical example.  His writing may be thought of as a work of critical 
poiesis, through which the norms and conventions that govern his recognizability on 
"either side of the Veil" can be limned, brought out "into the open."  Because of the 
reversibility whereby Du Bois represents others as much as he is represented by them, 
the "self" of autobiography is generalized; it becomes an empty site of articulation, an 
absent or aporetic cause, a structure of potential and composite life—the Negro 
appears ex negativo, as an absence that "presents" itself by "being" absent, as caesura 
or syncope.  This syncope is always before the rhetorical subject of his writing as its 
groundless authorization, an unsettled and unsettling question that makes readers 
responsible for the "strange meaning of being black here in the dawning of the 
Twentieth Century."  These readers include Du Bois himself:  "I pray you, then, 
receive my little book in all charity, studying my words with me…" (Writings 359, 
emphasis added).  Positioning himself as a reader of his own text and as a part of his 
project links Du Bois' autobiographical subject with his nominal object of study 
through a shared historical horizon typified precisely by the asymmetry of access to 
the means of literary production.18
                                                 
18 For this reason, I disagree with Shamoon Zamir's claim that Du Bois' notion of double-consciousness 
was largely determined by his own position as a "bourgeois intellectual," who understood himself to 
lack access to the interior of the "black mass."  Du Bois' text raises as an open question whether any 
such mass existed as such.  Further, the structure of Souls and his repeated claims regarding the 
"message" or "gift the Negro has for the world" call into question the extent to which his position as 
bourgeois is to be seen as ideal or, as he contends throughout much of his writing, merely contingent 
and thus secondary to his concerns.  See Zamir, Dark Voices: W.E.B. Du Bois and American Thought, 
1888-1903 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), esp. pp. 133-153.   Hereafter cited 
parenthetically in the text as Dark Voices. 
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His deployment of autobiography is deceptively simple, appearing to draw on 
an empirical uniformity of black folk rooted in his sociological study or on reified 
notions of "the black experience."   Instead what is shared is the "strange experience” 
of being inside and outside of the definitions of America, and the attendant structures 
through which this “strange meaning” is articulated as at once outside and immanent 
to those bodies called black.  This is the structure of sharing itself, though that sharing 
is named in its absence.  It is through the thought of this tenuous, minimal 
commonality that Du Bois proceeds, and it is through this that the stories he tells of 
others speak for him as much as his narratives constitute the folk before the Other 
without the appropriative logic of identity or Absolute Spirit.  This expanded, specular 
use of autobiography splits the book between the historical analysis of a single man 
and the historical analysis of a race, effectively arresting Du Bois' figure, the "I" of his 
text, between synecdoche and metonymy. 
The tension between modes of representation, and especially between 
incommensurate temporal registers—a stubborn non-synchronism—haunts Souls of 
Black Folk from the first lines of its prophetic, proleptic "Forethought": "Herein lie 
buried many things which if read with patience may show the strange meaning of 
being black here in the dawning of the Twentieth Century.  This meaning is not 
without interest to you, Gentle Reader, for the problem of the Twentieth Century is the 
problem of the Color Line" (Writings 359, emphasis added).  This initial metaphor, 
likening the book to a tomb or catacomb, designates the text as a site with unknown 
volume, an essay, broadly conceived, that avoids any first principle—when were these 
things buried?  By whom?  And when are the times of these buried things and people 
that nonetheless live on and animate thought in the present?  We can add to these 
questions a new one: what is the time of Du Bois, of Du Bois’ thinking?  What is the 
specificity of his Twentieth Century?  The ambivalent spatiotemporal structure, the 
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arrested beginning, becomes increasingly relevant to Du Bois' analysis.  It asserts a 
logic of continual re-working, reiteration and repetition even at the level of form.  His 
observation that "the problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color-
line," for example, is a repetition of Du Bois' own prior text, "To the Nations of the 
World," from the first pan-African conference; it is later repeated within Souls in the 
essay "Of the Dawn of Freedom." 
The phrase "the problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color-
line" is a performative utterance presenting itself as constative, descriptive of actually 
existing facts and people.  The color-line becomes the necessary condition of 
possibility for the marking of the coming epoch.  It is not continuous with history as 
the extensive history of known facts—the history of oppression and deprivation, for 
example—but rather gestures towards a dissimulating force within such historical 
narratives and proceed as a progressive line as the history of present beings or "Great 
Men."  The color-line calls into question the conditions of possibility for the 
emergence of such beings, while simultaneously insisting on the composite nature of 
Time, split between the official, dominant narrative Time, the disparate times not 
counted, partially counted or thought past from the point of view of that dominant 
narrative, and the resonant time of this text and this text’s "voice," oriented toward an 
audience it anticipates. 
 The metaphor of the book-as-grave in the "Forethought"—"Herein lie 
buried"—and the references to the immortal (untimely, a-temporal), transcendent 
Souls of the title mark it as a song or elegy, the relation between the already and not-
yet of every moment of time, pointing to the impossible coexistence of multiple 
“compossible” times.  Du Bois' text stages the problem of simultaneity of the non-
simultaneous, "a certain complicity or coimplication maintaining together several 
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current nows [maintenants] which are said to be the one past and the other future."19  
The problem announced by the color-line is the problem of temporalization—putting-
in-time—and punctuality—the subordination of several nows to a single timeline: a 
single past, and a single ineluctable future—in a word, modernity as progressive 
development.  The proclamation that the color-line is (will have been, is to be) the 
problem surpassing or informing all other problems "we" will have to solve in the 
twentieth century, marks an opening, a possibility and a threat, a warning against 
attempting to settle the so-called "Negro Problem" too quickly.  One needn't assume 
any fixed identity to the "Gentle Reader" addressed in the Forethought, despite the 
apparent presumption of that reader's indifference to the "strange meaning" of "being 
black" in Du Bois' moment or our own; the allegorization of the specular 
autobiographical "I" is complete in this gesture, including the author within this 
potential readership.  The "strange meaning," like all meanings and conventions, is 
subject to change, as is the "soul" of the folk, despite its pretense to eternity, the 
possible presentation of the present, the passing of the past; in short, it is the 
impossible figure of the fulfillment of time.  The much discussed "prophetic voice" of 
Du Bois announces nothing more (and nothing less) than a performative disruption of 
the discourses, including America's "Hegelianism," that provide ideological support 
for the brutal oppression and exploitation of "the darker peoples of the world" and 
other subjugated groups by naturalizing that oppression as historical necessity.20
                                                 
19 Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 1982), 55. 
20 It is easy to overlook Du Bois' interest, especially in later works, in thinking about the exclusions of 
the Italians and Irish, for example, within the determination of whiteness, as it is to overlook his 
abiding, if tentative, concern for the "woman question" and class differences, particularly in his later 
writings. 
  This 
"prophetic voice" attends to the differential sites of the dawning of an epoch.  The 
differences in articulations and interpretations of the meanings of an epoch and its 
problem supplements the autobiographical "I" by refusing to remain fixed to a 
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particular referent, in this case the biography of the writer, pointing ceaselessly to the 
future lodged in that past as its potential, its constitutively unrealized or outmoded.  
Prophecy may be thought of as a self-conscious poiesis based in the structure 
of credit I have been discussing.  In Souls, this prophecy is figured in both the 
"borrowing" and re-contextualization of the "cultural treasures" of the West, and 
through the articulation, as threat, of alternative futures based on those times excluded 
from official Time, that is, the threat of a sudden reversal of fortunes.  As threat, 
prophecy takes on the form of the promise—I am pledging to you that this will come 
to pass, promptly.  In its written form, it becomes a promissory note.  This structure 
gives us another way of thinking about the Negro's proleptic "message for the world."  
In the context of this "originary debt" or loan, to repay is to "return" or reject a 
particular support of self-consciousness—to act as though that support were no longer 
valid or necessary—and in so doing to effect a shift in the norms through which 
recognition occurs.  At stake in the fulfillment of this promise is nothing less than the 
apocalypse, a collision between incommensurate times, the coming of a time not 
speakable on conditions of the articulated present.  The promise is predicated 
simultaneously on the possibility of its non-fulfillment and the unknowable future.  Du 
Bois' call for "patient" reading postpones the first condition—that the promise must 
risk its own fulfillment, its promise so to speak.  If the reader fails to see this 
repayment in full, the impossible "full" revelation of the promised truth, it may be due 
to a failure in his or her reading.  The citational term "Negro Problem" attempts to 
sidestep the condition of the unknown and unknowable secret by providing a certain 
conception of "the Negro"—a conception that "is" (if it "is") "owned" by no one—as 
collateral.  However, this appellation alone does not tell the nature, form or scope of 
the problem posed by the color-line, nor the outcome of the promised apocalypse.   
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Ellipsis: W.E.B. Du Bois' Sound of Love21
I turn now to a central concept-metaphor of Du Bois' writing in Souls and 
elsewhere, the Veil, which he introduces in the famous initial formulation of "double-
consciousness" in Souls of Black Folk.  Though we know that Hegel's philosophy was 
much discussed in late-19th Century America
 
22 and that the term "double-
consciousness"23
Though not visible, "the Veil" rests on a visual metaphor, an interruption or 
division in vision itself.  But while the color-line has to do with putting objects in 
place within history, with temporalization, the Veil is more directly concerned with 
 had been used by such thinkers as William James (Du Bois' favorite 
professor at Harvard), Du Bois' use of the term "double-consciousness" to describe a 
temporal disruption makes me resist a strong paternalist reading (James read Hegel 
and his contemporaries' readings of Hegel; Du Bois read Hegel and James' reading 
Hegel…) that would link his thought directly to those others as a simple continuity.  
While other thinkers used the term "double-consciousness," it is not clear that those 
other thinkers were articulating the same concept.  Aside from the ways Du Bois' text 
complicates the position of the writing vis-à-vis tradition, relying on the texts of Hegel 
or the later interpretations of famous American "Hegelians" simply avoids the 
responsibilities of reading, either Du Bois or Hegel.  Du Bois' use of the term "double-
consciousness," like his use of the term "Negro" entails the burden of paleonymy; the 
use of old concepts to play the part of something absent, or nameless. 
                                                 
21 The reference here is to Charles Mingus' tribute to Duke Ellington recorded on both Changes One 
and Changes Two (Rhino/Atlantic #71403 and #71404, respectively).  Pertinently, Mingus' psalm to 
Ellington includes the lyrics "I was young and carefree/ Not a song had found my soul," and describes a 
process of finding that song through a process of recognition. 
22 See especially Dark Voices, 113-168 for an example of the argument linking Du Bois to the 
prevalent, contradictory Hegelianisms of his era and his teachers. 
23 For an analysis of such prior uses, see Dickson D. Bruce, Jr., "W.E.B. Du Bois and the Idea of 
Double Consciousness," American Literature 64:2 (June 1992), 299-309.  Bruce stipulates Du Bois' 
originality in using the term "to characterize issues of race" and sees him drawing on the philosophies 
of American Transcendentalism and German Romanticism along with medical discourses of "split 
personalities." 
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concepts (such as history) and their relation to phenomena, with the conditions of 
epistemology or determining concepts and theories.  Schematically, one might 
understand the "color-line" to refer to synchrony as a condition of possibility, and "the 
Veil" to refer to diachrony, the conditions of possibility for naming an I continuous 
with itself.  However, the color-line is the necessary precondition for the emergence of 
the Veil, the Veil is the necessary precondition for any awareness of the color-line, 
which is only apprehended retrospectively, even as it "colors" introspection and 
reflection.  The two terms cannot be collapsed into one another: each is the other's 
inverse, with the key difference being that the Veil, and especially the promise of 
unveiling, opens onto the (conditioned) thought of an unconditioned future, a future 
imagined on terms other than those of the present.  The Veil is in this sense a 
messianic figure for the passing of time, the potential (and potentially) redemptive end 
of time.  Souls provides a key—in its own writing, which is thus the inscriptive unity, 
the articulation, of and for the Veil: the construction of the un-constructible, 
thematizing the temporal lag of specularity, the mutual co-determination of center and 
margin.  Ultimately, the Veil establishes double-consciousness as a kind of pas de 
deux: both the steps of a dance and a division that yields more than two distinct or 
even halves.24  The Veil does not refer to phenomenology's intending subject, nor the 
psychological subject of cognized experience; instead, the Veil is a figure through 
which the givenness of the world as given, the dead time that haunts each articulation 
of the world "as such," a dissimulation of "organic" or "natural" totalities.25
Though "the Negro" and "the White" constitute each other as Negro and white, 
respectively, the color-line suggests that this difference is originary in the 
determination of a given time, such as modernity.  Modernity, like capital, 
 
                                                 
24 Through this pun, I mean to refer to both the steps of a dance, and also the French phrase loosely 
translated as "not both" or "not two," a reading I will develop. 
25 I return to this notion of dead time in chapter 3, through my discussion of Suzan-Lori Parks. 
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constitutively creates, assumes and depends upon its others, those out of step with its 
time.  The Veil, on the other hand, figures the struggles over the meaning of race's 
uneven divisions and the definition of official Time, and its potential end.  The Veil 
marks the inescapable mediation through which individuals and experiences come to 
be (mis)recognized, over identified with their structural positions.  Through it, self-
consciousness is revealed as an allegorical play in which people think of themselves 
and each other as personages within some "authentic state of affairs" that prove 
fictional, irretrievable as "authentic" or unmediated experience.  Race is not merely 
allegorical figure, "an abstraction whose original meaning is even more devoid of 
substance than its 'phantom proxy,'" but rather occupies an ambiguous position 
between material and immaterial; the Veil is a non-sensuous sensuous, a "phantom 
devoid of shape and substance," not a presence but the affecting absence of a relation 
that has never been present.26
Read in this way, the historico-allegorical accounts Du Bois gives of "the 
Negro" in "Of Our Spiritual Strivings" or the contemporary "The Conservation of 
Races" (1897) are not attempting to narrate history "as it was" but as negotiable, 
incomplete, and still capable of opening onto other, unrealized possibilities, in 
distinction from, for example, the ideology of Manifest Destiny.
 
27
                                                 
26 De Man, Blindness and Insight (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 192. 
27 As Du Bois puts it in "The Conservation of Races," the "resulting problem as to the future relations of 
these types [the White and Negro races] is not only of intense and living interest to us, but forms an 
epoch in the history of mankind" (Writings 815). 
  Du Bois' attempt to 
"rise above the pressing, but smaller questions…to survey the whole question of race 
in human philosophy" in order to lay the groundwork "of broad knowledge and careful 
insight" upon which "those large lines of policy and higher ideals of which may form 
our guiding lines and boundaries in the practical difficulties of every day" runs 
aground of the aporetic nature of those "natural laws" he appeals to, precisely because 
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of the ways in which the Veil is a naturalizing force that partitions even knowledge 
and historical fact (Writings 815).  The Veil, like the structures of racial differentiation 
to which it corresponds, is not so much "natural," as naturalized.  It is a kind of 
prosthesis, like eyeglasses; one looks through it but cannot "see" that looking.  
Through repetition and ideological necessity, insofar as race emerges as a justification 
for exploitation, it comes to seem a feature of the natural world, a permanent, 
unassailable structure, one that cannot be thought since as part of the ideological 
substrate that structures discourse, it is immanent to the innermost part of thinking 
itself.  There is not and has never been one Negro Problem, and that Negro Problem is 
not independent of or secondary to other concerns so much as the "Negro" masks the 
articulation of the greater social network in which it plays a part.  The Veil, then, is a 
figure for emplotment.   
In the initial account of double-consciousness, occurring at the beginning of 
the chapter titled "On Our Spiritual Strivings," this partition takes the form of a gap or 
fissure within what proves to be a failed exchange.  The essay begins:  
 
Between me and the other world there is ever an unasked question: 
unasked by some through feelings of delicacy; by others through the 
difficulty of framing it.  All, nevertheless, flutter round it.  They 
approach me in a half-hesitant sort of way, eye me curiously or 
compassionately, and then instead of saying directly, How does it feel 
to be a problem? they say I know an excellent colored man in my town; 
or, I fought at Mechanicsville; or, Do not these Southern outrages make 
your blood boil?  At these I smile, or am interested, or reduce the boil 
to a simmer, as the occasion may require.  To the real question, How 
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does it feel to be a problem? I answer seldom a word (Writings 363, 
emphasis added). 28
The preposition "between" establishes a narrative, or at least the possibility of 
narrativizing, always already in medias res, formally if not in its specific content 
(although that there is "ever an unasked question" shows the limits of this distinction).  
This question remains—haunts—the text of Souls as its primary question.  There is a 
rapport sans rapport between the specific comments or questions the "other world" 
sends back to "me," which are nevertheless not wholly separable from each other since 
they share language, and conditions of discursive intelligibility.  Again the Problem is 
of reading: three different kinds of statements are held to be metonymic substitutions 
for the question that cannot be asked.
  
 
29
The Veil is most decisively affixed by attempts to remove or see beyond the 
Veil, to ask, in this case, the black person to unmask himself—to "speak in his or her 
'own' voice" which amounts to saying the voice through which s/he is allowed 
speech—and give an account of his or her suffering.  Du Bois' performative silence, a 
figure of apophasis (saying by denying one is saying), doubles the initial silence, the 
initial apophatic question that asks without asking.  Though he claims to answer 
"seldom a word," he submits in his book to the implicit interpellative demand that he 
narrate his having come to racial consciousness, of having recognized the Veil: a tall 
  "Between" marks the "site"—there or 
herein—of differing/deferring, an illimitable rapport sans rapport, submitting 
identities to constant re-articulation.   
                                                 
28 In a similar scene in Darkwater, two pertinent questions are "Do you know where I can find a Negro 
cook?" and "Why–won't–Negroes–work?" leading to a similar silence, and a similar exercise of writing 
(109). 
29 Nor should it be thought, however, that this situation is strictly a racial conflict.  It is also a conflict 
between Northern and Southern moral positions, "Progressive" and conservative ideologies, marked by 
class and gender: The positions within double-consciousness are pas-de-deux, not (just) two. 
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new-come girl refuses his visiting-card, "peremptorily, with a glance," a wordless, 
apophatic glance subject to interpretation following which "it dawned on me that I was 
different from the others," similar "in heart and longing, but shut out from their world 
by a vast veil" (Writings 364).  
This story, though, which he invokes in later writings under a cover of 
continued silence or refusal to speak (in both Dusk and the Autobiography he writes 
only that he has written this incident previously, tacitly reproducing its performative 
silences), is staged as a myth.  A similarly significant silence or textual gap announces 
his shift from the general to the autobiographically specific: the revelation "bursts 
upon one, all in a day" during "the early days of rollicking boyhood;" he continues, "I 
remember well when the shadow fell upon me" (Writings 363, emphasis added).  In 
this narrative, "something put it in the boys' and girls' heads to buy gorgeous visiting-
cards…and exchange."  The visiting-card is a kind of promise.  Usually a small piece 
of paper bearing the giver's name, the visiting-card is given as a promise to visit, or as 
an indication that a visit has happened, and will recur.  The exchange of visiting cards 
mimics adult behavior, at the nexus of business and courtship relations.  If we assume 
this incident is not chosen arbitrarily, if we resist the temptation, that is, to quickly 
declare that this is the moment that expresses "the strange meaning of being Black at 
the dawning of the Twentieth Century," then the function of this narrative, and the 
sudden awareness, lies in the refused encounter.30
                                                 
30 Du Bois elsewhere describes his coming to race consciousness as a more gradual process.  See 
especially Autobiography 83-94 
  Her refusal is syncopic: in showing 
the impossibility of a certain future, it reveals those structuring presuppositions 
through which possibility is calculated, and through which possibility differs from 
potentiality in general.   
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The gender dynamics, like the curious timing, are not accidental.31
Here there is an abrupt, unjustified specular shift between the many and one, 
the "I," and back; this particular experience is made to stand in for all such 
  The status 
of gender and the everyday notions of the erotic, of desire and sexual desire, of the 
Negro's "longing" remain.  As I have suggested, the narrative of coming to race 
consciousness is staged as a myth, then referred to apophatically throughout Du Bois' 
other writings: it provides a text which in turn produces an event that is not one.  Du 
Bois writes,  
[B]eing a problem is a strange experience,—peculiar even for one who 
has never been anything else […].  It is in the early days of rollicking 
boyhood that the revelation first bursts upon one, all in a day, as it 
were.  I remember well when the shadow swept across me.  I was a 
little thing, away up in the hills of New England […].  In a wee wooden 
schoolhouse, something put it into the boys' and girls' heads to buy 
gorgeous visiting-cards–ten cents a package–and exchange.  The 
exchange was merry, till one girl, a tall newcomer, refused my card,–
refused it peremptorily, with a glance.  Then it dawned upon me with a 
certain suddenness that I was different from the others; or like, mayhap, 
in heart and life and longing, but shut out from their world by a vast 
veil (Writings 363, emphasis added). 
 
                                                 
31 My interest here is in determining the generative value of his having chosen and repeated this 
particular narrative to account for his coming to race consciousness in general, which is a separate issue 
from the masculinism of his public persona.  Thus, Hazel Carby's arguments about the construction of 
the "particular personal, political and social characteristics of a racialized masculinity to articulate [Du 
Bois'] definition of black leadership," and personal persona, are of a different order.  The complexity of 
his text may work against the "philosophy of moral uplift" associated with him, for much the same 
reasons that I argue his recourse to "Talented Tenth" ideology is merely a stopgap.  See Race Men 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 9-45. 
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experiences, which are eternal ("has never been anything else"), which is to say 
ideological.  The "certain suddenness," then, is mythic—this experience provides a 
way to narrate an otherwise unavailable "experience," which is not one.  Desire here is 
strangely impersonal—it is auto-telic, existing to reproduce or naturalize the 
heterosexual dyad; this setting-in-scene is also a setting in narrative abîme: "something 
put it into the boys' and girls' heads" to exchange visiting-cards, to mime the romantic 
rituals of adults.  Certain "gendered structures of thought and feeling" (Hazel Carby's 
phrase) seem to function as the presumptive horizon of intelligibility, the support for 
this narrative, and are exploited.   
For all that, however, it does not seem to be the case that sexual difference as 
such is naturalized, so much as the relations encoded in the word "gender" are taken as 
natural in order to give meaning to the structures of race within narrative he tells.  
Gender, in this sense, is a supplemental structure that animates the incident, and 
intersects with the narration of coming to racial consciousness.  Given miscegenation's 
function as one of the most enduring ideological props of segregation and Jim Crow, 
we might think that Du Bois deploys not simply the feminine but the form and 
generative potentiality of the erotic.  The thought of a successful coupling between Du 
Bois, "bone of the bone and flesh of the flesh of them that live within the Veil," and 
this (presumably) white girl, the thought that she might accept his promise and await 
his future visit, would have been taboo and ultimately threatened to rend the social 
fabric as it is.  Beyond the risks associated with some presumed audience, this staging 
is a profaning or de-sacralizing gesture—a kind of "profane illumination" to which 
gender is instrumental.  As a moment within his auto-poiesis, this myth is a temporal 
"sign"32
                                                 
32 By this I do not mean that the story "contains" time or "expresses" time so much as it puts 
temporalization on stage. 
—in time as the start of time, as that instant whose repetition is not traumatic, 
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but transformative.  In repetition there is a subjunctive transformation of available 
forms of intercourse.  Du Bois strategically risks alienating his readership, effecting a 
dislocation between persona and message, again within the structure of the promise, or 
prophecy.  He is able to mobilize the structural fears of miscegenation to effect a 
reversal whereby it goes from being the cause of segregation to one of its effects, 
simultaneously.   
The "tall newcomer," occupying the structural position of the feminine pole of 
a heterosexual dyad, gives what she does not have: "knowledge" of (and an occasion 
to acknowledge) the Veil, which in turn becomes an invitation to give to the world, an 
awakening of the impulse to give.  However, neither knowledge nor epistemology is 
not at stake in this passage: time is.  By refusing to make time for Du Bois, by refusing 
a place within a flow of time—the proposed visit at an unknown point in the future—
she gives—creates the conditions for—time to think, whose outcome is the 
formulation of the Veil concept, of knowing what the young Du Bois already knows.  
Time "does not properly belong to anyone; if certain persons and certain social classes 
have more time than others…it is certainly not time itself that they possess."33
                                                 
33 Jacques Derrida, Given Time I: Counterfeit Money trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), 28.  Hereafter cited parenthetically in the text as GT. 
  With "a 
certain suddenness" Du Bois realizes or diagnoses that certain opportunities will be 
unavailable to him due to the ways his race is articulated, that like the "would-be black 
savant" the fundamental conflict takes shape around differential time, "the most 
serious stake of political economy"  (GT 28).  This newcomer does not so much "give" 
this knowledge so much as demand its thinking.  Fundamentally at stake in this 
episode and others throughout Souls, including those that do not directly strategically 
engage a thought of woman, of those who can be called by the name "woman," is a 
relation to the Law, before which Du Bois describes himself as subject, both subject to 
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the law and object upon which the law would act.  The appropriative narration 
(moving from the general to the particular and back to the general) of his discovery of 
the Law in the attempt to transgress the law establishes the possibility of founding a 
different Law, one in which the Negro's "message for the world" could become 
intelligible, allowing" a different conception of present and past, and thus the future.  
Like the "tall newcomer's" or Du Bois' own remarked silence, the "Negro's message 
for the world" may indeed "be" a kind of communication that is not yet intelligible.  
Through playing the irreducible nature of the gendered erotic against ideological 
understandings of history (where a given moment in the "present" is the fated outcome 
of particular past events) and its meaning, Du Bois creates a space for a thinking that 
is disjoined from its own present, or "out of its place" in the racist cant of his day.  He 
plays on tropes of unruly eros common in literature, and scandal (which has its 
etymological roots in snaring), particularly around the scene of pedagogy,34
The Other's points of view, this narrative suggests, must be taken into account, 
though such accounting will always be incomplete.  The insistence on these gendered 
figures throughout Souls complicates binaristic understandings of "double-
consciousness" by revealing internal divisions further differing/deferring any potential 
identification, including the transition from one to I.   It also reveals something of the 
fundamental misfit between name and named, the strange temporality whereby the 
name seems to precede its object, seems to produce its object after, on condition of, 
the conventional or ideological framework that precedes it.  By preserving the place of 
 to set a 
scene where thinking emerges because of diverted desire rather than being destroyed 
when subjected to desire's denial.  The narrative shows the pas de deux of this would-
be romantic union, the multiple times that intersect through this refused encounter. 
                                                 
34 One thinks, for example, of Canto 5 of Dante's Inferno, where Francesca and Paolo's fateful union is 
initiated during their reading of courtly romances. 
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"woman" or "the feminine," Du Bois offers a double transgression of a certain 
orthodoxy—the agency that might "put things in mind."  This transgression makes 
visible in the object of inquiry what the orthodoxy by definition suppresses, raising for 
readers the question whether there can be any perfect alignment between object of 
knowledge and real object, between name and named, between representation and 
represented.    
The tall newcomer's response to him is a telling glance; his response is 
"seldom a word"; the Negro's response is "longing," which may or may not be 
verbalized.  In all instances, relation itself is refused, or revealed to have been 
impossible.  Refused relation creates this longing, that is, implies that relation had 
been presumed, marking the resistance of the Other, the sounding of the other within 
the self, which is to say a certain desire for the Other.  There is no (double-
)consciousness without this resistance,  no "unveiling" that does not run up against the 
Other's irreducible alterity.  If the introduction of this mythic narrative traverses 
several substitutions before producing the autobiographical "I," those substitutions 
stop at the radical non-substitutability of the gendered other, the unknowable part of 
the other that motivates erotics. 
This erotics is not the fantasy of the other as an extension of the self, or the 
other as an external cause responsible for one's capacity.  Rather, erotics must pass 
through the irreducible alterity of the other, through the non-substitutability of the 
other, poses a dissimulative threat—the threat of ecstasy in its fullest possible sense—
even to those discourses by which it is expressed, if it is expressed.  Erotics here is the 
name for what remains constitutively foreign in, though required by, desire, in 
discourse.  I do not refer here to that which is "in you, more than you," but to a "part" 
that is neither owned nor interiorized anywhere.  Erotics, then, is a syncope of 
thinking, a sublime passage "between" that suspends or defers the movement between 
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the phenomenological subject and the political subject, the dissimulating both through 
the suggestion of an intersubjectivity prior to phenomenology's intending subject and 
beyond the presumed relations between people in political space.  Like the words Du 
Bois seldom responds to the question no one asks, or the glance of the tall newcomer, 
the erotic specifies a certain constitutive reticence, a syncope of discourse.  Thus, 
erotics names the risk and promise of a literal ecstasy—the subject's (if we are 
justified in using this term) standing apart or outside itself—that does not emanate 
from or return to a singular individual or subjectivity.  On this view, to say that 
double-consciousness obtains in a broken or refused relation is as much to say that 
double-consciousness releases the erotic.  It is syncopic insofar as it marks a situation 
of silence, of not knowing how to proceed because it reveals the inadequacy of 
conventions of speech and inscription, reveals those schema or norms that distort 
understanding.  It does present itself, but "works" through adispossessing negativity, 
submitting subject positions, those historically rooted identities that, so to speak, 
underwrite the conditions of intelligibility.   
Like love in Jean-Luc Nancy's account, the erotic "is sexual, and it is not: it 
cuts across the sexes with another difference…that does not abolish them, but 
displaces their identity."35
                                                 
35 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community ed. Peter Connor (Minneapolis: The University of 
Minneapolis Press, 1991), 101.   
  Unlike love, however, the erotic cannot be uttered.  If 
love's utterance "is a promise…an utterance that draws itself before the law that lets it 
lets appear," and according to that law can be judged true or false, the "expression" of 
the erotic is impossible, an ellipsis or caesura.  It is not a given word or a promise that 
can be broken or threat, but the potential dissolution or rerouting of the word.  In Du 
Bois' staging, his choice and reiteration of this originary narrative marked by its status 
as repetition, the silent newcomer refusing his visiting-card initiates another scene, an 
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identity, a politics, a demand for a writing that is not merely a description of what has 
happened but of a different order of thinking.  In context, the newcomer's glance re-
marks awareness/articulation of the Veil, with this slash meant to instantiate a certain 
caution regarding the actual timeline of his becoming aware of the so-called Negro 
Problem, which has a certain historical specificity, and the Veil, which has conceptual 
specificity.  The several remarked silences in this text—the black boys' "silent hatred 
of the pale world about them," his student Josie's growing silent as she works, his 
character John's having become "silent and cold" or the "old bent man" who chastises 
John "with rude and awful eloquen[t]" words the text declines to reproduce—present 
similar ellipses, and express a similar want for new means to apprehend and change 
the world, for concepts where those are missing.  I return to this point at the end of this 
chapter.  Through the erotic's syncope, between must remain partially unresolved, 
apprehended imperfectly through retroactive narrative accounts.  The profundity of Du 
Bois' spatial metaphor must be noted: it is not "between me and the other" or Other, 
but "between me and the other world."  Despite the definite article, however, the 
position of that "other world" cannot be fixed, or tied to a specific or metaphoric site 
(e.g., the American South, the "White community").36
The "other world" posited on the other side of the Veil, no doubt, has religious 
connotations.  Space and time are linked through the figure of prophecy, whose 
discursive status skirts the need for permission to write elegies for the dead, or those 
who will be dead, and it is through the logic of prophecy that Du Bois seeks a space to 
   
                                                 
36 Though this reconfiguration of the erotic as that which effectively prohibits substitution sets a limit, it 
is possible to see the tall newcomer as the inverted rhetorical double of Du Bois in relation to his 
readers insofar as he reads and names the Color Line and exposes the pre-existing norms about which 
she remained silent while enacting, and which the rest of the world seemed to pass over in a "conspiracy 
of silence."  This does not mute or annul his decision to make her a tall newcomer to his self account as 
"a little thing," but rather opens it to further complications. 
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articulate from the "other side" of the Veil.37
This mimed religious discourse, however, must not lull us into performing a 
"faithful" reading of Du Bois' text, which would amount to reducing it to the genre of 
the sermon or liturgy, a jeremiad against the specific problems of his historical 
moment.  The reader faces the aporetic nature of autobiography as a "figure of 
reading" whose moment "happens as an alignment between two subjects involved in 
the process of reading in which they determine each other by mutually reflexive 
substitution," here multiplied insofar as Du Bois at times figures himself as addressing 
those on the "other side" of the Veil ("De-Facement" 922).  One might extend De 
Man's observations about autobiography to questions of representation in general, 
particularly in Du Bois' case where expanded, specular use of autobiography splits the 
book between the historical analysis of a single man and the historical analysis of a 
race, effectively arresting Du Bois' figure, the "I" of his text, between synecdoche and 
metonymy.  On the other hand, the prophecy itself is partly determined by the 
  One notes, in this regard, Du Bois' 
declaration that "The problem of the Twentieth Century will be the problem of the 
Color Line": his declaration takes the form of a simple observation about a time to 
come, rather than a promise or command that we make this a problem.  The appeal, 
that is, is to a time that will have been, imagined from a perspective after the end of 
the existing order: it marks an attempt to get out ahead of one's time.  However, this 
prophecy must always attempt to skirt or exceed death, to have already passed through 
death and speak from the other side of the vale.  The living exceed the frame of 
representation, differ from and defer representation.  Like prophecy, representation 
can only refer to the dead, multiply the death through its reducing its object into 
ordered sensibility.   
                                                 
37 This strategy is employed most dramatically in Darkwater, especially "The Souls of White Folk," 
where he refers to his position "high in the tower…above the loud complaining of the human sea." 
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prosthetic structure of the Veil, which is only partially subdued by the suspended non-
place/non-time of the prophetic voice, which lacks the (racialized) body the 
autobiographic form provides.  If the autobiographical voice invites an ideological, 
naturalizing link between the writing, written and reading subjects, the Veil is the 
figure that intercedes, exceeds and defers such recognition.   
What remains curious is the situation of the Veil, more precisely its non-
situatedness, as in the following passage:  
 
The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife,—this 
longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into 
a better and truer self.  In this merging he wishes neither of the older 
selves to be lost.  He would not Africanize America, for America has 
too much to teach the world and Africa.  He would not bleach his 
Negro soul in a flood of white Americanism, for he knows that the 
Negro blood has a message for the world.  He simply wishes to make it 
possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American, without being 
cursed and spit upon by his fellows, without having the doors of 
Opportunity closed roughly in his face. (Writings 364). 
 
The erotic is one name for this strife, which defers this merging into a "better and truer 
self."  Indeed, Du Bois' refusal to proclaim a desire for an either/or reduction of the 
self into a singular identity is perhaps the most radical of all of his gestures, insofar as 
it calls for a redefinition of both terms.  This refusal marks the excessive character of 
the identity—figures identity as a representation always more and partially other to 
itself—suggesting a non-resolution of a dialectic between self and Other that is not 
tragic, but makes identity iterable while denying anything other than a negotiable, 
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formal origin from which the Negro would subsequently figure as a "problem."  
Neither of the "old selves" is lost through striving, but neither signifies the same thing; 
internal differentiation and fragmentation within a single body or within racial 
populations become the starting point of politics that do not presume unity but rather 
start from difference and fragmentation—"a mass of bickering people."  That the 
names "Negro" and "American" would be retained following this impossible 
"merging" of identities is affirmation of the risk of paleonymy referenced above, and 
the two are coordinated under, or alongside, the term Africa.  A palimpsest within the 
construction and maintenance of separate White America and Negro Slave, Africa 
operates as synecdoche for blackness "as such" and a sign of unassailable difference—
the impossible point, of "origin."  Despite the efforts here to reinterpret it, Africa is a 
sign of previousness that antedates Europe's initial contact with Africa or the New 
World.   
The terms of that temporal positioning are affirmed through the 
acknowledgment that "America has too much to teach the world and Africa"—
pointing to the excessive, threatening nature of the gift, which as gift must be 
unexpected, and non-reciprocal.  This gift of "teaching," impossible as gift, threatens 
always to turn into a debt or responsibility (i.e., no gift at all), much like the equally 
menacing "message" "Negro blood" has for the world.  It is precisely at this moment, 
with so much at stake, that Du Bois' text slips into a discourse of liberal 
individualism—the world to come is here suddenly only (though given the historical 
context this is not an insignificant demand) the bestowal of formal political freedom 
without the necessity or obligation of assimilation.  The refusal to assimilate remains 
the radical component as it threatens the very definitions (and, in this way, positions) 
of America and Africa, and of "being black."  What emerges, for this reason, is a 
tension between two senses of freedom in Du Bois' text: on the one hand a political 
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freedom—the demands and rearticulations that would have been consonant with 
contemporary ideologies that amounts to access to political and economic 
institutions—and on the other a more evasive "genuine human freedom"—those 
challenges that demand a fundamental change in relations, an undecideability that is 
the possibility of going forward.  After all, calling for the Negro to live as both Negro 
and American and, as such, to change and disfigure American in that very process is 
already radical, even if the ultimate resolution of double-consciousness, if it is 
possible to speak of such a resolution, suggests that the very terms be replaced with 
some as yet unknown terms.  The "message for the world" cannot be an institutional 
message or demand as yet unanswered, but retains itself as an encounter, yet to come. 
 
Propaganda and the Im-Parting of History 
 
I turn now to the status of the artwork in Du Bois' writing, and by extension the 
precise notion of reading so far developed.  In his 1926 essay "Criteria of Negro Art," 
a transcript of a talk given to consider the relationship of the NAACP, a "group of 
radicals trying to bring new things into the world," to artistic production later 
published in The Crisis, Du Bois famously declares that "all Art is propaganda and 
ever must be."  He adds that "whatever art I have for writing has been used always for 
propaganda for gaining the right of black folk to love and enjoy."  He concludes, "I do 
not care a damn for any art that is not used for propaganda.  But I do care when 
propaganda is confined to one side while the other is stripped and silent."  This set of 
propositions is far more complicated than it initially appears, especially when one asks 
what it means to declare both that all Art, by definition, is propaganda while also 
insisting that all art ought to be used for propaganda.  Du Bois links art with imagining 
a world—and a politics—beyond immediate concerns, and a duty to "let this world be 
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beautiful."  Du Bois' play on the "is/ought gap" points to an aporia between the 
artwork as structure—e.g., a set of social practices called "art"—and as reference 
governs the scene of reading (or, given that this essay was first delivered as a lecture, 
of listening), including the "patient reading" he calls for in Souls' "Forethought."  Does 
the status of the artwork depend upon its being, such that its propagandistic function 
rests in its presence—either, that is, its having been produced by blacks who have 
been excluded from the means of cultural production by the collusion of racist 
structures within society or the structure or grammar of the artwork itself?  Is the claim 
that art (or Art—we must not fail to notice the shifting status here) must within itself 
stage or "give voice" to political or social strivings, offering itself as a symbolic 
"reflection" of or imaginary "solution" to concrete problems, or that the encounter 
with the artwork makes thinkable what was heretofore unthinkable?  Along similar 
lines, ought the emphasis be placed on the uses to which those who encounter the 
artwork put it making the call for an insistently propagandistic interpretation, such 
that the work is taken to be "really about" social or political questions (e.g., the Negro 
Problem)?  Rather than resolving this aporia, the essay develops it, declaring both that 
"until the art of the black folk compells [sic] recognition they will not be rated as 
human" and that "it is the bounden duty of black America to begin this great work of 
the creation of Beauty, of the preservation of Beauty, of the realization of Beauty."  
For this task the Negro is to use time-honored "tools" including Truth ("the highest 
handmaid of the imagination, as the one great vehicle of universal understanding") and 
Goodness ("in all its aspects of justice, honor and right…as the one true method of 
gaining sympathy and human interest") (Writings 1000-1002).  In this articulation, the 
artwork's vacillation between the immediate and the eternal, calls for careful attention 
to the ways the artwork, identified largely throughout the later essay with the literary 
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text, opens out to or interpellates an audience "beyond the narrow now."38
As with Du Bois' cryptic claim that each race has a "message" for the world, 
insisting on the historical individuality of all peoples, which emerge as a result of the 
differences inscribed within and between communities, may be necessary for local 
understandings, but they work against this "universal understanding."  However, the 
apprehension of such differences is the only means through which any universal 
understanding is possible: it does not belong to the voice but is that which makes any 
particular sounding or iteration of voice incomplete on its own.  From this perspective, 
the term "propaganda" is also polyvalent, invoking at once the text at the referential 
level (those events or people the artwork depicts) and, schematically, at its critical 
level (the thinking it motivates or its way of resolving conflicts).  Elsewhere, 
emphasizing pedagogy, he refers to the "underground propaganda" that "the trained 
man of darker blood" will have to resort to in order to "organize his world for war 
against Europe" without which the future, rationalized as the fated outcome of the 
present, "is going to be based essentially upon the same policies as in the past" (DW 
60).  Insofar as those "trained men" work within the ideologies of their day, and 
reproduce them without respect to their will or intention, their "propaganda" rests in 
the sense of their words, a quality that they do not "have," and to their texts as that rift 
  One must 
have a materialist outlook of the conditions of the emergence of the artwork, and a 
materialist conception of the function of the artwork as artwork, even as this latter 
commits one to that special form of speculation called criticism. 
                                                 
38 Those examples are apparently extemporaneous scenarios that illustrate the viciousness of racism—
e.g., a "brown" daughter who commits suicide when she is not allowed to attend her white sister's 
wedding, a white woman who extorts money from a "colored lawyer [surrounded] on all the other sides 
[of a town square] by men who do not like colored lawyers" by threatening to scream if he refuses her 
ransom—and the ways in which racism constrain the possibilities for black artists and black art in the 
United States.  Curiously, David Levering Lewis' Reader omits the literary examples but keeps the 
historical ones that tell the "untold tale" of colonialism and world events. 
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between grammar and reference.  Propaganda will be a name for that which slips 
through and exposes the grammar of possible thought.   
The very word "propaganda" suggests seeds sown to produce or reproduce, to 
multiply or cause.  It has a similar sense, to the word radical, whose etymology links 
it to the Latin radix, or root, but with the following wrinkle: this seed reaches back 
from a potential future to establish roots in this present, attempting to subvert or elude 
the calculable possibilities of the present.  From this vantage, propaganda is not 
limited to promoting actions or "sympathy" in the present, but can make possible a 
thinking of the future (and a redemptive re-thinking of the past) by limning the 
boundaries that structure thought in the present.  The thought of that future entails 
negotiating on their own terms what Wilson Harris calls "the adversarial contexts in 
which cultures wrestle with each other" in order to grasp, despite the "camouflages 
and masks," the myths of cultural origins and heritage, the "flexible frames within the 
mystery of genuine change."39
                                                 
39 Wilson Harris, "Adversarial Contexts and Creativity" New Left Review, 154 (November/December 
1985), 128.  
  The statement "all art is propaganda" does not lay a 
claim for Sartrean commitment, but rather a claim that art always contains and stages a 
contest over origins, always exceeds the conditions of its creation and reception to 
point to an unknown and unimagined future.  To say that all art is propaganda in this 
sense simply identifies a structure of Art, of all doing or making.  To say that it must 
be becomes a declaration that criticism—the "free and unfettered judgment" of every 
person, whose "valuable and eternal judgment" in turn requires that we make ourselves 
"free of mind, proud of body and just of soul to all men"—must promote thinking, and 
thus not content itself with interpretations or perspicuous readings.  Interpretation may 
be a valuable place to organize such a critical practice, but it can only be a transient 
moment geared toward further thought.   
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The challenge for the artist, especially the "marginalized" artist who works 
from a disempowered position within a social context, is to work through double-
consciousness as the co-existence of incommensurate temporal registers within the 
literary and historical text.  On the one hand, Du Bois sees the darker races "as though 
in this morning of group life" and, extending the metaphor, having "awakened from 
some sleep that at once dimly mourns the past and dreams a splendid future," whose 
Youth bears "on its breast" as "a mighty prophecy" capable of actualizing a "new 
determination for all mankind" (Writings 995).  Because double-consciousness rests 
on an historical determination marked by "accidents" or "contingencies" that 
determine who will have access to social institutions, it opens onto the many different 
subject positions we occupy for any number of people, and the irreconcilability of 
these determinations, with given a priority that seems absolute.  When Du Bois offers 
criteria for Negro art and then describes the characteristics of all art, the conclusion to 
draw is that art in general, and "Negro art" in particular, can and must do more than 
"represent" the beauty of the phenomenal world, but must seek to produce Beauty that 
is still only potential. The prophecy or message of the Negro is for the world, 
inscribing "universal understanding" in the future, when all races will have delivered 
their messages for the world, that is, in a future community.   
There is, however, another stream of history that we might call, advisedly, an 
"everyday" conception of history as given or a political history, one which takes the 
people not in its becoming but in what it is understood to be and to have been.  Du 
Bois writes, "We are bound by all sorts of customs that have come down as second-
hand soul clothes of white patrons" and the "growing black public still wants [of] its 
prophets" or artists the same things that the more established white public, steeped in 
the historical practices of minstrelsy, demands (Writings 1001).  It is to this historical 
present that Du Bois addresses his demand that art be used for propaganda.  Insofar as 
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his demand is that the artist strive to present an undistorted Truth, the paradigms 
through which the artwork is received and the constraints under which the artist works 
shift the locus of emphasis from artistic intention or perspicuity of representation to 
the opposite: moments of opacity, illegible moments that place a demand on thought 
that it exceed itself.  There is nothing about the artwork or literary text that performs 
this task: the search for "criteria" for Negro art is an appeal to community, to the 
future community where the historically unique races he discusses can deliver their 
messages to the world.  Such opacity, moments that stall or defer meanings that are 
only apparently clear, emerges through a critical practice—a "patient reading"—
attentive to the mechanisms of meaning, the ways the artwork undoes itself and its 
meaning, attentive to the striving to "say," potential voice, the mechanisms of 
delivering a message: an impartibility that extends beyond immediate circumstances, 
beyond immediate message.  Without that reach beyond the narrow strictures of its 
present, without attempting to find the eternal within the transitory, then there is no 
possibility for propaganda in the sense of building toward the future, only the 
propaganda of immediate solutions to immediate problems, with those solutions 
rooted in the inadequate thinking of the day.  Only through and because of the debris 
of history can the world to come be prophesied, projected to an audience to come.  It is 
to the fallen present that Du Bois tenders the demand to "let this world be beautiful," 
and "for Beauty" set right (995).   
Beauty, though it has many functions and uses throughout Du Bois' writings, is 
one name for the perspective of redemption from which all the races' messages will 
have sounded.  "That somehow, somewhere eternal and perfect Beauty sits above 
Truth and Right I can conceive," he writes in "Criteria," "but here and now in the 
world in which I work they are for me unseparated and inseparable" (Writings 995).  
In Souls Beauty is either on the side of a "natural" harmony seen as discord in the 
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present—"The innate love of harmony and beauty that set the ruder souls of his people 
a-dancing and a-singing raised but confusion in the soul of black artist; the beauty 
revealed to him was the soul-beauty of a race which his larger audience despised and 
he could not articulate the message of another people"—and the gift—"little of beauty 
has America given the world save the rude grandeur God himself stamped on her 
bosom" (Writings 366, 536, emphasis added).  Whereas Souls seems to oppose beauty 
and "ingenuity," ("the human spirit has expressed itself in vigor and ingenuity rather 
than beauty"), by the writing of Darkwater beauty requires ingenuity: "Unless men 
rule industry, can they ever hope really to make laws or educate children or create 
beauty (DW 122, emphasis added).  These two texts mark a fundamental shift from 
beauty as an attribute belonging to the fundamental nature of things to beauty as the 
outcome of labor.  Beauty is both that which has no purpose other than itself and that 
which promotes thinking of things as they are, but due to material constraints, cannot 
be. 
The outcome of this shift, already present in the formal presentation of Souls if 
not always apparent in the body of the text, is a decisive turn away from the 
ambiguous movement between the specific black person and the transhistorical figure 
of the Negro, which is an allegorical figuration more than a citation of "fact" or 
"essence."  The shift from a thought of "the soul-beauty of a race," the specific beauty 
of the race as it would be apprehended from the impossible perspective of this world, 
redeemed, accents the discrete and momentary over and against the assurances of the 
ideology of history as a progressive line, or the progressive development of a singular 
essence.  The message each historically unique race has for the world is not the 
transcendent Truth sounded at last at the end of a dialectical movement to uncover the 
Absolute, but above even Truth, Beauty.  From this, we can infer that even so-called 
representational or "realist" fictions, on demand that they be propaganda to be 
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worthwhile, need always to be attempting to restructure and re-present the past and the 
present toward the glimpse of a future anterior. 
I would like to underscore two essential points: 1. Du Bois never shies away 
from the difficulties of creating a people, and in no way takes for granted that there is 
a pre-constituted, self-announcing people that could be the subject of politics, or serve 
as a final definition.  In this way, he does not collapse the experience of the diaspora to 
a uniform experience of slavery or oppression.  For this reason, too, he avoids 
ontologizing "the Negro" or linking it to a predicate "resistance"—his analysis of the 
art-consuming and producing Negro public would render this view unintelligible.  
Thus, he holds open a place from which to think about "the Negro's" relative 
autonomy within a field of power (one of whose conditions, as may be clear from the 
tropes Veil, color-line, and double-consciousness itself, is belatedness).  As he puts it, 
"We are bound by all sorts of customs that have come down as second-hand soul 
clothes" (Writings 1001).  The political problem of forming a people remains one of 
the chief problems in Du Bois' thought for political work in the present, though it is 
not at all clear that this people would be perfectly aligned with the historically unique 
race or its message.  And as the use of gender in the earlier text suggests, any people 
formed is formed based on its unsurpassable internal differences. 
2.  To the extent that Du Bois does not reify a singular "black experience" as 
the ground that "Negro art" is bound to express, the place (which is not one) from 
which it propagates its "message for the world" is in some future that can only be 
approached through a rigorous negativity.  It is not this world, nor the (political) 
freedom to pursue material gains—"powerful motor cars," an "elaborate estate," 
becoming a "Rotarian or a Lion."  Du Bois' notion of the work of art is likewise 
opposed to the reclamation of some loss or submerged origin.  Privileging Beauty—as 
that which transcends the conditions of the present—the artwork reaches beyond its 
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time, always just out of reach and away from view until the advent of genuine human 
freedom, the right to tell the whole truth, or deliver the full message to the world.  The 
past, then, is not a resource or ontological guarantee of resistance, just as the people 
cannot have a singular "essence" to be expressed for the present.  Further, he does not 
assume some "pure African form," "expression of memory" (Baraka), "black phonic 
substance" (Moten) or "slave sublime" (Gilroy)40
To conclude, I would like to return to the concerns of voice with which I 
opened this chapter, away from the question of finding or having a voice, speaking 
with a voice, the futures of such voicings and listening: echoes.  Such echoes, which 
permeate the "haunting music" of what Du Bois calls the sorrow songs (themselves a 
metonym for tradition in general), re-inscribe temporality into tradition and introduce 
the possibility of decay, signal interference, dispersion and transformation: the 
possibilities of multiple sounds present in any unitary sound or note.  This multiplicity 
is not an external force of impurity but is an internal, material attribute of sound and 
its reception, as contradiction in the naming of tradition, and as a conflict between the 
immateriality of "tradition" itself and the materiality of sound.  Echo aligns itself with 
noise in an attempt to detail the impossibility of the source or origin of sound except 
as a named origin, as a potential interrogation of political potentialities in working the 
materiality of the artwork.  Such manipulation works as an implicit critique of history 
 to which the work refers or that it 
expresses.  Its "rootedness" in the future-as-utopian-imagining splits the work of art 
between two incommensurable time frames—not just production and reading, but 
reading and re-reading, opening the work to its own futurity and potential 
obsolescence.  In this way, the efficacy or felicity of Negro art can only be determined 
from an unknown future, perhaps one not intended by this present.   
Coda: Voicing Music  
                                                 
40 The texts alluded to are Black Music, In the Break, and The Black Atlantic, respectively. 
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conceived as an externally given, progressive narrative (e.g., of New World slavery 
and subsequent colonial and neo-colonial subjection) as the always available "home" 
or "essence" to which the work has a pre-determined relationship such as a note has to 
a chord.  Considering carefully the metaphoric and analogic resonances of "home" or 
"root" as the tonic in a given harmonic structure, the creative context can be 
understood as a figural or articulated site that must be continually constructed and 
reconstructed, negotiated within the work.  Such a conceptual re-orientation creates a 
contingent, agonistic space for rethinking displacement or the status of being 
"unhomed," an unhomely site from which to re-imagine political agency, to orient the 
demand for Beauty. 
Beauty itself cannot be constructed, only striven toward.  A poetics that 
pursues the echo and thus privileges noise, or what is considered to be noise, suggests 
one path toward this expansive sense of beauty.  Such poetics are seek to hold or 
possess without possessing.  These poetics imply an ethos to pursue the not-yet 
realized, to resist satisfaction with the present or historiographical narratives of 
resistance and overcoming.  They inscribe a responsibility to remain open to the 
freight of speaking in the present moment, of the unredeemed nature of the present and 
its status as 'world of tomorrow' that may not live up to yesterday's cultural or even 
individual dream, even as the present strives toward another 'world of tomorrow' that 
cannot yet be brought into words.  They refuse any one home as the home, or its 
home; they keep a place for the past that speaks in the present as a "tasteless seed" and 
the ways the present will speak—will have spoken—in a moment that is more than the 
future, singular, of all the disparate, susurrant pasts and presents that co-exist in any 
moment. 
In this spirit, I would like to turn anew to the status of the epigraphs in Souls, 
especially musical notations that head each chapter of Souls.  As I have suggested, it 
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will not do to consider them merely a sign of memory of some pre-digested past, or to 
argue that they serve to dignify the "sorrow songs" with which they are paired.  The 
repetition, temporal displacement, and especially the openness of language to its own 
inevitable obsolescence implied by Du Bois' arguments for art being propaganda are 
crucial to the narrative development of double-consciousness, and in the concept itself, 
as we have seen.  One cannot speak without ambiguity of a "subject" of double-
consciousness, or of double-consciousness as the "symptom" of incomplete subjection 
or failed interpellation: if it is such a symptom, it is equally a less determinate gap, a 
specter within knowledge and epistemology, within ideation, a foundation that initially 
appears (though it never appears) solid only to crumble or disappear, unspeakable.  
Simultaneously, double-consciousness demands such writing and articulation, such 
patient study.  The challenge Du Bois' writing leaves us with is that of finding a way 
to speak of oppressive structures such as race—if these can be spoken of—that does 
not simply affirm the terms of those structures and its history, where the latter is 
oriented toward this present (and the future as a future present).  The challenge is to 
conceive the future as a future anterior, as a now that might not come, or may not 
come in the terms anticipated when we, in this moment, attempt to articulate the 
future, a necessary task to all politics.  The challenge for creativity in adversarial 
contexts is to find ways to proceed that treat the temporal gaps in such structures 
strategically, to desediment oppressive institutions and practices without accepting 
that oppressive logic, that, in short, does not take the two positions implied by double-
consciousness as having been given in advance, and thus fateful.   
Du Bois gradually abandons completely the idea of conventional political 
representation on the model of speaking for a self-identical, historical group in favor 
of a more flexible model closer to something like speaking with, a notion already 
graspable in the emphasis on education and on the elite living among the people.  Less 
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a reserve of plenitude "in the past—as designation, representation, artwork, thing" that 
waits to be made present through reflection or contemplation, we might think of music 
as on the side of action or, again, a negotiation that is not a quality of any existant.41  
The sound, if there is any, is not a present sound, the sound of beings or Being, a 
sound of union between the past and the present; it is not subject to (or of) any 
lichtung or clearing, but is only the sound to be produced and known, if it is known, in 
the ephemerality of its production.  As multi-reedist Eric Dolphy once said, "When 
you hear music, after it's over it's gone in the air.  You can never capture it again."42
Du Bois asks that readers study patiently, with him, but we might re-accent this 
as a call to think with him, to attend especially that we attend to the fragmentation of 
the people, the "fundamental miscount" involved in the articulation of any political 
group, and our own fragmentary identifications, the way his text like his mythic letter 
misses its recipient.  This is the promise of being both "a Negro" and "an American," 
where we understand that the former term is wholly contingent upon the latter, and 
that the latter can have no meaning apart from the former.  It is possible to see in the 
structure of the book—its fourteen chapters plus a Forethought, with each chapter 
headed by a signed quotation and an unsigned fragment of music, added prior to their 
collection and publication as a book—support for a re-evaluation of the fragmentary.  
  
On the one hand, Dolphy is wrong—through transcription or phonography, we can 
hear it again, re-apprehend it, analyze it exhaustively within technical limits.  On the 
other hand, however, he is right—you cannot capture it again, to replay the record is 
to hear it in light of having heard it already, a practice that changes the listening and 
the thing listened to.  If it speaks it is because it is made to speak, with all the 
responsibility entailed by that making speak.   
                                                 
41 Fred Moten, In the Break: The Aesthetics of the Black Radical Tradition (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2005, 148. 
42 Eric Dolphy, Last Date (Verve 822226). 
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While it is true that the " music acts more as a repetition than a recollection … moves 
toward the future rather than toward the past," it does not necessarily follow such 
citation the impossibility and necessity of " an epistemology of the future that is not 
eschatological," unless "eschatological" names the uncertainty of the communities that 
will have received his book?43  After laying out the conflicts between levels of 
discourse and of history, Kevin Thomas Miles sees in Du Bois the invocation and 
promise of a far off "kairological event."44
                                                 
43 Kevin Thomas Miles, "Haunting Music in The Souls of Black Folk," boundary 2 27:3 (Fall 2000), 
199-214.  Hereafter cited as "Music." 
44 Kairos refers to "the propitious moment for the performance of an action or the coming into being of 
a new state," or the "fullness of time" (OED) 
  From that perspective, the music might 
remind "us in the fashion of art that we cannot remember the voicings of these 
melodies," while requiring recollection as repetition, which might "serve to excite a 
movement within our own souls similar to that of love" ("Music" 213-4).  The music, 
that is, would find its "text," a specific topography and history of subjugation and 
support of a black aesthetic tradition in the United States, a position from which would 
neutralize (or sublate) the anarchic potential of these "non-textual," uncanny 
epigraphs.  After such an event, the event of the full word made manifest and audible, 
the full meaning of the text—the Negro's full gift, as it were—would be available.  
Any such "full meaning," however, would be indistinguishable from an ideological or 
fateful confirmation and validation of what is already known, settling too cheaply the 
problem of double-consciousness and neutralizing the destructive potential of an 
ultimate unveiling or apocalypse.  The music quotations are unsigned and unnamed, 
uncommented on save a brief index in "On the Sorrow Songs."  The additional reading 
we are responsible for—the repetition that is also a recollection—is both part of and 
furthers a project of knowledge implicated by double-consciousness itself.  How 
would one assign value to these songs, transcribed in the keys of F, G, E-flat or A, 
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especially given the imbalance of knowledge between those who would have sung the 
songs and those who notated them, those who can recognize them on sight and those 
who know the songs only when they hear them? 
These graphs of music create an uncanny doubling, calling to mind not an 
effable or ineffable past, but a kind of future anterior, the call to necessary 
incompleteness, that is, to thinking politics, but also thinking politics.  The music, 
inviting repetition, rudely introduces another time, demands a reorientation of thought, 
precisely through their mute, glyphic structure, which further defers reading, 
positioning the "strange meaning of being black" in an indeterminate future, always 
later, always awaiting definition, differing/deferring the final message, for example the 
inscrutable message the Negro blood has for the world, until the audience "hears" it—
though they will not hear the same thing twice.  Though they are the partial graph 
form of a music that speaks to the legacy of slavery and "spiritual strivings" (both in a 
religious sense and not), these glyphs themselves are mute and, even if played, 
fragmentary, being just enough of the song to create a haunting echo of a song that's 
never really been heard before.45
                                                 
45 It is perhaps too esoteric for this discussion, but the notations are abbreviated for space in some cases, 
and in all cases lack the specific information of harmonic modulation (chord changes) that would allow 
an accompanist to provide support for whomever played or sang the melodies (and the lyrics are not 
present).  A skilled arranger or accompanist could take the melodies and devise harmonic structures that 
would be wholly incompatible with the songs as they are known, but that would nonetheless be 
satisfying.  See, for one example, John Coltrane's re-harmonizing of "My Favorite Things" or "Body 
and Soul." 
  Insofar as "these songs are the articulate message of 
the slave to the world…tell[ing] of death and suffering and unvoiced longing toward a 
truer world," to perform this music at all is to attempt to "give voice" to, or find a way 
to hear, those longings, to speak with those specters that continue to haunt not just 
American institutions or African Americans, but in the contemporary world of late-
capitalism the global institutions that affect the lives of all the "darker peoples of the 
world" whose fates are inextricable from their Others.  Performers are obliged to re-
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create the song through collaboration, especially those unfamiliar with the songs.  
Thus, in the end, it is not—cannot be—Du Bois who has something to teach his 
audience.  Rather, he presents readers in his present and ours with an enigmatic code 
for all to decipher endlessly, together. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
EXPLODING DIMENSIONS OF SONG: FUGITIVE ARTICULACY AND MU-
TOPIA  
 
To the extent that our senses have moment 
meaning is fragment 
– Ed Roberson 
 
"Throughout the piece, one finds the music actively and unremittingly heterospecific" 
- Bedouin Hornbook 
 
Mu: "The Root of Whatever Song"  
Not to get to the "origin" of song, the fleeting moment of a transit or transfer 
between poetry and music, music as dwelling in poetry or poetry in music.  Instead, 
the question, again, is of listening, of the "graphicity" of sound, of writing.  That 
music has served as a resource for many poets—influencing structure by analogy 
between music and poetic composition, or providing poetry the occasion or subject—
is well-documented, particularly in the case of black writers.  But musicality—the 
thinking or qualities of music not exhausted in any listening or analysis—is by 
definition excessive: listening again to familiar or treasured recordings often yields 
new details, reveals the self-differentiation or constitutive incompleteness of a given 
work.  Music itself is linked at once to memory, commemoration and the forgetting of 
self, the ecstatic loss of self to the extent that music may involuntarily "set the ruder 
souls…a-dancing and a-singing."  This orphic capacity is not of or in the music as an 
in-dwelling tendency or presence, nor as the residue or haunting remainder of some 
 78 
history, but rather refers to the non-analysable part of the performance, of the song or 
lyric: what I will refer to as its μtopic (mu-topic) striving.  This striving is not related 
to the will of the performers; it has nothing to do with traditions of performance but on 
the contrary relates to the scene of listening, communities of listeners.  It is glimpsed 
in breakdowns, in those gaps between a work as structure or grammar—adhering to 
conventions—and the work as an iteration through which something unexpected might 
break through: a "certain arch and/or ache and/or ark of duress, the frazzled edge of 
what remains unsung."46
The relationship between music and writing is not transparent or without 
ambiguities.  Literature may "borrow" or transcribe techniques—e.g., motivic 
repetitions, serial composition—to generate new compositional possibilities, cite 
musical performances or recordings, or it may attempt to represent distinctly musical 
effects in language, pushing language aslant from its presumptive referential function 
(including onomatopoeia) to explore other capacities and possibilities of language.  
Taken together, these techniques, all of which are present in the writings of poet and 
novelist Nathaniel Mackey, exploit music's general pull or torsion as part of a 
subterranean effort to question the status of the literary text, of representation in 
literature, and its movement along the axes of convention, or paradigm, and 
recombination, or syntax.  Lurking behind my analysis here is a continuation of the 
previous chapter's effort to consider "black inventiveness," the condition of writing as 
a black author in a context where one is allowed only certain kinds of utterances, 
without determining in advance, "from the outside," the direction or provenance of the 
work as responding to, resisting, or subverting this or that conflict "in the world" that 
 
                                                 
46 Nathaniel Mackey, Eroding Witness (Urbana (IL): U of Illinois Press, 1985), 54.  Hereafter cited 
parenthetically in the text as EW. 
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the text is presumed to represent.47
Musicality and the µtopic raise the question of originality apart from the 
modification of given ideas or forms, and open the question of the relation between a 
work's sensuous or aesthetic qualities and the socio-political milieu in which it 
emerges, which is never a simple situation but it always crossed with multiple, 
contradictory impulses.  Musicality, often considered by philosophy to be mere 
materiality that, without text, lacks the power to appeal to the understanding, will be 
central to thinking of literature's fugitive spirit, the violations of the paradigmatic by 
the syntagmatic, its own materiality and organization on the page that exceeds 
hermeneutics.  More than noise, such moments are like propaganda's seeds.  They 
suggest a fugitive articulacy, impossible "speech," irreducible moments wherein 
something genuinely new becomes thinkable, something that may be, as it were, "from 
another time."  Generally, my question is what links can be drawn between music—
music as material practice, musicians and/or sound recordings—and time, the given or 
staged time of the text, and of reading and writing?  What thinking is made available 
by those writing practices, especially experimental writing practices, that cross music 
with poetry, rendering the boundary fluid if not merely nominal, making each the 
other's supplemental "flipside," such that it is undecidable whether one should refer to 
"post-bop" poetics or "open form" musics?  More specifically, what difference is there 
  The binary of oppression/resistance makes 
negativity—rejecting, subverting or critiquing a given paradigm or set of norms—the 
primary point of interest of African American or other minority literature, with the 
unintended consequence that the otherness already suggested by the use of "African 
American" to modify "literature" ceases to be merely descriptive, but becomes an 
active othering.   
                                                 
47 "Other: From Noun to Verb" Discrepant Engagement (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 
2000), 265-285.  Hereafter cited parenthetically in the text as DE. 
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between a poetics that, using musical techniques, reaches toward alternative 
imaginings in and of language, and a poetics that cites musical examples as a symbol 
of dissent, discontent, or critique?   
Nathaniel Mackey's work, which I consider in this chapter, deploys music—
music traditionally associated with African American culture, music of the African 
diaspora more broadly, and other "world music"—as referent and structuring 
principle, linked to a "practice of outside," a constantly deforming and reforming 
"tradition" that is never more than an articulated whole, a graph of linearity.  This 
work is one of encounters, staged and missed, unlikely confluences, mis- and re-
alignments, progressing through a commitment for open-form, serial poetics that 
allows for—indeed courts—repetitions within which new connections become 
available.  He produces an aesthetic informed by lack or "wounding," an anti-nostalgic 
relation to the past that articulates a claim that time's arrow implies a two-way transit, 
less concerned with redeeming (or representing) past sufferings than demonstrating 
the intrusion of one moment on another, often through the mediation of music.  Any 
articulated past, e.g., the personal past or the past of an historical group, is only one 
possible past cited in the interest of notions of a particular present, or desired future.  
That the past remains open is a condition of the coming of the future.  Mackey's 
preference for serial poetics, and the repetitions such a writing practice inevitably 
entails, allows for a temporal logic similar to that of the phonograph.  One does not 
hear a moment mummified and repeated without loss across all contexts and time, but 
a ceaselessly reiterated and thus revised and rearticulated moment that highlights the 
discrepancy between the sound one hears, the familiar sound easily put into a context 
or tradition one is most familiar with, and that sound that escapes determination.  Like 
the mechanically reproduced record, Mackey’s work opens out unto an unknown 
audience, one that will have been, as the nature of experience is to be found in the 
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recollection as re-collection, the articulation of one event with another through 
palimpsestic revision.   
Throughout his ongoing serial poem The Song of the Andoumboulou there is 
persistent reference to music, performed or playing on a jukebox.  Accompanying 
shifting spaces (nominally to memorialize the places the dead may have visited), this 
music mixes the registers of memorialization and aspiration, substituting place for 
place to emphasize locomotion, and transmission.  The name of this series comes from 
a recording, Les Dogon (an ethnic group in Mali), on which an example of the 
referenced funeral song appears.  François Di Dio writes, "The Song of the 
Andoumboulou is addressed to the spirits.  For this reason the initiates, crouching in a 
circle, sing it in a whisper in the deserted village, and only the howling of dogs and the 
wind disturb the silence of the night" (cited in EW 31).  It is, Mackey notes, a funeral 
song that moves from song to eulogy and back, a lone voice "reciting [the deceased's] 
genealogy, bestowing praise, listing all the places [the deceased] set foot while alive"  
Ultimately it marks " the entry of the deceased into the other life…'the wail of a new-
born child into a terrifying world.'"48
The Andoumboulou themselves, product of an incestuous coupling and 
emblematic of a broken kinship link, are made to bear a similar "graphicity," being a 
  Mackey insists on the "forms of graphic 
inscription in Dogon cosmology, the cosmogonic potency and role of sign, figure, 
drawing, trace, diagram, outline, image, mark, design, and so on" extending this 
emphasis to the "strikingly tactile, abraded vocality, the grating 'graphic' tone and 
timbre of the song of the Andoumboulou itself" (SA xi).  Writing is "inscribed" in 
music as much as poetry inscribes or indexes music, the two together to gesture 
"above where sound leaves off," or beyond the constraints of conventional articulacy.   
                                                 
48 Mackey, Splay Anthem (New York: New Directions Books, 2006), ix.  Hereafter cited parenthetically 
in the text as SA. 
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"rough draft of human being," and finally the human in general, displacing "true" or 
perfected humanity in some unknown future.  The terrifying world they are borne into 
is "our" world, our present encoded in their pasts and future without "our" being 
related to "them."  The specific contours of this would-be perfected humanity are, to 
my mind, less important than the aspirational quality, the constitutive incompleteness 
that informs the writing inspired by the Andoumboulou, and the centrality given to 
song—both the song as artifact and the act of singing.  The opening lines of "Song of 
the Andoumboulou 1" read  
The song says the 
dead will not 
ascend without song. 
 
That because if 
we lure them their names get 
our throats, the 
word sticks.  (EW 33) 
 
The word sticks, gets stuck in "our throats," or holds itself without coming forward or 
revealing itself.  The name marks a certain refusal of naming or speech.  Here, the 
poem performs a saying without saying, announces, if I can put it this way, a definite 
silence that, in this context, is a syncope of the "we" that sings to connect itself with its 
dead.  The message issues from the song.  However, as other critics have noted, song 
has an ambiguous relationship to signification.  "The song says…."  What is song's 
discourse?  Does this mean that the lyrics of the song alert those listening that the dead 
need song to ascend, or that something of the song—perhaps its glyphic structure or 
graphicity—alerts or "intimates" without speaking, says without "saying"?  The 
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second stanza, goes on to suggest a necessity to this song that sidesteps the (tacit) 
assent often taken to underpin such communal observances.  Song, in Mackey's 
account, intimates—both indicates through some means and draws near; without it, the 
word, become threatening, sticks.  Song thus becomes an apotropaic performance, 
guarding against some unruly word that "gets our throats"—taking away the breath, 
suffocating or disgusting, revealing the contours of community.  The stanza itself is a 
"breathless" sentence, beginning with a relative pronoun but refusing direct 
subordination, eliding a comma between "them" and "there"; its sense may or may not 
depend on what the song says.  The word that sticks and its relation to "their names" 
is, as in the epigraph to the poem "something secret," something that readers are "not 
to know."49
This secret recurs throughout the long poem in such guises as inverted syntax 
that defers or obscures grammatical subject (e.g., "Weathered raft I saw myself / adrift 
on") and silences generated by antecedentless "what" (e.g., "Not yet asleep I'm no 
longer / awake, lie awaiting what / stalks the unanswered air").
  The song of the Andoumboulou, then, is at once an artifact, a traditional 
observance that binds participants in a community or culture, and a threat to the 
identity of that community, the distinction between the living and the dead.  It is an 
observance—"The dead, they say, are dying / of thirst"—with the song being 
necessary to satisfy them, the part of them that lives on in us, if it is to live on, while 
threatening always to overflow its bounds: "not even words. / Except it says itself / for 
days // in your head" (EW 34).   
50
                                                 
49 Those are the words of "the European" who is inquiring about  a point of cosmology that  
Ogotemmêli refuses to clarify to him, "a Nazarene."  See Conversations with Ogotemmêli (London: 
Oxford UP, 1965), 58.  Cited in EW, p. 33. 
50 The antecedentless "what" becomes thematic: the title Whatsaid Serif refers to the "what-sayer," who 
must receive and respond to any story for that story to be told.  That function is internalized into the 
writing in an anticipated moment of reading or audience. 
  Like the ambivalent 
role of song and the mode of living-on for the dead, secret here suggests a reticence 
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regarding disclosure that in Chapter One I termed "erotic syncope."  However, rather 
than read this secret in light of Mackey's notion of "discrepancy"—drawn again from 
Dogon origin myths, in this case highlighting an originary, etymological "creaking" or 
words and highlighting the impossibility of rigorous self-definition for any person or 
culture—I prefer the more general term μtopian (mu-topian) to thematize poetics, and 
problems of reading.  The µ or mu- (also the name of a serial poem since collected 
with The Song of the Andoumboulou) divides itself between the present state of affairs 
it precedes as condition of possibility, and the anticipated future: it inscribes a certain 
"post-," a moment after that is also the moment before and the moment of.  Mu-topia 
indicates the "space" of writing's formation, deformation and reformation, the tension 
between originality and tradition, between the creative act and its context.  Through 
graphic similarity to the English word "utopia," I mean to suggest both the ineluctable 
graphicity such utopian longing must contend with, and, in writing, motivate.  Mu- 
also lends itself to music, both as a node around which an imagined collectivity can 
condense, and a "liberatory index of possibility" (DE 7).  It stands as "a stimulus to an 
extramusical pursuit of innovative authority," both poetic and political authority, 
rendering the relationship between poetry and music chiastic: each exposes and 
supplements the inadequacies of the other (DE 9).  As index of possibility, music 
"points to" what is or has been, there, in that place.  What power or disruptive capacity 
music "has," it has through the figurativity it enables, its retreat rather than its irruptive 
self-presentation.  Music's potential power derives from its having already been 
imbricated in social and semiotic networks, and its openness to re-positioning within 
other semiotic series or networks.  It points to or indicates possibility, but "is" not 
possibility "as such."  From this point of view, it is a sign or "symbol of dissent" 
precisely because of its indexical function when it is used in other contexts.  To the 
extent that one often associates certain music—as expression of the "experience" of 
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depravation—with dissent, that habitual association grants music a limited power to 
effect or express desire for thinking and being otherwise, meaning otherwise than 
itself both on its own and especially when represented or referenced.  It figures in the 
construction and deconstruction of an articulated whole as any such whole's "outside," 
or threatening excess.  It is in this way that the mu- to be discussed in this chapter is 
the mu- of music as much as it is the mu- of mûthos. 
With a recursiveness that is part of the definition, Mackey cites Charles 
Olson's citation of Jane Harrison’s definition of mûthos as "a re-utterance or pre-
utterance," whose first example "may have been the 'simply the interjectional 
utterance mu'" (SA x).  Within and complicating this recursive set of references, he 
cites an album, Mu-,  recorded by multi-instrumentalist Don Cherry and percussionist 
Ed Blackwell, and an Atlantis-like album thought to have disappeared into the Pacific.  
By extension, mu- becomes "[a]ny longingly imagined, mourned or remembered 
place, time, state, or condition," including, the reference to Don Cherry's album 
suggests, both empathic ensemble interplay and the "original" performance as "lost 
states" (SA x).  Each of these accounts refers both to some prior event and to some 
moment of recording or writing.  For this reason, one might re-write the "theme of 
utopic reverie" or "lost ground" as a theme of μtopia, raising the stakes on utopia's 
placeless place: such is not the impossible ground of sought-for harmony, but 
constitutively lost, "found" through a labor not reducible to the work of mourning. 
Mu-, as what gives rise to mythologies, names an opportunity and an 
obligation to carry on despite long odds, despite the absence of any final word or 
work, though this "despite" is also "because of."  As a momentary utterance, an 
interjection, mu- opposes itself to the stasis of a full or transcendent signifier as 
presence or presence-to-itself.  It is, the sonic mu- of movement, including both the 
movements of the African diaspora and the circulation of texts within its network, and 
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thus any "cross-cultural exchange," understood as a sentimental and political 
formation enacted through physical (e.g., travel, exile) and technical migrations (e.g., 
books, record).  For the same reason, mu- is also the mu- of multiple.  It marks a 
temporizing of space, a conditioned thought of an unconditioned future.  Mûthos' 
capacity to extend itself into myth must be thought as a mobile capacity that 
symbolizes myth's capacity for rearticulation, myth's transformation over time in 
response to changing conditions without collapsing or stilling into reification or myths 
of permanence.  The μtopian names possibilities for working with the inadequacy of 
language, and of thinking, in the present, literature's aspirant call to a world that will 
have awaited it.  Such lacks are instead productive, the very seeds of productivity and 
imagination, and provide leverage on the fatal closure of any system, including that 
system we call "reality."   
Mackey also ascribes to the poems a "salvag[ing] operation,"51
                                                 
51 Nathaniel Mackey, Paractitical Hinge (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005), 233.  
Hereafter cited parenthetically in the text as PH. 
 such that 
reference to the Andoumboulou, who both never existed and are all that exists of the 
human, performs a kind of conjuring work bound up with song's invocation and 
homage to the dead.  However, the conjuring work here seems to be on the model of 
mechanical reproduction, whose power rests in its ability to wrest sounds and images 
from their original contexts.  Suspending the affective investments one may have in a 
particular recording, the recording itself is neutral; it stands as a means to reverse or 
"cut back" to an earlier time without necessarily lending itself to archaeological 
projects of recovering origins or ruses to effect immortality.  From this perspective, 
the record is not a means through which a performance is preserved and repeated 
indefinitely within the limits of the storage medium, but rather through the capacities 
of repetition a store of difference, with each listening being differential listening.  The 
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repetition that the record invites, and that serial poetics risk, need not be thought of as 
a repetition of the same thing but can also, like a record's repeated playing, allow that 
repetition to be a re-articulation that is the precondition of the new.   
 
"On the edge of an 'it' otherwise / out of reach" 
Poetry shares an affinity with the phonograph in another sense: its relation to 
the senses, especially the auditory senses.  The poem inscribes an audiovisual 
encounter with an anticipated audience, allowing it to move beyond reference, beyond 
the individual poet's experience or voice.  In part, this is because of changes in 
individual experience.  Commenting on flows of information at the end of the 
twentieth century, Mackey argues that "the individual consciousness is often being 
impressed or imprinted upon, impinged upon in some cases, by what's going on in 
various places at various times and at various levels at various times" (PH 303).  He is 
specifically referring to world events and the access people have to the presents, and 
pasts, of other places.  We have already seen an example of this mediated interrelation 
in Mackey's own encounter with the Andoumboulou first by record, and later by 
books.  His metaphors, tellingly, are all related to inscription—the familiar condition 
of inscribing as one is inscribed in and by other discourses, articulated within and by 
other articulations.  Rather than remaining at the level of poetry's inscription or 
transmission of information—e.g., its reference to or invocation of other cultures—
Mackey underscores its "expression" of sensibility: "there are ways in which that 
sensibility reaches beyond or at least wants to reach beyond the confinements of the 
everyday, of the empirically verifiable, the sorts of things that we assume to define in 
the realm in which relevant events occur" (PH 303).  To identify a "cross-cultural 
poetics" as a political and aesthetic project requires that we attend to those aspects of 
the artwork that exceed or extend its logos, to the "limits of the sayable."   
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Sensibility need not oppose thought or privilege affect as the immediate 
perception of a some self-conscious being.  As Mackey's writing bears out, thinking is 
bound up with the sensible, aesthetics, where thought is not reducible to cognition.  
The term "sensibility" also refers to taste, refinement, or pathos, often within a 
particular community.  This other sense remains in play, but the reach "beyond" that 
Mackey underscores suggests that to follow the paths of thought opened by the former 
sense will lead to an undoing of the latter sense.  Of particular importance, once again, 
is the phonograph52
                                                 
52 Mackey's own record, Strick (Song of the Andoumboulou 16-25), featuring Mackey reading with 
instrumental accompaniment from Royal Hartigan and Hafez Modizradeh deserves consideration that 
extends beyond the scope of the present argument. 
 (or other reproduced sound) as a means of dissemination: 
throughout his work (and on his own recording) recordings recur, providing an oblique 
commentary, an oblique warning regarding privileging voice too greatly, since 
"voice," too, can be other than itself on account of its graphicity, that otherness in the 
voice that anticipates reproduction.  In earlier poems, this graphic quality manifests 
itself through phonetic doubling ("Dawn so belated I wept, / would've cut its tongues, 
having been denied/ Erzulie's inmost / aye") or deferral:  
Drummed,  
I put in, played  
upon by hands,  
hers,  
made a "priest" of…  
 
Faces, run  
out by water.  
 Features waste and reappear.  
(EW 46, 35, emphasis in original)   
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In the former example, aye sounded in the "inner ear" invokes eye and I, implying all 
three.  The situation named by this denial is not only refused consent, but refused 
attention, refused coupling.  In the latter, the sound pattern of the lines surrounding 
"faces" anticipates the word "faeces," which makes more literal sense to have "run out 
by water," a pun or confusion suggested by objectless "features waste" in the last line.  
Here, there is an implicit grammatical reflexivity of the language—in the absence of a 
direct object, the syntax suggests that the features waste themselves and reappear.  
Within the system of reference in the long poem, one might say that the features waste 
themselves by reappearing, or as the mode of their reappearance.  The drawing 
together of waste or faeces and face makes an implicit temporal or historical claim 
about historical process.  "Song of the Andoumboulou 4" begins with an epigraphic 
reference to powerful stones "said to have been brought by Africa by the slaves, who 
concealed them in their stomachs by swallowing them."  That story, in turn, echoes a 
story Ogotêmmeli grudgingly tells of the colored stones, taken to be the bones of a 
man named Lébé, thought to have been left as the excrement of the water spirit 
Nummo that are actually her ornaments.53
                                                 
53 The syncretism Mackey appears to be attempting between this myth and Erzulie, goddess of love in 
the Haitian vodoun pantheon known for her love of such ornamentation, is beyond the scope of my 
present argument to work out. 
  Features "waste" – appear as waste – which 
is their mode of survival as historical objects, in this case in the (orthographic or 
phonetic) similarity of semantically unrelated words.   
The implicit claim is for an "alternate vocality," an alternate sounding attuned 
to the surplus signification of language that is the terrain of poetry.  As the poem 
continues, the graphicity of language is marked by a kind of orthographic "declension" 
centered around pronouns, and, through that play, an engagement with the possibilities 
of community and narrative: 
Arced harp cut from 
 90 
wood 
one night brought up 
what's under. 
Masks 
made of trembling. 
Paint. 
Purgatorial stealth. 
Made of 
its amends an unappeasable 
indulgence. 
Makes of them its 
then, 
of it their 
if.54
These lines, structured around another "secret" ("what's under"), turn on the multiple 
valences of the phrase "made of"—invoking again the re-use of that which might be 
the waste or excess of some other process—and the structure of the if/then 
proposition.  The effects of this latter, staged in the last four lines cited, implicate at 
once conventions of writing and spelling, and fundamental philosophical or 
metaphysical presumptions expressed by its grammar.  Since English lacks a 
conditional tense or mood, one ordinarily uses the conjunction "if" in the indicative 
mood to introduce a conditional clause, usually in the present or present continuous 
tense, where one assumes the truth of an event that has not yet happened.  A second 
 
 
                                                 
54 Mackey, School of Udhra (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1993), 29.  Hereafter cited 
parenthetically within the text as SU.  This poem is of the "mu" series. 
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clause, often but not necessarily beginning with "then" typically answers the 
conditional clause, stipulating that at such time as the event of the conditional clause 
comes to be, something else will result.55
In the poem, an unspecified agency (syntactically "arced harp") makes of 
"them" a "then," at once temporalizing and making conditional a (human or other) 
collectivity that the object pronoun "them" would replace grammatically.  
Simultaneously, the poem draws attention to the fundamentally grammatical nature of 
propositions or declarations of belonging, the contingent, lag-behind nature of 
collectivities, which may not be known, or known to themselves, in the moment of 
their constitution.  At another level, this moment marks a moment of the "birth" of 
narrative, if not song—constitutively in medias res: the arced harp makes "them" a 
formative feature of its past: its then.  The transition from "it" to "if" reverses the 
if/then proposition, the grammatical foundation of cause and effect, to a temporally 
unclear "then/if," which can only make sense as part of a series of contingencies: 
Then, if… if… and if….  "Being" becomes a product—made of—temporality, not vice 
  Logically, if/then propositions presume the 
truth of both clauses, putting the latter in a contingent or (temporally) dependent 
relation to the former, annexing temporality as a problem by making it merely internal 
to whatever appears.  "If," in other words, introduces a calculation of possibility, of 
conditions of possibility for some future action within a grammatically conceived 
cause-and-effect relationship, those things that can happen in the world as it is given, 
as a condition of its givenness.  For this reason, if/then propositions are directly 
implicated in epistemology, that set of foundational assumptions for thinking that 
determine, for example, what is excess or waste, and what is central.   
                                                 
55 It makes no difference for my argument here that the subjunctive mood has a nearly identical 
grammar (e.g., if it were/had been raining, [then] I would/would have brought my umbrella), since the 
grammatical presuppositions remain fundamentally unchanged.  The subjunctive mood draws upon a 
similar calculation of possibility, which is at issue here. 
 92 
versa.  Rather than one thing (I bring my umbrella) happening as a result of another (it 
rains), the inversion here suggests that being—as object or subject, them or it—
initiates a series of contingencies, that only masquerade as certainties.  Causality, of 
course, is not abolished by this inversion.  On the contrary, chance is affirmed.  In 
both instances, the transition arced harp effects through what it has "brought up"—
either unearthed or mentioned—requires only that a single letter be changed to alter 
the sense of the lines.  In both cases, the letter changes to another either ordinally or 
morphologically proximate: m to n, t to f.56
                                                 
56 Here, it is worth recalling that the name of Mackey's third volume, containing Song of the 
Andoumboulou 16-35, is Whatsaid Serif, invoking both the collaborative nature of storytelling practices 
and typography, with "seraph" hovering sonically along the edges. 
  These two transformations—one word 
"made of" or into another—mark the structure of the conditional by illustrating the 
insubstantial nature of distinctions presumed to be solid.  The invocation of music's 
transformative or generative capacities, its ambivalent position within linguistic 
semiotic systems and adjacent to those systems makes temporality of the 
Andoumboulou, at once prior to the humans that "we are" and contemporaneous with 
"us" to the point of indifference a feature of the writing itself.  Poetry, that is, borrows 
music's capacity to confront and thwart the pull of grammar to "say" the unsayable. 
This "unsayable" itself is made a theme by repetitions throughout the work, 
pushing language not beyond itself, but further into itself, into its own materiality.  
One example involves the word "loquat," the fruit of the loquat tree, but also the third-
person present subjunctive conjugation of the Latin , to speak: 
Loquat exuberance 
got the best of them, loquat 
eloquence, loquat allure. 
(WS 69) 
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Though I would emphasize the rhythmic and phonetic qualities of this of this 
repetition as crucial to the work of the play, repetition does not make the words 
"meaningless," but instead underscores the meaningfulness of language's 
sensuousness, its eloquent sensibility or fugitive articulacy beyond the immediate 
meaning of the words.  This sensuousness—the sound and look of the word—
anticipates a later moment of fraught etymology:  
Anomalous bed they 
called "loquacious,"         melodious 
word whose root they mistook, 
took   
to mean loquat-sweet… 
(WS 69, Mackey's ellipsis).   
These lines establish an aporia or point of indistinction between "loquat" in English, 
which derives the term from transliterated Cantonese, and "loquat" in Latin, which is 
indirectly related to "loquacious" after all.  "Root," like the repeated "took," draws 
attention to the histories of contact and conquest that have shaped English's 
development.  Simultaneously, the connection to the present subjunctive mood returns 
us to the if/then proposition discussed above, insofar as the present subjunctive of "to 
speak" resembles the conditional: e.g., "whether s/he speak or not…" or "I recommend 
that s/he not speak."  Unlike the grammatical structure of the conditional, which treats 
time in terms of simple cause and effect, the subjunctive mood indicates states not 
thought to exist.  As "took" is related to "mistook" whether we recognize a 
commonality or not, so the two senses of loquat are bound to one another by a third 
language that has, so to speak, consumed them both, without being able to reduce one 
to the other.  Indeed, as the poem seems to suggest, the confusion of the two, brought 
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out by their common spelling and pronunciation, is a condition of possibility and 
impossibility for language. 
Within the long poem, the speculative (and refused) relation of the fruit to 
speech occurs earlier through direct citation:  
[…] "What does 'Language  
is a fruit of which the  
skin  
is called chatter' mean?" (WS 19).57
This chatter, another name for which is speculation, that necessary attempt to think 
beyond present conditions, that chanced relation poetry risks and enacts is a necessary 
precondition, here drawing out the surprising correspondence between two words that, 
though unrelated, poetry relates through homophony and orthography, revealing a 
"fruitful" arbitrariness in signification, and the site-specific bounds of any locution.  
The interrogation of "root," which also must be read two ways, like the proliferation of 
anagrams
    
58
                                                 
57 The phrase is Cerno Bokar's, a West African Sufi teacher, who, according to Louise Brenner, strived 
in his teachings to "move 'beyond the letter' of the written word."  The citation in full: "Language is a 
fruit of which the skin is called chatter, the flesh eloquence, and the seed good sense.  Those whose 
profession it is to flatter the masses [i.e., the griots or praise singer-musicians] know the uses of all 
these parts, and they employ them in a marvelous fashion."  See Louise Brenner, West African Sufi: The 
Religious Heritage and Spiritual Search of Cerno Bokar Saalif Taal (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1984), 179. 
58 Examples of these include "That" (ahtt, ttha), "Star" (tsar, rast, rats), and , nearly,"alterably": 
"Holding air he was / holding the world, he intimated, / lolled his tongue, trailed / off into singing, 
Lebert / Aaly / the name he now took…" (WS 79).  That name derives from an Art Ensemble of 
Chicago composition dedicated to Albert Ayler, for whose unspoken name "Lebert Aaly" is a near 
anagram. 
 throughout the poem, emphasizes the capacities of language users to more 
or less arbitrarily redefine or refashion words to suit their needs, to articulate what 
"conventionally articulate speech" leaves unsayable.  Better, such play emphasizes the 
multiple, simultaneous bases on which language is constituted, the material base in the 
supposed message.  Rather than emphasizing language as power, then, language's use 
is underscored, alongside an implicit claim for poetry as a process of tapping 
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language's potential.  This poetry invites us, that is, not to think about what words 
mean but to look at how they mean, and how they might mean otherwise.   
The Song of the Andoumboulou, chronicling the journey of its eponymous 
subjects to reach the surface of the earth, stretches between past and present, engaging 
a question about the relation of one to the other.  In different terms, past and present 
are put in a differential relation to one another through a shifting referential terrain 
charting movement from and between sites (mythic and otherwise), temporal moments 
through the intrusion of songs "on the box" of the poem's locations, and through the 
pronominal shifts I have been discussing.  That sites become more specific—"The 
same cry taken / up in Cairo, Córdoba, / north / Red Sea near Nagfa, Muharraq"—
seems compensatory for the unstable identities of the actors effected by the mixed 
points of view.  The "voice" of the poem emerges in first or third person, singular or 
plural, often in a self-interrogative tone that locates the "identity" of the poem's 
speaker(s) outside of the presumptions of language, or speaking, of identity.  As with 
epic poetry, there is a quest to found a nation—to recover "lost ground"59
                                                 
59 In the preface to Splay Anthem, Mackey writes about "Mu" that it "carries a theme of utopic reverie, a 
theme of lost ground and elegiac allure" and goes on to write that the "places named in the song of the 
Andoumboulou, set foot on by the deceased while alive but lost or taken away by death, could be called 
"Mu" (x).  In terms of my argument, though the tone of the reverie may be utopic, the movement of the 
writing, as writing, is µtopic. 
—although, 
as reference to established territories attests, this founding will necessarily be a re-
founding or re-inscription of space: "each the / other's non-pronominal elsewhere / 
nominal / out" (WS 59).  Along these lines, transitions between places in Song are 
typically merely nominal, containing an implicit deictic: "It was a train / in southern 
Spain we / were on," "it was a train outside São Paulo on our way to Algeciras we 
were one," "a / train gotten on in Miami" (WS 30-31).  Unlike epic, these poems do not 
establish home or nation, but instead continue moving toward "some ecstatic 
elsewhere."  This is µtopia—that trace of the here-and-now immanent to founded 
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nation as much as lost ground.  In its singularity, µtopian "site" is not available for 
myths of founding or re-founding.  It marks the trace of irreducible otherness that such 
myths of origin or emergence suppress.  The "outside" sought can only be a "nominal 
out," a so-called "out" that poetry in particular, but literature more generally 
asymptotically approaches through its poetics, which extend beyond themselves 
toward a potential future.   
The status of the Andoumboulou, cast in the unlikely role of quasi-epic heroes, 
thematizes the location of this "exterior" as interior to some other system or structure 
(i.e., the Earth), in much the same way that "lost ground" is not lost to all, or lost in the 
same way.  Coupled with the shifts of pronouns, the use of deixis to mark their 
timeless sojourn, both in the form of geographic sites and irruptive "cuts on the box" 
shifts the emphasis away from ipseity—the personal identity or being upon which 
literature is often presumed to be based, the being it is presumed to express—toward 
hæcceity, or here-and-nowness.  Emphasizing the orphic potentialities of song, 
especially its generative ecstasy (its literally coming from another place), one can 
either have song's power, or the resistance it is supposed to express.  Music's orphic 
potential is the condition of identity's impossibility: ipseity is always "deferred," or 
"reft" (SA 15, 55).  As with the record itself, Song seems concerned with the 
dissemination of singularity as that which is not caught in considerations of selfhood, 
"selfness" or identity.  Such selfhood in writing, insofar as it relies on a grammatical 
structure of pronominal substitution (and tendencies of reading, as discussed in the 
previous chapter), becomes iterable.  The emphasis on pronouns and the breaks of and 
within pronominal substitution implicates the metonymic substitutions of any 
articulated unit: "Uninevitable they, / however much it seemed otherwise" (WS 20).  
Lost, µtopic ground is "remnant of an alternate / life," an echo of a potential world 
opposing the merely possible, the trace of what is not made present in recollection.  
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Music in Song becomes the privileged locus for the organizing/disorganizing, 
gathering/dispersing movement of the µtopic, the aspirant call whose tone is bent blue 
by unfulfilled longing for response, unfulfilled longing for some not yet realized 
collectivity's answer.   
 
Phantom Objectivity and Objective Hauntings 
Neither the "here" nor "now" of hæcceity is uncomplicated in Mackey's work.  
Both prove to be self-differential, often, as with pronouns, through the problems of 
self-reference.  In his writing about poetics, and in the concepts produced or invoked 
in his writing—particularly such notions as duende (in García Lorca's formulation), 
metavoice, ahttlessness (anagrammatic "thatlessness"), ythm (anagrammatic "myth" or 
(rh)ythm) and the andoumboulouous in Song, post-expectancy and the cut in From a 
Broken Perfume Bottle Traces Still Emanate (which grows out of Song)—the 
sensibility writing reaches after is marked by a constitutive incompleteness or active 
un-completing, a suspicion of the givenness of any moment or utterance.  These 
concepts or notions—inflections of the µtopian—share an attention to what is 
immanent, though not necessarily present, to language—to what is "underneath" or 
"beyond" language while still, in a sense, "belonging to" it.  Partially at stake in the 
insistence on sound recording and performance practices related to sound technology, 
particularly in the serial novel, is the temporal rift phonography dramatically stages 
between source and audience, and the kinds of attendant practices—for performer and 
audience—that can emerge with the possibility of repeating an experience of listening.  
The record serves both as a touchstone for the work (Song's "another cut came on the 
box," the arguments staged via particular recordings and the exchange of records and 
cassettes in From a Broken Bottle, Traces of Perfume Still Emanate, considered 
presently) and as an implicit, internal challenge to notions of poetry, in the broadest 
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sense, as a simple "expression" or "transmission" of "personal experience."  As 
personal experience is both informed and changed by encounters with others, through 
the influx of information (including the ideological formations that yield "personal 
experience" as a meaningful concept) sound reproduction enables and participates in, a 
poetics marked by contact with the record raises the question what encounter is made 
available in the poem, that is, what the poem does express if not experience.   
For poetics, of course, the question is not the expression of experience but the 
struggles towards such expression, the ways in which poetry stages an estranging 
encounter with language, and what Walter Benjamin referred to as language's 
"impartibility" [Mitteilbarkeit].  Among other things, poetry is the encounter with 
language as medium, its participation with the "outside" or edges of its own 
exteriority.  Discussing his title Eroding Witness, Mackey describes such tarrying with 
language's outside as bringing "writing or language as witnessing into a kind of 
complication that can appear to be erosive, that can appear to be pulling the ground or 
the foundation out from under what we normally expect in the speech acts and the 
writing acts that we encounter" (PH 309).  This apparent erosivity points to the limits 
of expression, the participation with language's supposed "outside," or what is deemed 
inexpressible within certain limits, which are treated as if "internal" to language's 
functioning because they are integral to what can be made sensible at a given time.  If 
music serves as an index of liberatory potentiality that informs poetry and provides a 
supplemental sense of (political and aesthetic) authority, the poem in its turn would be 
an index of the struggle of language after what it cannot (yet) say, both nothingness 
and the not-yet.  Music, understood as fugitive articulacy, is no mere index; it is a 
principle of poetics, a graph of "words meaning / more / than the world they / pointed 
at," or writing's disruption of "natural" or given totalities (WS 22).   
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Fugitive articulacy, those moments of language's self-supercession, suggests 
one "eccentric out"—a courting of the expressionless, a saying of the impossible.  In 
Song, the means include a complex network of references, especially musical 
references, and a shifting collective-individual "voice" that splits the poem between 
epic and lyric, suggesting that lyric perspective relies upon a suppressed epic or 
mythic foundation, which serial form defers.  In his related serial novel, From a 
Broken Perfume Bottle Traces Still Emanate, such articulacy is considered in more 
explicitly musical terms and impartibility thematized through the epistolary form, 
written by "N." to an interlocutrix addressed as "Angel of Dust."  There, characters 
share dreams or divine visitations, and suffer vertiginous "cowrie shell attacks" that 
stall the novel's progress.  In this novel, to which this chapter now turns, music is less 
supplement—an alternative expression that picks up where language leaves off: 
"Words / don't go there, they said, / no sooner said than they were / there, albeit there 
defied location…" (WS 91).60
                                                 
60 The phrase "words don't go there" is often attributed to saxophonist Charles Lloyd as his response to 
an interviewer who requested that he comment on piece of his music.  In this poem and prose co-
authored with Art Lange Mackey declares that "Writers influenced by jazz have been variously rising to 
the challenge of proving him wrong."  See Moment's Notice: Jazz in Poetry and Prose eds. Mackey and 
Lange (Minneapolis: Coffee House Press, 1993), ii. 
  Any possible "expression" must orient itself spatially 
between two sites, which may be infinitesimally proximate, and temporally between 
two moments.  Expression, that is, takes place within the limits of deixis, a there that 
always will have "defied location": "No 'it / was' could be made of it, pure / dispatch" 
(SA 79).  The epistolary form, particularly in this novel, makes both narration's lagging 
behind the event and the struggle with/against deixis into themes, simultaneously 
questioning the status of the "correspondence" between the text of the narration and 
the event itself.  This "there," a "'space' we're all immigrants from," is a null space or 
μtopia available only as a retrospective figuration, "resonance rather than resolution" 
as N. puts it later.  This "space," in other words, is a vertiginous, negative space (not to 
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be confused with the concept of the same name from graphic design), a space of non-
happening: a caesura or syncope.  It is a pivot point from which many lines of flight 
can be drawn, and re-drawn, but it is not a timeless there awaiting determination. 
N.'s first letter to Angel of Dust, copied to Jack Spicer, García Lorca and H-
mu, is "Song of the Andoumboulou 6."  This prose poem reads as a statement of 
Mackey's poetics, making a case for "absence as unavoidably an inherence in the 
texture of things (dreamseed, habitual cloth)" (EW 50).  However, more than the 
difference in the signatory, a moment of deixis complicates such a straightforward 
reading: "I see things in your world as solid in a way my 'myriad words' can't even 
hope to be. […] Only an other (possibly Other) sort of solidarity, as if its very 
underseams—or to be more exact, those of its advent—sprouted hoofs" (EW 50, only 
"solid" italicized in original).  The author of this letter, identified as N., locates himself 
in another world, identifies as possible Other, and contrasts Angel of Dust's "solid" 
world with his own, which he insists is not "insubstantial, unreal or whatever else."  
This prepositional location inscribes the difference, again, between a poetics 
concerned with ipseity and one concerned with hæcceity, marking a similar distinction 
between a cross-cultural identity and a cross-cultural poetics, between experience in 
the text and experience of the text.  Another letter follows in the third section of "Song 
of the Andoumboulou 7," where N. describes "last night's poem (which I have yet to 
write)" and to insist on the need for a "cut somewhere" as a precondition for 
"relational coherence," inscribing a relation between "them" and "then," as we have 
already seen.   
Early in Bedouin Hornbook, the first novel of the Perfume Bottle series, (which 
similarly begins with a reference to writing that has not or will not happen—"I'm not 
at all sure this won't be the last letter you'll receive from me"), the "cut" becomes a 
specifically temporal concept related to reggae, and epistolary form's relation to 
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"relational coherence."61
 This response, which in the supposed time of writing amounts to an anticipation, an 
aspirant "claim to connection," seems to be drawing on one-drop reggae where 
listeners (and band members) may perceive the same song as having two different 
tempi.  This structural aporia means, for example, that one could justify transcribing 
the music in two different time signatures, or dance in two different ways, but this 
  Apologizing for returning to "business we've been over 
before," N. writes of 
the cricketlike chirp one gets from the guitar in most reggae bands as 
the echoic spectre of a sexual "cut" (sexed/unsexed, seeded/unsown, 
etc.)—"ineffable glints or vaguely audible grunts of unavoidable 
alarm."  (BH 38) 
 
Responding to apparent objection ("You got me all wrong on what I meant by "a 
sexual 'cut'"), N. goes on to clarify that he does not have in mind "'a thinly veiled 
romance of distantiation'": 
I put the word "cut," remember, in quotes.  What I was trying to get at 
was simply the feeling I've gotten from the characteristic, almost 
clucking beat one hears in reggae, where the syncopation comes down 
like a blade, a "broken connection.  Here I put the word "broken" in 
quotes to get across the point that the pathos one can't help hearing in 
that claim mingles with a retreating sense of peril, as though danger 
itself were beaten back by the boldness, however "broken,"  of its call 
to connection.  (BH 42) 
 
                                                 
61 Bedouin Hornbook (San Francisco: Sun and Moon Classics, 1997 [1986]), 9.  Hereafter cited 
parenthetically in the text as BH. 
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choice will have depended upon imposing a structure, closing an open form.  The 
openness, however, means that the "originating" instance is not singular, but endlessly 
differed/deferred: there is an insistent "previousness evading each and every natal 
occasion," an insistent both/and rather than an either/or.    
N. terms the cut "sexual" because  
the word "he" and the word "she" rummage about in the crypt each 
defines for the other, reconvening as whispers at the chromosome level 
as though the crypt had been a crib, a lulling mask, all along.  In short, 
it's the apocalypse I'm talking about, not courtship. (BH 42-43, my 
italics) 
 
In this account, the moment of (insistently grammatical and textual) identity's birth is 
also death.  "Abort" and "origin" share an etymological root, made conceptual here 
insofar as the articulation of an origin or singularity of being ("he" or "she") relates to 
the desire to subvert "relational coherence" in favor of a singular (given) narrative.  As 
in the previous chapter, what is at issue is an erotic syncope, the "broken" or refused 
connection upon which narrativity depends, the empty site of articulation that, analogy 
to reggae suggests, is a matter of perception, of superimposing closure onto an 
essentially open set.  All of this, of course, continues similar considerations discussed 
above, although in a specifically narrative, prosaic form, extending these observations 
to literature more generally.  In addition, the epistolary form dramatizes the scene and 
medium of writing, the relays and negotiations entailed in sense-making.  Specifically, 
letters signed N. install a double signature, opening the question of the relationship 
between the author, Mackey, whose name appears on the title pages of the books of 
this series and who speaks in the name of the other, N., whose name appears at the end 
of most of the letters throughout the series as a counter-signatory.  One is invited to 
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consider the relation between the two "authors," the structure of which suggests a 
cycle of masks or avatars, a cycle of misadventures, or wrong turns; in a word, one is 
invited to conceive of them in a serial relationship, a series whose temporal 
boundaries are questioned (a questioning staged within the text by the first letter).  The 
term "avatar" highlights N.'s semi-autonomous position vis-à-vis Mackey, accents 
both the concept's religious sense—the descent of a deity to earth in an incarnate, 
fleshly form—and its contemporary, everyday sense—that which stands in for or 
represents the (transcendental, infinite) self in some other form.  The avatar, in other 
words, is virtual, representative of, but not reducible to some originary entity. 
Mackey has explained that in creating N. he was "invoking a certain audience, 
a rather spectral audience" to mitigate the severe "sense of isolation" in which Mackey 
felt himself to be working (PH 298).  Such isolation, implied by the epistolary form 
and figured throughout the novels in the form of audience demands and expectations, 
the negotiations of tradition, and especially the anonymity of the audience who 
encounters the band primarily via their record, Orphic Bend, might be usefully 
understood through recourse to the spectrality Mackey invokes.  Any audience, as 
ideal readership, exists only spectrally, as that absent or deferred "body" whose 
responses are partially anticipated or at least awaited, a revenant body whose fit with 
any present audience is inherently imperfect.  The audience participates in that 
"absence [that is] unavoidably an inherence in the texture of things" (EW 50).  The 
central conflict, subtending all event and argument, proves to be a concern over origin, 
the origins of origin, what N. calls "Supreme Friction" whose unbending invokes a 
desire to "misconceive or miscarry, to want to be done with any relational coherence, 
to want to abort" (EW 54).   
N., then, is a gnostic remainder carried over from another text and the reminder 
of another, alternative beginning, the invented sense of the past.  The opening letter of 
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Bedouin Hornbook, dated 14 June 1978, thematizes the narrative's uncertain origin, its 
own fraught and difficult birth.  N. writes of a dream he has had in which he comes 
upon an open manhole around which lays an assortment of plumbing fixtures he 
understands to be a disassembled bass clarinet.  Intuiting that the "crowd"—a spectral 
pressure—wants to hear him play John Coltrane's "Naima," he finds himself playing 
the version of Coltrane's "Cousin Mary" recorded by Archie Shepp on Four for Trane.  
He throws in "a few licks of [his] own" before "coming to the realization that what 
[he] was playing existed on a record," the vinyl's scratches audible "somewhere in 
back and to the left" of him (BH 7).  His own performance, including his own 
supplemental licks, are pre-inscribed on a record, which in the dream serves as a 
disruption of the performer's identity in favor of emphasizing the performance's 
iterability.62
This beginning, after the first beginning in the sixth poem of a series, promises 
an end—"please don't expect anything more from me in the way of words"—that does 
not arrive, after having figured a dream of an original performance that turns out not to 
be original.  What kind of "birth" or "origin" is this?  What are we to make of this 
  In addition to the stereophonic specificity of this account, which I will 
address toward the end of this chapter, this opening scene also dramatizes very clearly 
the question of expression or impartibility, extending those through considerations of 
performance and a newly problematized "originality."  Though N. throws in "a few 
licks," the solo's "proper" signatory remains Archie Shepp, meaning those familiar 
with Four for Trane would recognize it, even if initially that recognition might take 
the form of a teasing familiarity, a "repetition" simultaneously masked and enhanced 
by being "infinitely more gruffly resonant and varied and warm" (BH 7).   
                                                 
62 Both "Naima," dedicated to Coltrane's wife at the time, and "Cousin Mary," dedicated to a cousin, 
were initially released on Coltrane's Giant Steps album which, as Lewis Porter points out, contains 
several such dedications, including one to band mate Paul Chambers ("Mr. P.C.") and a stepdaughter 
("Syeeda's Song Flute").  See John Coltrane: His Life and His Music (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1999), 156. 
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series, from one world and one book to another, which continues after its proffered 
end, seemingly, like the Song of the Andoumboulou, on condition of an end, or death 
that must retrace the steps and genealogy of the dead?  Emphasizing the retracing 
rather than the iteration of cultural norms or dispositions, the several deferred 
beginnings (and endings) of Perfume Bottle underscore the negotiations between those 
marks left behind—e.g., tradition, previous occasions—and progression in the present 
moment, which can never fully dislodge itself from that past which is the condition of 
possibility for the present.  As the analysis of the cut suggests, however, that past itself 
is not a simple origin: other possible perspectives that one can imaginatively re-engage 
or re-activate haunt the articulated past.  Such openness to that haunting co-presence—
at the expense of a secured identity—may go toward explaining the ludic allusiveness, 
which cites both prior texts and albums as "origins."  The past emerges as that in and 
against the flow of time, a rhythmic structure that turns in and against itself "in the 
way of words."   
Formally, this vertiginous plane of the text is gestured toward through 
allusions to philosophers, anthropologists and musicians, through the recurrent, 
incapacitating visitations from elsewhere (the "scattered cowrie shell attacks"), and 
through the after-the-fact lectures/libretti, which tend to correspond obliquely with 
events in the lives of the band members, producing a sense that "there's no 'really' 
when it comes to 'was,'" that "I wasn't really there, that the 'I' which was was an 'I' 
which wasn't my own."63
                                                 
63 The context that gives rise to these observations is N.'s reflection on the use of "alienate" as a verb to 
describe the dispossession of Kenyan peoples by the English, giving historical specificity to the concern 
over words' part of speech, underscoring the performativity of words. 
  The first such visitation occurs during a heat wave—taking 
form of a strange coincidence for Penguin and what seems like possession for 
Djamilaa, who begins to rant about the "enemies of Ra" in the band, which, upon 
realizing that it is the "hour of God" and the hour Coltrane died, generates a wave of 
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dizziness in N.  Upon the spell's subsiding, the phrase "phantom objectivity" haunts 
N.: "It refers to a situation, if I've got it right, where we find ourselves haunted by 
what we ourselves initiate" (BH 88).  His discussion of the relationship of (musical) 
form to conformity and thus to fatalism, a situation "so pat as to become oppressive," 
directly invokes Lukács, for whom "phantom objectivity" refers to "an autonomy that 
seems so strictly rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its [the 
commodity structure's] fundamental nature: the relation between people."64
Thus, encounters such as the scattered cowrie shell attacks (and it is not 
accidental cowrie shells are used in western Africa as both currency and missiles) are 
not, or not simply re-visitations of other times, remembrances of otherwise lost or 
forgotten moments; they are not events at all, but rather, again, the suspension of 
event, syncope.  Within the novels, they occur with increasing regularity, serving as a 
  Mackey, 
in another context, describes phantom objectivity as the effects of the "the veil by 
which the social order renders its role in the construction of reality invisible" (DE 
235).  Phantom objectivity effectively erases traces of its mediation of "reality," and is 
thus aligned with the phantom of "phantom limb," to the extent that in both cases 
"phantom" is a "relative, relativizing term that cuts both ways, occasioning a shift in 
perspective between real and unreal, an exchange of attributes between the two" (DE 
236).  Invocations of the category of experience, understood this way, must be taken 
with a proverbial grain of salt.  Whatever poetry might "say" about experience, on 
whatever frequency, is always already in advance of itself, haunted, as in the opening 
recounted dream, by the conditions of its intelligibility, the conditions of any speech or 
thought, even as poetry attempts to transcend or un-limit thought.  
                                                 
64 Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 1971), 83.  Lukács goes on to suggest that commodity exchange and its social forms greatly 
influence the "total inner and outer life of society," meaning that, using N.'s language, the commodity 
system has a quantum-qualitative effect to the extent that its presence in a given society is total.  The 
eccentric "out" N. seeks, therefore, must be a correspondingly quantum-qualitative out, i.e., a strategy. 
 107 
dramatic wedge, and an alternate narrative timeline that, like the libretti, provides a 
separate set of characters and possible events.  The first such moment, here a broken-
glass attack rather than a broken cowrie shell attack, occurs in Bedouin Hornbook after 
N. finally manages to orchestrate an encounter with the Crossroads Choir, an 
"anonymous, axiomatic band whose existence had always been taken for granted," 
known primarily through rumor, encountered in secrecy (BH 111).  They play at a 
scene of uncertain characteristics: "[o]ne moment it seemed like a cathedral, the next a 
storefront church.  The possibilities seemed to go on without end" (BH 112).  The 
crowd, as in the opening dream, is anonymous, "composed of hairless, mannikinlike 
men and women, each of whose faces wore itself like a tight tautological mask," a 
parody of presence (BH 112).  During a flute player's solo, after the latter's recourse to 
speech ("'As for me,' he muttered, 'who am neither I nor not-I, I have strayed from 
myself and I find no remedy but despair'") leads the audience into bacchant-like 
frenzy, "inventing" call and response where there had been none, "numerous bits of 
broken glass imbedded themselves in [N.'s] forehead, each of them the seed of a low, 
breathy growl which seemed to emanate from the stars" (BH 115).  Simultaneously 
"heavensent" and evocative of a past trauma (a car accident), the attack spurs thought 
of the necessary pre-conditions to "free the future from every flat, formulaic 'outcome,' 
from its own investment in the contested shape of an otherness disfigured by its 
excursion thru the world."  The attack spurs the imagination of a future on conditions 
other than those made available as repetitions of the "objective" present.  However, 
this "space" (N. refers to it as "the sweet, sour, somewhat acidic hollow in which what 
was spoken belied the mootness of what might better have been intoned") cannot be 
taken as an unproblematic "good."  Mûthos is a destructive capacity, a "vacated 
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premise" that will have been known, "an image of change I thought I'd one day grasp" 
(BH 119).65
The onset of each subsequent cowrie shell attack is accompanied by music, a 
particular performance from a particular record.  The following letter finds N. laid up 
in bed suffering from what "feel more like shattered cowrie shells…tightfisted 
imprints, fossil imprints" accompanied by a feeling of dizziness and Ornette 
Coleman's version of George and Ira Gershwin's "Embraceable You" "piped into [his] 
head like subcoritcal muzak" (BH 125).  He describes them as an "inverse gravity in 
which [he's] cut loose from every anchoring assumption…a radical, uprooting vertigo, 
a rash, an evaporative aspect of [him]self" (BH 125, my emphasis).  His 
hospitalization lasts about six months (the entire narrative to date ranges from 14 June 
1978 to 5 September 1983) and represents an arrestation in a narrative already prone 
to small developments and dilations of time.  The spell, which doctors cannot 
pathologize, is broken when members of the band visit N. and, silently, "play" 
(producing no sound on their respective instruments), a pantomimed performance of 
varying tempos (described by analogy to phonographic playback—33, 45 and 78 
RPM) that proves to be "an inoculation in the clearest, most radical sense of the term" 
(BH 137).  Most senses of "inoculation" refer to the introduction of the germs, 
especially of a disease, into the body through a wound.  The OED lists two other 
meanings: one that involves "imbuing a person with feelings, opinions, etc.," a graft of 
sentiment, and an older sense, referring to the junction where the parts of two plants 
become continuous, a graft in the literal, horticultural sense.  Read in this way, this is 
the moment of the band's crystallization into a quasi-organic ensemble, while formally 
   
                                                 
65 This episode also marks the first instance in Perfume Bottle of the "word balloons" that accompany 
many of the band's performances and record, which I will address below. 
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crystallizing the disparate threads and concerns of the novel, the disparate times of 
practice as preparation and practice as activity, into a fragile unity. 
Almost immediately, Lambert expresses his desire to add a new member to 
their ensemble through the medium of a composition, "Prometheus."  His introduction 
of the composition references an unsigned quotation that gives an added dimension to 
the cowrie shell attacks: "'To articulate the past historically,' he [Lambert] said, 'means 
to seize hold of a memory when it flashes up at a moment of danger.  This danger 
affects both the content of a tradition and its receivers: that of becoming a tool of the 
ruling classes'" (BH 146).  The citation is, of course, the sixth thesis of Walter 
Benjamin's "On the Philosophy of History," opposing historical materialism to 
Leopold von Ranke's view of historiography that would represent the past "as it really 
was," which is precisely the condition of the future being thinkable only as the fateful 
outcome of that articulated past "as it was."66
                                                 
66 Walter Benjamin, "On the Philosophy of History" trans Harry Zohn in Selected Writings, Vol. 4 
1938-1940, eds. Eiland and Jennings (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).  Hereafter cited as 
SW4.  
  The formal juxtaposition of this citation 
with the reconsiderations of kinship that inform Perfume Bottle and the first cowrie 
shell attack suggests that attacks are not on the order of Proust's memoire involuntaire, 
but rather that the vertigo is that of a forceful, though involuntary, critical reorientation 
or re-constellation of memory as a spectral substrate to things "as they are."  As 
moments that bring N. face to face with the possibility of non-being, unrestrained 
µtopia, they spur the thought of things that might have been, and thus the awareness 
that things can always be and have been otherwise.  In this way, they are an answer the 
problem the novel (and Mackey's poetics more generally) pose regarding the 
relationship to loss as originary, inevitable and inevitably mourned, with or without 
specific historical or biographical occasion.  The aim is neither to seek an external 
object to internalize as the completion of the self, nor to find "resistant material" in an 
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authentic past.67  Instead, both of those "lacks" are located within the ontological and 
ideological structures that give rise to them, demanding the impossible imagination of 
an ecstatic 'out,' figured as an involuntary out, with that which is excluded in the 
expression of a "self."  Radically, then, the cowrie shell attacks figure the syncope of 
the self, the exposure of time as "double-jointed," the multiplicity of any moment 
referenced above with respect to the musical measure, to a co-existence or relation that 
cannot be discussed in causal terms (DBR 97).68
In its most radical, threatening form, these attacks culminate in the introduction 
of N.'s own avatar, Natty Dredj (shortened to "Dredj"—the name referencing a Bob 
Marley composition and a key figure in Rastafarian mythology representing a tear in 
the self), who writes dateless letters to the Angel of Dust in Bass Cathedral, the fourth 
book in the series.  The dateless letters, the first of which evokes the hot Santa Ana 
winds that occasion Djamilaa's spells, explicitly reference a being "outside of time," 
which is to say a non-being, being that is not yet or is no longer.  This datelessness 
corresponds to a flux in the signatory, "namelessness inversely related to his recent 
graduation beyond initial constraint" (BC 45).
 
69
                                                 
67 Like Adorno and Horkheimer, however, N. also critiques what he calls "middlebrow American tastes, 
middle-of-the-road aesthetics," which are more or less congruent with what the former call "the style of 
the culture industry." 
68 Djbot Baghostus's Run (Los Angeles: Sun & Moon Press, 1993), 97.  Hereafter cited parenthetically 
in the text as DBR. 
69 Bass Cathedral (New York: New Directions Publishing Corp, 2008), 45.  Henceforth cited 
parenthetically in the text as BC. 
  The new signature, making literal the 
µtopic dissolution of self the cowrie shell attacks imply, fundamentally changes N.'s 
already fractious relationship with the Angel of Dust (who, in writing the liner notes 
for their album, speaks for the band).  Within the terms of the novel, this newest 
speaking-for literalizes the ongoing concern of speaking with the voice of another, 
linked with the metavoice or "voice" from elsewhere, which remains among the 
novel's central concerns from the opening letter, previously discussed.  That the 
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cowrie shells are shattered suggests that this play of avatars is not reducible to the 
currency they might otherwise invoke; this is not a mere exchange of equivalents or 
phantom self-generation, which is not the same as saying they are strictly aneconomic.  
The attacks are often triggered by public deaths—Bob Marley's and Thelonious 
Monk's for example70
The shattered cowrie shell attacks raise the question of "redeeming" the dead 
or otherwise past, a redemption whose status is always fraught.  To the extent that 
cowrie shells function as currency, their shattering defers economic connotations—
both monetary and theological—suggesting an attempt to subvert the tragic heroism or 
flattening identity at the root of common notions of redemption, especially the 
messianic sacrifice or "exchange" of one for many.  On the model of Benjamin's 
materialist history, we might think of these attacks as a form of anarchic thinking, "not 
only the movement of thoughts, but their arrest [stillstellung] as well" (SW4 396).  The 
shattered cowrie shell attacks' temporal (dialectical) standstill suggest less the "'laws' 
for the course of historical events," but, the communicability of another time that 
—further intimating the attacks with death as a limit of the 
thinkable, a particular form of non-being the text can only respond to with vertigo.  In 
the broader context of Mackey's writing, in the novel and in the "Song of the 
Andoumboulou," the aleatory cowrie shell attacks advance a link between creative 
work, poetry, and death or the dead, those specific dead whom one claims as one's 
ancestors, one's personal dead, who "will not/ ascend without song" (EW 33).  To 
understand such death, we must think beyond reductive notions of ancestry or kinship; 
death, never absent, is a particular kind of temporal concern relating to those things 
passing out of being, the "irretrievable image of the past which threatens to disappear 
in any moment that does not recognize itself as intended in that image" (SW4 391). 
                                                 
70 This latter attack afflicts Penguin, whose disappearance and reappearance spark the central concern of 
this book, the appearance of comic word bubbles during performances, the second instance of such 
bubbles appearing during performances in the novel, the first time they become news. 
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coexists, unredeemed, with this articulated now, the irruption of a past moment 
awaiting its moment of recognizability.  These episodes of temporal arrest or stilling, 
often triggered by death, differ from individual melancholia and public mourning, 
untamed by a "common denominator" or singular signifier (i.e., "culture," "diaspora," 
"revolution"), not curable by a substitute object (SW4 403).   
The problem, of course, is that one cannot live, or imagine living, in this 
undefined state at the cusp of non-being.  This is why I have preferred the term μtopia, 
the multiple utopia, the momentary availability of possibilities thought passed.  Being 
aleatory, the cowrie shell attacks also represent a play on notions of accessibility, the 
idea that one directs one's work or actions toward a certain, fixed class or racial 
audience who immediately recognize themselves as the intended audience and further 
recognize their own predicament and are spurred to revolutionary action.  Mu-topia 
understands loss as an aperture, like the open moment through which a messiah might 
enter.  If there is a messianism in μtopia's aperture, it must be thought as a messianism 
without messiah, opposed to the kairological Event that would be the end of history or 
the resolution of all contradictions.  There is no unique moment most propitious to 
action, and beside such a moment could only irrupt as Event, potentially unrecognized, 
nameable only after it has "passed."  There can have been such an Event, however as a 
moment posited, an imaginary new origin or starting over.  As much as they suggest a 
"revolutionary chance," the cowrie shell attacks' status as "messianic arrest of 
happening" means that their effectivity cannot be known, much as Benjamin's 
historical materialism's outcome or use cannot be directed in advance to particular 
aims or interests.  The homogeneous empty times of historiography and, in the case of 
Mackey's novel, narration itself, are disrupted, but as with any syncope, "time" 
eventually resumes.  A chance made available demands action, even as the attacks 
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represent inaction, their outcome often further creative work, although on other terms 
than before.  To redeem is to re-deem, to change or say again.   
 
Time Now Had a Hole in It 
Typically, the cowrie shell attacks, narrated after the fact, end with the split 
perspective being "healed," N. being brought back into alignment with himself 
through the intervention of the band and/or through records.  Such moments of re-
alignment trigger a particular, individual vertigo, a "phantom caress" returning the ego 
to itself, or at least to a recognizable version of itself fit to speak in its own name.  I 
want to return to the record as it is represented, a representation that plays on the 
uncertain vacillation between noun and verb, between sound writing and figure 
writing.  The characters in From a Broken Bottle have an erotic relation to the music, a 
relation to it based on its non-substitutability (technical reproduction notwithstanding).  
Records, like the music they convey, serve as a kind of "technical-ecstatic" foundation 
for thinking and thinking otherwise, privileging a density of personal and inter-
connection, troubling the line between the two.  At issue seems to be the 
communicability of sound; schematically, this communicability refers to both its 
extensive aspect—its distribution across defined space and especially across differing 
"uses" or interpretations (e.g., the Barthesian "studium")—and its intensive aspect—its 
"own" temporality, materiality and "inoculative" capacity (e.g., the Barthesian 
"punctum").  Though a phonograph may help one imagine oneself in a "community" 
with others listening to the same record, the alternation of intensive and extensive 
listenings—the former catching what is most peculiar or personally striking, the latter 
what is most familiar and locatable within traditions or histories—means that the two 
modes of listening to the same record produce at least two different objects, multiplied 
across an unknowable number of anonymous listeners. 
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The tactile metaphors regarding music's caress or "gruff embrace"—the "song 
so black it / burnt / my lip"—are one means through which the text problematizes any 
simple privileging of the aural, reminding us that listening is not a passive activity but 
an active one, the sound, even on record, having been partially constructed by the 
audience.  The novel makes the case for recorded music as a dense labyrinth of 
connections and reconnections, linked through a reciprocal anticipation: the audience 
anticipates the next sound, and the record anticipates an audience.  This structure is 
thematized and complicated by the appearance, both during live performance and on 
records of the band, of balloons—later given the name B'Loon and a corresponding 
story—that come to accompany the performances, seemingly according to their own 
will.  The balloons are perhaps the most "magical" element of the novel, thematizing 
the irrepressible capacity to say otherwise than one intends, otherwise than what one's 
words "want to say" that I have called fugitive articulacy.   
The first appearance of balloons with text—which mark a central conflict of 
Atet A.D. (with regard to live performances) and Bass Cathedral (with regard to a 
recording)—is in "Song of the Andoumboulou: 25," subtitled "'zar' nth part," in 
reference to one of several of that poem's mythic locations.  In that poem, the balloon 
functions as an extension of a theme of volitionlessness: 
Heard 
my head say cradle me, myself cradle 
my head.  Wondered whose head I meant, 
what voice I spoke with, volitionless, 
feet 
stuck to the floor… 
 
A balloon tore 
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loose, floated off, I called it  
back…  B'Head looked in from 
on high… 
(WS 46, my emphasis) 
 
In this sequence, the irregular lines situate "heard" rather than "head" above "feet," 
lending primacy to sensibility as discussed above, implicitly suggesting affection—
e.g., having one's ears impressed with sounds from elsewhere—as potentially 
conditioning an ecstatic experience apart but not apart from an "I."  The theme of 
speaking with the voice of another returns, whereupon a "balloon tore / loose," a pun 
on inspiration, the fraught or illusory nature of the artist's freedom and privileged 
perspective, and a literalization of the theme of "lost ground," the groundlessness of a 
thought from the impossible perspective of redemption.   
In Bedouin Hornbook, balloons appear during N.'s performance with the 
Crossroads Choir, a near-mythic group N. had been pursuing; the encounter takes 
place 4 July 1980, raising questions about the trans/national belonging at stake in 
attending to the ancestors, especially with regard to the balloons' relation to 
accent/ascent/assent.  The ensemble has been playing "Body and Soul," the crowd 
chant-singing selected lyrics: "my house of cards has no foundation," and "my life 
revolves around her/ What earthly good am I without her? / My castle has crumbled, / 
I'm hers, body and soul."  N., as he plays, thinks of a seven-day romance he had had.  
He tries "to sound as much like [Eric] Dolphy as [he] could," feeling himself to be in 
the endless eighth day, after the end of the love affair, after the creation of a world, a 
day that "prolonged itself into eternity."  This day nonetheless returned to him as if it 
had passed, eight becoming "upright infinity," eternal return—this endless eighth day 
is not a day of infinite repetition of the same but of difference, the world of 
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experience, the world in which we live.  While N. plays and reflects on this eddy of 
time, in his re-telling of it, the audience bursts into spontaneous song, accompanied by 
"a ball of light [that] bounced from syllable to syllable as in the sing-along cartoons 
we saw at the movies when I was a kid" (BH 123).  This sing-along refers to his 
µtopian everywhere-and-nowhere sense of having a "blank check drawn on a closed 
account," with implied, idiomatic "bounce" differentially accented, crossed with 
ascent.  The "cabalistic ball of light" becomes a white balloon upon which the words 
"Only One" are written, kept aloft by the audience's play, snidely commenting on the 
song's romantic claim.  This balloon, which comes apparently of its own accord from 
elsewhere, materializes metaphor, literalizes the ascent of the dead invoked in the 
"Song of the Andoumboulou," both the technē of song and the obligation to repeat the 
gesture which does not burnish N.'s spirit but "takes [his] breath away" as it rises (BH 
124).  The date, within a U.S. context of national remembrance and celebration of the 
ideals of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," suggests the ways each of those 
values is haunted by its opposite: the balloon goes up, but comes down more rapidly. 
This ambiguity is reaffirmed in the second instance, which further links N. 
with Penguin (they both, in my reading, suffer from cowrie shell attacks, though only 
N.'s go under that name).  The letter, dated 28 April 1981, begins with N. telling of a 
recent gig in Berkeley, and lamenting that the Angel of Dust has not sent him a letter.  
He goes on to consider the ways that "inarticulacy spoke" in a street guitar 
performance, such speaking of inarticulacy continuing as themes of "what was 
'known'" and knowledge refused (BH 182, emphasis in original).  Through the street 
performances, N. senses a "loud critique of available options," buoyed by an insistence 
on slippery, eroding foundations, a feeling of "being ushered…beyond oneself," a 
sense for which he offers the catachresis "jellyroll," an overheard or "borrowed" term 
from one of the singers.  The stage for the performance is set by the band's discussion 
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of a suggestively worded advertisement for whipped cream—"Top your favorite 
bottom with real whipped cream"— retroactively related to both Lambert's 
"Aggravated Assent" and Penguin's "Bottomed Out," the latter being an improvised 
"technical ecstatic" melody possessed of a "rough and ready sensuality" girded by 
"deep, rough and ready grunts" from the baritone saxophone that "seemed to erupt 
from an ocean's floor" (BH 187).71
The solution, from Lambert, is to add a "new proportion," taking the baritone 
sax from the performatively supine Penguin and replacing it with a sopranino 
saxophone. out of whose bell issue "bubble after bubble of the sort children make with 
soapy water."  This figure links child's play, amniotic fluid (N. refers to it as an 
"embryonic proportion"), tactility, and fragility, which in turn figures a connection 
  Throughout his account of this performance, N. 
refers to his desire to escape the strictures of bourgeois ideology, to his understanding 
(and the band's imputed understanding) of "the resident hollow one's apparent solidity 
concealed," expressed first through Penguin's face as he performs, its left side 
"tend[ing] to bulge with a wad of breath at the outset of each run" (BH 195).  This 
"wad of breath" is thought of as a "cud" that becomes homophonic "could," then 
attempts to reach from "conditional 'could' to unconditional 'will,'" or promissory 
"shall" (BH 197).  There is a complex interplay between band and audience, each of 
whom has the imputed need to attempt an "unheard-of conception."  The audience 
eggs on the band with ecstatic calls (or responses) such as "uterine hoofbeat" and 
"navigable drought," while the band, still attempting an "out" from the "centrist 
ordeal" of consumerist "middle-of-the-road aesthetics," worries about the risk of 
overstatement in the other direction, a risk N. describes as "haunting the need for new 
conception it paradoxically fed" (BH 202). 
                                                 
71 Though this is beyond the scope of my present argument, one could profitably consider these 
"transcribed" performances in terms of the affect they attempt to convey and the varying degrees of 
technical, musical knowledge they assume. 
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between audience and band members: a "transitory, nameless oneness" initially 
attempted by guile, later genuinely, retroactively, felt (BH 204).  In a later instance, 
this figured unity, like the ecstatic reach the balloons signify, is referred to as a 
"tactical attainment," not a communicated or necessary coalescence, but an erotic 
union, an erotic syncope that neither resists nor affirms an order of thought, so much 
as a thought suspension of thinking, of those assumptions and presumptuous assertions 
that postpone thinking.  The balloon visitations "initiate" a synaesthetic encounter with 
music as a kind of thinking in its own right, to be attended to on its own "terms," and 
to continually reinvent terms so as to avoid the temptations of eternity.  A pure 
encounter of any kind, they suggest, is but a fantasy.   
The next balloon appearance is 4 June 1982.  In the interim, the balloons, as 
emblematic of all such revenant visititations (reminders of the openness-from-within 
of any ensemblic designation), take the form of gender-specific shared dreams and 
hauntings related to the search for and ultimate addition of a new band member, the 
drummer Drennette, that comprises much of Djbot Baghostus's Run.  The band is in 
Seattle playing Lambert's "Prometheus," Penguin back on his customary oboe with 
"something to say," the expression "something to say" literalized by the emergence of 
a "comic strip balloon."  The text of that balloon adds a mythico-erotic element to the 
band's internal mythology of Drennette, imagined/envisioned before-the-fact to be a 
demiurgic figure alternately named Djeannine (for the males of the band) or Penny 
(for the females).  This scene suggests a relation between the balloons and the 
"speaking" of articulacy.  That which speaks in articulate speech, a concern one might 
stretch to include N.'s retrospective narrative accounts or records of the music he is 
involved with—and to the notion of post-expectancy, the in-turning of one moment 
back on itself to recuperate possibilities not pursued, "reminiscing what only / might 
have been" (SA 13).  The first use of the term occurs in Djbot Baghostus's Run in order 
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to describe a disjunction between the world Drennette believed herself to be in with 
her lover, Rick, and the "reality" of the situation, those forces that limit what can be 
hoped for the future, what future may be hoped for as continuous with the present.  It 
is occasioned by a bike accident, "like walking up a stairway and reaching for a step 
that isn't there," not the moment of the fall but the re-interpretive moment after.   
From this, we might think of the balloons as "playful" a lever against limiting 
binaries, including the line dividing the so-called ineffable from the more 
conventionally spoken of.72
The story N. concocts for them is a syncretic mythography.  He invokes a 
sense of history as having not begun, of future-oriented origin.  The balloons become 
the material aspect of B'Loon, a gnostic figure combining earth-diver myths of the 
loon who "plunges into primeval waters and brings up a mouthful or beakful of 
mud…from which the earth is then made" and the pseudo-Bahamian "play with B' [for 
"Brer"]-Ba [the Egyptian term for "soul"]…the spirit or embodied soul of namesake 
  The balloons are a demand, concerned with the 
communicability of the message, the possibility of communication more than the 
message itself.  Rather than raising a material question about access or technical 
limitations in the recording or broadcast of sound (the question, indeed the thought, of 
playing the band's record on the radio has not been brought up), the balloons in 
particular raise a philosophical question about the stance and substance of listening.  
The unwilled, semi-autonomous arrival of the two-dimensional balloons and the 
relation of their appearance to respiration (or to the length of musical phrase) is 
evidence.  Rather than asking what the balloons say, or what the text means in relation 
to the music, people question whether the balloons, which refuse to be photographed 
(leading some to enlist the aid of police sketch artists). 
                                                 
72 The point, of course, is not to argue that simply everything can be brought into language, but that to 
think about what remains ineffable requires a thought of language's communicability, that is, what is 
communicable in language, and so what we mean when we say something is ineffable, or indescribable. 
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play."  B'Loon, because of this mixed origin, is a "motherless child."  This loon who 
founds and re-founds a world is also soul-kin (a literalized "soul-brother") to the 
inhabitants of the worlds coming into and going out of being.  B'Loon is less 
resolutely future-oriented than "outside" of time, on another timeline that has access to 
futurity and to a past that has not passed, a revenant past that he does not so much 
figure as point to, a counter-enchantment myth that "muddies our mouths with the way 
the world is."73
Post-expectancy crosses the personally monumental—that which matters in the 
individual life—with the publicly monumental, the intensive and the extensive, 
without reducing one to an "expression" of the other, and thus not trivializing one at 
the expense of the other.  The "ecstatic elsewhere" opposes itself to possible 
worldviews (Weltanschauung) and narrativized life-experiences based on notions of 
history and historical mediation, and vice-versa.  Rather than assuming repetition to be 
a naturally occurring "act," it names a certain repetition as an obligation, beyond, as it 
were, the pleasure of repeating.  The repetition's post-expectancy, born of time "falling 
behind itself," exposes the gaze's reversible subject and object not to what was missed, 
but to what did not happen but was thought to have—post-expectant repetition is 
palimpsestic, revisionary.  Its manner of "seizing" an image or memory is not merely 
additive or synthetic on the model of "recovery," but syncopative, antithetic: it 
demands, but largely eschews proffering solutions.  Temporality is internally haunted 
  Accompanied by words or not, the balloons are more about what 
cannot be said than what can, the conditions of articulacy.  The appearance of balloons 
during performance suggests an ongoing demand to re-constellate concepts, an 
ongoing deconstruction that puts origin "outside" any law of general equivalence, 
making it a non-substitutable (but not irreducible) central category that must be 
problematized (and, as his name suggests, always already contaminated).   
                                                 
73 Atet A.D. (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 2001), 122.  Hereafter cited as AD. 
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by its pretenses to fullness, to self-adequacy, with all that could have happened, but 
did not. 
 
Orpheus Calling 
As to whether the concrete block could be construed as playing on or 
poking fun at historical-materialist precepts, I suppose I'd have to say 
yes, why not, to "playing on," though poking fun at I'm not sure about.  
The word "concrete," like any other, creaks… – Djbot Baghostus's Run 
 
I would like to conclude my discussion of Mackey's poetics by returning to the 
secret, as it becomes a theme of concealment or revelation, especially in Perfume 
Bottle.  Both embodiment and sexuality recur as themes throughout Mackey's writing, 
often taking the form of unrequited love, or the pair of "archetypal lovers" who recur 
throughout Song, in much the same way that discussion of affection, phonetics or 
morphology imply an irreducibly physical encounter with language.  One afternoon at 
Venice, N. notes a "quantum increase in public access to 'private' parts," an increase in 
visible skin that makes him think of Carnival, split between bidding the flesh farewell 
and taking solace in it; it becomes an approximate notion that refuses "to resolve into 
fixed, unequivocal meaning" (BH 70).  Carnival—publicized private parts and 
privatized public space—leads him to think of "the body's dichotomous desire to 
extinguish and extend its own mystique," the body's participation in an "open secret" 
such that to extinguish is to extend the body's mystique.  Disclosure, "a further phase 
of complication," becomes a kind of concealment; the "truth" of the body recedes even 
as the body is a continually "present" secret.  Foregoing what he considers an obvious 
observation—that "one disrobes to unveil an anticlimactic mystery inverts the shell-as-
outer-bone's concealment of nothing if not an esoteric absence of bone"—he 
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complicates these concerns in a composition entitled "The Slave's Day Off," intending 
to consider relation between the body, form and resistance.  To extend the question of 
the body and its spaces, to ask about the overlapping notions through which it is 
apprehended, is similarly to problematize common usage of "exposure" with regard to 
"the truth" of this or that ideological procedure: to whom does one expose, and how is 
this exposure "resistance"?  What is the relationship between transgressing a rule or a 
boundary and "resisting" that rule or the regime that enforces it?  As Mackey's poetics 
continually lead us to conclude, despite grammatical structures, one does not speak of 
"the body," singular, only of plural bodies; the specification of a singular body 
synchronous with a singular name or identity, fixed through time, is an effect of 
enframing narratives, or narrative emplotment, including "personal" or sentimental 
narratives.  "The body," that is, is disjoined from the proper in the etymological sense, 
its blunt materiality crossed with its rhetorical situation despite claims to the contrary, 
such blunt materiality understood to be another "creaky" positing of materiality.  
One is also lead to consider the links between disclosure and enclosure, the 
enclosure of public space for private enterprise, the spectral "invisible hands" and the 
force of law.  In a semi-public space of Santa Cruz called "Pacific Garden Mall," the 
band performs, circling "counterclockwise…an uroboric strut, marking every eight 
beat with an ever so slight stutter-step" for a small, transient audience (BH 76).  It is 
one of their few uninvited performances.  They are, in the terms of U.S. racist 
discourse, "out of their place."  After a few songs, they begin Lambert's "Aggravated 
Assent" (which, though not named as such, has an ironic correlation with N.'s "Slave's 
Day Off"), bells on their feet recalling ankle chains, when the police appear, telling 
them to disperse because they are making too much noise (BH 80).  The earlier 
consideration of public vs. private, and especially being in one's place,  is 
supplemented by a renewed thinking of "inside" and "outside."  In the context of this 
 123 
performance, this secondary consideration takes an new resonance after a spectator 
suggests the band's music may be too esoteric or "overly elitist" for public 
performance: "the private or esoteric is referred to as 'outside,' and the public or 
exoteric as 'inside.'"  N. concludes that revolution, understood broadly, must make "for 
a lateral displacement (a stepping aside from whatever one thought 'upward' and 
'downward' meant)," lest one find oneself merely spinning in a rut or groove, the 
revolution merely nominal, or literal.74
Spinning and circling recur both as literal ambulatory circling and as figural 
recumbent appeal.  At an early audition for a new member of the group, the two 
females of the group stage a musical protest, Djamilaa singing what N., recalling her 
orphan status, describes as "a wordless wrestling with flamenco singing… part wail, 
part suspended sentence" that eventually takes an "orphic turn."  She lowers her 
volume at one point to allow "the rest of us [Lambert, Penguin, N., and the would-be 
member Sun Stick] to catch up with the "not-of-our-time intensity" of her singing 
(DBR 14).  The men sit transfixed at her voice's "textureless appeal," its erosive 
capacity.  When she takes up a song recorded by Nancy Wilson, "China," her 
interaction with Aunt Nancy (who has been renamed "Ain't Nancy" for the occasion) 
invites the intervention of a "curious compound play of identity and difference" (DBR 
16).  The play seems to involve a temporized excess of embodiment, ahead-of-its-time 
embodiment that participates in the logic, meaning the structuring effects, of the 
secret.  One could equally write of the "structuring defects": in order to be a secret, 
open or otherwise, the body must be subject to revelation or unveiling, unconcealment.  
The secret, that is, must not be kept indefinitely, or it is no secret at all worthy of that 
   
                                                 
74 Another instance of such "invisible hands" or police omnipresence occurs at the end of Bedouin 
Hornbook, in an after-the-fact lecture/libretto called "The Creaking of the Word," with that libretto's 
protagonist, Flaunted Fifth, being accosted by the police while urinating in a field at the outskirts of 
town, as his numb right hand, disembodied, caresses Djamilaa's "pantyless rump" through her cotton 
dress, a play on "outskirt" that suggests the body's place in spiritual or sentimental geographies.    
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name.  What power the body has, as secret, lies jointly in its being concealed as secret, 
and after having been revealed, through the post-expectant re-orientation or 
"revolution" made available.  As open secret, however, the secret is poorly kept, its 
power diminished by the disavowal that attends to it.  I know very well a secret is 
being concealed from me, but I will act as though there were no such secret, which 
may be, as N. suggests and then disavows, that the body conceals no secret, which is 
not the same as saying it reveals everything.  Thus, "disclosure" is a "further phase of 
complication": the final unveiling is indefinitely postponed, leaving a "play of identity 
and difference" no less urgent for its linguistic origin: neither I, nor not-I but in a vital 
sense both. 
The "orphic turn" is neither the look back that seals Eurydice's fate, nor 
Orpheus' fatal, Bacchante-infuriating turn away from the company of women.75  
Instead, it is a pivot between material and immaterial, sensuous and non-sensuous, or 
known and unknown, an ahead-of-its-time "knowledge" for which "intuition" is too 
fraught a term.  Both noun and verb, an orphic turn is one tactic, invoking Antonio 
Gramsci, in the "war of position" on the everyday (the "centrist ordeal" N. frets about), 
a non-totalizing counter-enchantment N. will later refer to as "no-look obliquity" (AD 
167).76
                                                 
75 In Raeburn's translation of Ovid, in his despair Orpheus "even started the practice among the 
Thracian / tribes of turning for love to immature males and of / plucking / the flower of a boy's brief 
spring before he has come to / his manhood."  (Book 10, lines 83-85). 
76 The context for these comments, which yield the name of their album, is the willful disappearance of 
their drummer, who worries that they are practicing too much for their album.  Hers is a secret 
"statement," one that gives itself by withholding itself, on the inevitability of error, an openness to 
errancy, that I cannot develop here. 
  The modifier "no-look" encapsulates the inevitability of a certain spectacle: 
one does not look precisely because someone else is looking—it makes spectacle into 
a tactical advance whose commodification is only partly beside the point.  The orphic 
turn is not a critique or diagnosis of so-called "ocularcentrism," but a comment on the 
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inevitability of the gaze as two-way relay, a warning against the pre-possession 
looking tends to entail.   
With that in mind, I now turn to two scenes from Bass Cathedral that combine 
spectacle and orphic enchantment.  In the first, recounted in a letter dated 18 
September 1983, the band has listened to the test pressing of their album and are 
somewhat alarmed at B'Loon's appearance, during Aunt Nancy's solo (she thinks of 
the text as a "time-lapse translation" of her "thoughts and feelings extending much 
further back than the moment of her 'Dream Thief' solo," where they appear) (BC 6).  
Playing a gig at a club called Onaje's, Drennette calls "Dream Thief" (which had 
debuted during the Santa Cruz performance discussed above).  During the 
performance, she plays a cigar box guitar, which figures in the story for which B'Loon 
is supposed to be amanuensis.  Penguin joins in strumming a broom as if it were a 
guitar, "seeking leverage on Drennette and Aunt Nancy's churchical exchange," 
recalling obliquely the haunting visitation that precedes Drennette's addition to the 
band, then Djamilaa joins in, delaying time with her percussive foot taps, seeking 
"leverage, an oblique, dislocating fulcrum furthering her own blue-ictic stroll, pianistic 
strut" (BC 13).  Lambert then joins in with what N. refers to as a "dance":  
 
he extended his arms in front of his body, hands hanging limp, the 
classic or stereotypic sleepwalker's pose though his eyes remained 
open.  His arms were extended for balance one soon saw, as he now 
leaned back on his heels, letting the front of each foot come up off the 
floor.  His heels alone touching the floor, his legs locked at the knee 
and at a 75° angle with the floor, he proceeded to step in time with the 
music, walking backwards in a counterclockwise circle (BC 13).  
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Simultaneously literalizing and suggesting the absence "Dream Thief" implies along 
with a blurring of categories analogous to "loquat" above—are the dreams stolen, the 
theft dreamt, or the dream itself thief?—Lambert's improbable limbo "in time" is 
subsequently emulated by N., who, feeling himself "possessed of a non-predicative 
truth" puts his horn to his lip to play, only to surprise himself by joining in with 
Lambert's "backwardswalking circle," both follower and, because he's behind Lambert 
and thus in front from the perspective of their "progress," leader.  The phrase "in time" 
is likewise ambiguous, referring equally to the rhythm of his dance and to the layers of 
temporality, shared and disclosed, the performance avails itself of.  There is at once 
the time of Aunt Nancy's haunted childhood (her father dies shortly after giving her 
the cigar-box guitar), the time of the balloons that "see deep in to the past and 
present," the recursive time of their shared Penny/Djeannine dreams, and the 
"seemingly endless instant" of the performance, among others.  
This dilation of time is much like the time of the novel more generally: though 
published over the course of about twenty-two years (to date, between 1986 and 
2008), only about five years of narrative time has passed (as noted above, the letters 
range between 14 June 1978 and 5 September 1983).77
                                                 
77 Though I cannot pursue this question here, one could ask what, if anything, about this era in 
particular might be holding Mackey's imagination, what not-yet expired notions or possibilities readers 
are invited to attend to. 
  The dilation of time, both on 
the level of this scene and on the "macro" level of the novel's four parts to date, which 
largely thwarts conventional character and plot development, suggests a change of 
scale.  It is not that "personal" or "private" time trumps or overshadows "public" or 
"political" time, but that the lingering development of the former interrogates the 
latter, implicitly questioning those hierarchies that privilege the latter without carefully 
considering those whose names and actions will not be considered when "historical" 
accounts are given.  It would not be inaccurate to conclude that historical context is 
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ignored entirely; indeed there is an hypertrophy of context that challenges notions of 
"progress" and "development."  Lambert and N.'s limbo-without-bar suggest tactics 
for getting around an ongoing ordeal—called variously marginality, centrism, patness, 
or banality, what we might catachrestically call "the social order."  This presumes a 
certain interaction with the audience: after the performance, the band encounters an 
audience member who imitates the walk in appreciation. 
A later scene more directly thematizes such audience interaction, the confusion 
of leader and follower, of cause and effect that runs throughout all the work 
considered here, returning us more directly to questions of the body and so-called 
"lived experience."  In a letter dated 13 February 1983, N. recounts the band's record-
release gig at The Studio.  For the encore, they play a tune "off the record" called 
"Djam Suasion," a modified jam session " that avails itself of the impromptu impulse 
and proceeds on a very bare outline of structure and motif" Djamilaa calls "drift 
conduits" that allow opportune mistakes to dictate the shape of the piece (BC 65).78
                                                 
78 Though somewhat unorthodox, this approach to composition and arrangement, where certain "drift 
conduits" are made available to the players just prior to performance, calls to mind Butch Morris' 
"conduction" and Anthony Braxton's Ghost Trance Music. 
  
Extending one of the "drift conduits" used to signal soloists to end into a solo of her 
own, an "anacrotic run […] reminiscent idea's utopic wish, would-be return to 
reminiscent flesh's first awakening" (BC 67).  The passage concludes by crossing 
James Brown's "Sex Machine" ("the way I like it is the way it is") with Walter 
Benjamin's "On the Philosophy of History": "'the way it was' the way one wanted it to 
be" (BC 68).  Further alluding to James Brown, the rhythm shifts to a "4/4 shuffle 
meter" (think "Gonna Have a Funky Good Time (Doin' it to Death)"), which provokes 
the audience to "dance": "knees bent, asses lowered to the floor but short of outright 
squat, they assumed something of a jockey's position," seeming to celebrate 
embodiment as such, "the wonder of arms and legs having a torso to attach to and 
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extend from" as if discovered for the first time (BC 68).  There is no indication that the 
audience has any formal or "historical" connection to one another save a common 
besiegement of abstraction one might understand them to be attempting to escape in 
the retroactive moment of awareness, the dance itself.  The following passage, during 
which B'Loon visits where the band is but corresponding to the movement of others, is 
worth rereading in this regard: 
 
Each dancer raised and lowered his or her right arm, pounding his or 
her right thigh as with a hammer, an ever so restrained hammer whose 
handle was the dancer's forearm, its head the dancer's fist.  It was a 
methodical, all but robotic pounding, deliberate and insistent yet of a 
soft, slow-motion cast, as though the air were a viscous liquid the arm 
strained against, fought to rise and fall, move at all within. 
As first hit thigh, at the exact moment fist hit thigh, a balloon emerged 
(BC 69). 
 
The rhythmic and aural patterning that emerges, in part due to the insistent "his 
or her" used to keep pronoun number agreement and gender neutrality, is comparable 
to that discussed above.  The short a [æ] (hammer, handle), o [ɒ] (robotic, 
methodical), i [ɪ] (liquid, viscous) along with the repeating p and b draw attention to 
themselves as words, a formal supplement to the methodical movements described, 
insisting on language's specific modes of embodiment, writing's labor.  The gender-
specific balloons, which recur with each strike of fist to thigh, narrate a man and 
woman engaging in oral sex, each beginning with the phrase "I lie on my back," each 
insisting on the nose pressed to the "crack of [the other's] ass," insistently referring in 
explicit detail to the genitals with frank vulgarity (e.g., "balls," "cunt").  Coupled with 
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the formal repetitions of words and vowel patterns, one has the sense that these 
members of the audience have become literal "sex machines."  The "enjoyment" of the 
body becomes explicitly sexual, recalling the word jazz's carnal roots, explicitness 
becoming the austerity of the martinete, a form of the cante jondo, informed by the 
hammer-and-anvil suggestion of the dance's fist strike.   
After the band shifts from 4/4 to a slower "duple time," Djamilaa reinscribes 
the hammer-and-anvil implication of the dance through the martinete, abetted by 
Drennette who accents the dancers' movements with well-timed cymbal accents.  
Invoking cultural crossings—"an Andulusian Ogoun and a Gypsy John Henry," or Isis 
searching for dismembered Orpheus rather than Osiris—Djamilaa's voice "erase[s] the 
balloon's X-rated script," rendering them captionless, as much because words become 
beside the point as because the point shifts more decisively to work, "sacred labor."  
These crossings, that is, are a "transitive equation," a way of thinking that even 
questions labor's sacredness precisely by keeping labor open as a question, a question 
extended by the invocation of "Work Song."79  Oscar Brown, Jr.'s lyrics to "Work 
Song" locate this labor on a chain gang, tacitly invoking conviction without due 
process, conviction for a crime of necessity, the criminalized act of stealing for 
sustenance once living off the land has become impossible.80
                                                 
79 The text specifies the version recorded by Cannonball Adderley (whose nickname is sometimes said 
to be a corruption of "cannibal") with his brother Nat, who composed the song, Bobby Timmons, Sam 
Jones and Louis Hayes. 
80 One pertinent couplet suggests the crime is "being hungry and poor." 
  Labor is a modality of 
"serving time," a modality referenced by Drennette's "monotonous marking of time—a 
corroborating but…complicating witness" that bespeaks "abject, alienating duration 
while the very manner of its production seemed intent on underscoring strike."  
"Strike" is  another turned word, referring to "would-be liberatory" labor action as 
much as discipline or labor itself, implicating the body's actions or withheld labor 
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within juridical and social forms of discipline.  It is a reminder that that the body's 
pleasure can be recuperated by a repressive state apparatus.  The band, "possessed 
agents of iterativity," (my emphasis) also mark time, repeating the head of "Work 
Song," at once extending the moment and refusing to let time pass, labor here also a 
punning reference to post-expectancy.   
The balloons' blankness, anticipate the felt "supple oneness" between band and 
audience, a sense "that no named aggregate enclosed or could caption."  Of course, 
"one" is also an apparently singular pronoun that inscribes a collectivity, keeping open 
that strand of Mackey's poetics: every social unity passes through figuration, 
communicates itself in, rather than through language.  Insofar as this oneness is 
available retroactively through narrative, it is a named aggregate, an effort to supply 
captions to the blank balloons, which themselves figure the blankness or contingency 
of an encounter.  This oneness, as a tactical naming of the unnameable, is a 
revolutionary chance or orphic turn, participating in multiple, irreducible times 
without itself being timeless or necessary.  This points back to of the major problems 
the balloons raise within the plot: one asks of the revenant aesthetic encounter "did 
that happen?" or "what just happened?" underscoring the unknowability of the event.  
That this oneness, and the feeling it describes, would be the impossible resolution of 
the planned and the accidental, the intentional and the aleatory, available only through 
the mediation of the record or narrative more generally, returns throughout the book.  
Joe Henderson's flubbed, premature two-note would-be unison line on Andrew Hill's 
Point of Departure, a flub that becomes obvious as a flub only on multiple listenings, 
becomes the occasion for N.'s reflections on the links between repetition and 
necessity, repetition and experience, and the recording's vitality.  By the end of the 
scene one is left with N.'s inverted Orpheus, his accidental Pied Piper, uncertain 
whether one leads or one follows, the fragile, aleatory "community" formed through a 
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repetitive, iterable experience, the retroactive imputation to music and poetry the 
orphic capacity to create and sustain erotic conjunctions, an imputation that 
temporarily lends them that power.  
The audience's dance and N.'s posited "supple oneness" amounts to an 
encounter with the impossible—the audience beyond the blank certitude that there will 
have been some "ones" who listened, of the synchronicity of this aggregate body so 
named audience, of any determinate outcome of the risks of such performance or 
synchronization (i.e., the effectivity of the dance).  Though the mechanical dance 
recapitulates the struggle with or after freedom following Emancipation, highlighting 
the disciplining of the body that underscores the dance's being understood as freedom, 
the scene and the iterative, tactical oneness it makes available suggest a reinscription 
of that discipline into another scene.  The dance and the relay that moves the 
performance from "Sex Machine" to cante jondo to "Work Song" to bulería, from 
certain meaning to an invitation to articulate new meanings, suggest a turn away from 
the body's apocalyptic freight.  The escape from "a centrist ordeal" is not conditioned 
on forgetting the contingencies and sedimentations through which embodiment is 
possible, not simply through "resistance," but through revolution, an orphic turn.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE THEN THAT WILL BE: THE WORK OF DEAD TIME AND THE PROBLEM 
OF REFERENCE 
 
There is uh Now and there is uh Then.  Ssall there is.  (I bein in uh Now: uh 
Now bein in uh Then: I bein, in Now in Then, in I will be.  I was be too but 
thats uh Then thats past.  That me that was-be is uh me-has-been.  Thuh Then 
that was-be is uh has-been-Then too.  Thuh me-has-been sits in thuh be-me: we 
sit on this porch.  Thuh Then thats been somehow sits in thuh Then that will 
be: same Thens.  … – Suzan-Lori Parks, The America Play 
 
Listening to Ghosts 
 
Why doesn't anyone ask me about form?  – Suzan-Lori Parks, qtd. in Brustein 
 
This chapter, focusing on the work of playwright Suzan-Lori Parks, raises the 
question of staging, especially the staging of an immediate or historical context, and 
the limits and openings of such theatricality.  Refusing the prescriptions of racial 
formations, both from racists and putative anti-racists, Parks argues that "As there is 
no single 'Black Experience,' there is no single 'Black Aesthetic' and there is no one 
way to feel or dream or interpret or be interpreted."81  Regarding her ongoing literary 
project, she says that "there's something else going on" that she's "defining as [she] 
go[es] along."82
                                                 
81 Suzan-Lori Parks, "An Equation for Black People on Stage," in The America Play and Other Writings 
(New York: Theater Communications Group, 1995), 4.  Hereafter cited parenthetically in the text as 
AP. 
82 Shelby Jiggetts, "Interview with Suzan-Lori Parks."  Callaloo, Vol. 19, No. 2, (Spring, 1996), pg 313.   
  Questions of meaning, often rooted in a calculus of racial 
exceptionalism, become therefore "sentence[s] outside of the play[s]," drawing on a 
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metonymic algebra whereby figure x in the work corresponds to figure y in the critic's 
argument or z figure or event in the so-called 'real world'.83
Most generally, the question of belonging, of what is proper to the literary text 
or black writer, take precedence, and must be considered alongside other questions 
one might ask of literature, without presuming to know in advance.  For example, 
Robert Sanford Brustein argues, "Despite her joyous encounter with language, it 
cannot be denied that Suzan-Lori is also writing plays about race."
  As with Du Bois, 
considered above, Parks presents above all the challenge of reading her work, whether 
staged or, as I will consider it here, presented on the page emphasizing openness to the 
range of questions the literary generates.  One such "other question" involves 
exploring "The-Drama-of-the-Black-Person-as-an-Integral-Facet-of-the-Universe" 
rather than an historical or sometimes transhistorical given, an orientation that extends 
the "place" of the black person, and of drama (AP 6, 21). 
84  Certainly, 
characters are often explicitly raced in her work, but it is not clear that race is always a 
theme, or in what ways Parks' work is "about" race, if by that is meant notions racial 
subjection or race as "lived experience."  In a similar vein, Elinor Fuchs argues that 
Parks' early work is in a lineage that includes Beckett and Stein insofar as it pushes the 
limits of character and upsets traditional dramaturgical temporality, but insists that the 
figures on stage enact "themes" and "motifs" of "black suffering, loss, and 
misrepresentation through history," thus subordinating formal concerns to a common 
blackness.85
                                                 
83 See Steven Druckman "Doo-A-Diddly-Dit-Dit: An Interview with Suzan-Lori Parks and Liz 
Diamond' in A Sourcebook of African American Performance: Plays, People, Movement, ed. 
Annemarie Bean (London: Routledge, 1999).  Hereafter cited as Druckman.  Pointedly, the preceding 
play features a production still from The America Play with the caption "In Parks' The America Play, 
the Foundling Father (Reggie Montgomery) allows frustrated African Americans to reenact Lincoln's 
assassination," in tension with Parks' comments about such criticism. 
84 Robert Sanford Brustein, Millennial Stages: Essays and Reviews 2001-2005 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2006), 219, emphasis added. 
  Jennifer Johung goes further and argues that despite "aspects of formal 
85 The Death of Character: Perspectives on Theater after Modernism (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1996), 103.  The very rapid summary of Parks work, to be fair, may be a product of the 
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experimentation" Parks' works "seem to operate specifically alongside an African 
American cultural experience," furthering a normative argument that (European) 
literary experimentation is foreign or not proper to African American cultural 
production.86
This chapter reads Parks' work as being literally "about" race, drawing on the 
term's spatial sense—around the outside, on every side—and kinesthetic sense—
revolving or rotating.  Accenting "about" this way, deferring the ostensive definition it 
might otherwise introduce, might open up critical possibilities of reading the plays in 
ways responsible to their form, the "joyous encounter with language," and to her stated 
interest in space and "new equations" for black people on stage.  Parks is a thinker of 
race, as such thinks with, rather than merely about race as a pre-constituted object 
forged in definite historical experience.  "A black play [the object she considers and 
defines in her essay "New Black Math"] employs the black not just as a subject, but as 
  In all three cases, the form (i.e., the language) of the text is reduced to 
mere "surface," while the "real content" is at the level of representation.  Rhetorically, 
the referentiality of texts included within a particular tradition serves to limit or 
predetermine or pre-limit the directions critical discourse can take, while installing a 
limit on the play experimentalism might otherwise represent.  The (historical or "real 
world") referent becomes criticism's primary concern, which in turn enables it to tame 
or neutralize the fundamental lack to which experimental play might point.  One might 
choose the name "Great Hole of History" for this lack, insofar as what is missing is 
any necessary relation among historical subjects; in Parks' work, reference to real 
world events is part of a deeper play, the illimitable opening onto other contexts and 
modalities of being, against the constant, equally illimitable threat of loss or erasure.   
                                                                                                                                            
magisterial overview Fuchs attempts, but its rapidness and the seemingly "immediate" availability of 
this particular racial narrative is at issue. 
86 Jennifer Johung, "Figuring the 'Spells'/Spelling the Figures: Suzan-Lori Parks's 'Scene of Love (?)'" in 
Theater Journal, Vol. 58, No. 1 (2006), p. 40. 
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a platform, eye and telescope through which it intercourses with the cosmos."87  
Thought in these terms, blackness "as such" cannot be a "fact" apart from its use, that 
is, apart from the discursive contexts (which cannot be predicted or completely 
determined) in which it is functions, thereby requiring attentive interpretation, or 
reading.88
A person from, say, time immemorial, from, say, PastLand, from somewhere 
back there, say, walks into my house.  She or he is always alone and will 
  The primary locus of engagement will be form, especially the staging of 
overlapping, or hybrid temporalities—e.g., domestic and historical time alongside the 
"timelessness" of ideology and the present moment.  Putting to one side 
characterological readings, the known socio-politico-historical context and the implied 
or actual presence of black bodies, I will consider the works' use of the not- or not-yet-
present, non-contemporaneity within an articulated "present" and discontinuity with 
the past (as the ideologically construed past whose political value precedes its 
utterance).  These temporal configurations within Parks work serve to upset the 
orthodoxies of literature, drama, and their criticism.  "Blackness" in Parks' work 
neither refers to the same object, nor to some unchanging object.  Instead, it refers to 
an affirmative difference, a difference that is not simply saying 'no' or defining by 
opposition. 
Along these lines, one must be attentive to what Parks terms ghosts, which is 
both a description of the figures of the play, of what exceeds the plays and renders the 
term "character" unsatisfactory: 
 
ghost 
                                                 
87 Suzan-Lori Parks, "New Black Math" Theatre Journal, Vol. 57, No. 4 (December 2005), 582, 
emphasis added.  Hereafter cited as "Math." 
88 And here, of course, I am partially following Druckman's suggestion that one might profitably think 
of Wittgenstein's reflections on language alongside Suzan-Lori Parks' rigorous linguistic play, a 
crossing I will explore more specifically in the pages that follow. 
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almost always take up residence in a corner.  Why they're alone, I don't know.  
Perhaps they're coming missionary style—there are always more to follow.  
Why they choose a corner to stand in I don't know either—maybe because it's 
the intersection of 2 directions—maybe because it's safe. 
They are not characters.  To call them so could be an injustice.  They are 
figures, figments, ghosts, roles, lovers maybe, speakers maybe, shadows, slips, 
players maybe, maybe someone else's pulse (AP 12, Parks' emphasis).  
 
The performative uncertainty—e.g., the repeated say and maybe, and the proliferation 
of synonyms or metonymic substitutions—along with the subtle spatialization of time 
("time immemorial" becomes "back there") serves at least two purposes.  On the one 
hand, it signals a deferral of definition, a comfort with ambiguity and recognition as an 
opportunity for re-cognition, knowing again what was presumed known.  This writing, 
like much of Parks' work, at once challenges and assumes authority as a means of 
calling knowledge itself into question.  On the other hand, theatrical ambiguity and 
deferral of definition are also presented as inherent in relation, and in life ("someone 
else's pulse").  As Derrida remarks, "this being-with specters would also be, not only 
but also, a politics of memory, of inheritance, and of generations."89
                                                 
89 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx trans. Peggy Kamuf (London: Routledge Classics, 2006), xviii, 
emphasis in original.  Hereafter cited as Specters. 
  Following this 
line, I argue that attention to themes of memory and memorialization, and especially 
the mechanisms of memory will yield a politics of her writing beyond a narrow 
conception of those forgotten or remembered, those silenced or given voice.  Themes 
of inheritance and generation recur throughout Parks' work, typically accompanied by 
a concern over speaking for those are not present, non-contemporaneous "spectral" 
moments (i.e., moments that do not or no longer belong to time), moments of dead 
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time between presence and inscription, in a phrase, the mechanisms through which 
"Thuh Then that's Been somehow sits in the Then that Will Be" (AP 126). 
I situate ghosts alongside the notion of "fugitive articulacy" developed in the 
previous chapter (figures of literal fugitivity recur throughout Parks' work, but they are 
not centrally at issue here).  This "phantom articulation" opens the possibility of an 
unpredicted line of thought that goes beyond immediate, spontaneous ideological 
recognition.  This thinking is non-prepossessing and fundamentally flexible and 
affirmative, open even to the concepts and norms of the dominant order without 
accepting that order as the last determining instance.  "Fugitivity" is thus not a simple 
saying "no" to power, but instead draws its power from the structuring power 
relations, from their inability to close without remainder.  I will consider this call for 
thinking—an unlimited call for reading and collaboration—in the pages that follow, 
paying special attention to her critical writing, and her plays Imperceptible 
Mutabilities in the Third Kingdom and Venus. 
 
The Void and the Great Hole of History  
 
History is time that won't quit – Suzan-Lori Parks 
 
In the prefatory essays to The America Play and Other Plays, Suzan-Lori Parks 
assigns her work two primary tasks, in distinction with what she posits as the tasks of 
the conventional theater: to "produce some reaction of sorts" or "discuss some issue" 
with a particular, contemporary audience.  Stressing literature's ability to make 
something "actually happen" her first task entails "working theatre like an incubator to 
create 'new' historical events."  The quotation marks around the word "new" signal the 
risk and even the impossibility of her endeavor: the "new"—both the new event and 
 139 
the word new—is a citation.  As we will have to consider the status of the proper in 
literature, so too does Parks' work lead us to the question of the relationship, if any, 
between literature and Events.  Any unearthed, "silenced" history registers as silent 
only because it has been previously unacknowledged, or inadequately acknowledged.  
The play would create nothing: it would be a re-articulation or re-membering.  For 
structural reasons, the task cannot be completed, only begun again:  
 
[because] so much of African-American history has been unrecorded, 
disremembered, washed out, one of my tasks is to—through literature and the 
special strange relationship between theatre and real-life [i.e., the phenomenal 
world]—locate the ancestral burial ground, dig for bones, find bones, hear the 
bones sing, write it down.  The bones tell us what was, is, will be; and because 
their song is a play—something that through a production actually happens—
I'm working theatre like an incubator to create "new" historical events.  I'm re-
membering and staging historical events that through their happening on stage 
are ripe for inclusion in the canon of history (AP 4-5, my emphasis).   
 
The task of creating new events remains ambiguous, not least because the 
implied invention would itself be an event.  Unasked, however, is the relationship 
between phenomenality—bodies on stage, already marked by race—and those 
narrated events that comprise the so-called "canon of history."  This latter operates as 
a metonym for "real-life" that separates itself off discursively to govern 
simultaneously the writing, its performance and its interpretation.  The inscribed 
circle—e.g., the obvious or "undeniable" correspondence between black bodies, black 
history and black experience—reduces the plays' function precisely to the simple 
"discussion of issues" Parks disparages, while simultaneously reducing "the" "Black 
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Experience" to a single origin or originary unity.  There would be no new event, no 
event at all, since anything or anyone that would come would already have been 
inscribed within a given history, available as referent, the play depends upon for 
coherence and meaning. 
The reference to digging (both funerary and archeological metaphor), raises 
what for me is the central complication.  The "incorporation" of events and people 
gone, of those no longer or not yet there, relies on knowing in advance what peoples 
and events are relevant, limiting in advance allowable haunting.  Thus, a similar logic 
of exclusion would govern the distinction between those "memories" or artifacts 
relevant for the project of allowing currently present people to claim, for example, 
"full citizenship," and which are irrelevant.  From this vantage, materiality or 
phenomenality exist only at the level of metaphor, subtended by a logic of 
identification that has first passed through ideological recognition, the spontaneous 
"knowledge" of common myths and codes, the shared assumption of an 
"homogeneous empty time" that allows the even, lossless transmission of cultural 
knowledge and value.90
Following Parks' metaphors more closely, one imagines that unearthing the 
dead is legitimate on the grounds that one is trying to win for one's ancestors a place in 
the "canon of history."  That relationship, however, can be established only after the 
  This homogeneity undermines and renders ambiguous or 
merely nominal the heterogeneity implied by the predication "African American 
history." 
                                                 
90 For a particularly compelling discussion of ideological recognition opposed to (and determining of) 
identification, see Louis Althusser's essay "The 'Piccolo Teatro': Bertolazzi and Brecht," pp. 144-149.  I 
am sympathetic to Althusser's discussion of spectatorial identification as relates to Brecht's Epic 
Theatre and especially his rigorous consideration of the role ideology plays in pre-determining and pre-
limiting the content of the work.  However, the line Althusser draws between the world of the play and 
the "real world" wherein the spectator becomes actor seems to me untenable, on the one hand, because 
of the role of ideology, as Althusser discusses it, and, on the other hand, the aporia between the play's 
structure the structure of the so-called "real world."  The link between the two structures seems 
incoherent without the presumption that the former is a reflection or "essential section" of the latter, a 
position that would itself pre-limit the "content" of the work.  
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bones have been retrieved (her essay, pertinently, is titled "Possession"), made to sing, 
the song or the listening transcribed into a play, the play performed and interpreted, 
establishing a circle of performance and under the metonymic sign of blackness.  
There is an inscribed circle of inheritance, but, as Derrida argues, being an heir does 
not mean that one must have or receive one's inheritance, for "the being of what we 
are is first of all an inheritance" (Specters 68, Derrida's emphasis).  There need not be 
imagined an autonomous, intending subject searching for origins or ancestors but a 
subject always marked by an inheritance, including that part of the inheritance she 
might reject, outside of questions of will or acknowledgement: we "inherit the thing 
that allows us to bear witness to it" (ibid.).   
Blackness, then, is both "inside" the works as an effect of their intended 
embodiment by black actors, and "outside" the works insofar as interpretation of those 
bodies relies on prior inscriptions, sedimented ideas, idealizations, and reading 
practices displaced onto the work as its property.  The defining element gives and 
withholds itself in the same gesture, forever marked by the histories and narratives that 
contain it.  The "black play" hovers at the edge of being and nothingness: "A black 
play does not exist.  / Every play is a black play" ("Math" 577).  To put the "the 
history of History " in question necessitates the re-inscription of history as abyssal, a 
void.91
                                                 
91 One gets a sense of this void similarly, across two languages, in the fifth chapter of Fanon's Peau 
Noir, Masques Blancs, "L'expérience vécue du Noir," ("The Lived Experience of Blackness/the Black") 
translated and often cited as "The Fact of Blackness."     
  Here the void stands between blackness, the determined difference that stands 
as the outside of the work (and as "outside" or excluded from history), and blackness, 
the determining, predicating difference that marks the circulation of the plays, and the 
definition of the plays as "black plays."  Though the plays may cite or re-articulate 
events that are in some sense already known (e.g., because they refer to historical 
happenings or literary texts), the void implicitly invoked here suggests the need for 
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readings that do more than refer, especially refer negatively to existing axiological 
norms or faith in the black author's inevitable "resistance" to or "subversion" of racist 
or white supremacist norms.   
Parks does not refer to direct communion with ghosts, but with the bones of 
the ancestors, and that that bones sing, and that that singing becomes a play, which 
then must be performed, even if its primary mode is the words performing on the page.  
The emphasis remains on writing, the "dead time within the presence of the living 
present" as time unredeemed and irrecuperable under the sign or thinking of simple 
presence.92
In addition to suggesting the finitude of what appears permanent, the 
possibility of using those structures to some other purpose, the singing of bones brings 
to mind the disparagement of animism on the one hand, and the charge of cannibalism 
on the other.  One is reminded, for example, of Wilson Harris' account of the Carib 
bone-flute,
  Indeed, it is here that her demand for infinite readings and re-readings is 
undercut by the thinking of inheritance, taking on the property and properties of the 
dead, effects that can be imagined or claimed as belonging to some "us," to some 
community that exists between and as "us."   
93
                                                 
92 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1997), p. 68. 
93 "Adversarial Contexts and Creativity," New Left Review I/54 (November-December 1985), pp. 124-
128. 
 at once the sign of conquest and shared context, the cannibalism that 
supposedly separated the savage from the civilized, and the trace of the other in the 
self.  At the level of her text, then, Parks' fundamental gesture is not to silence or reject 
this image of the self as other, but to affirm and even amplify it, to translate it to other 
media and present it, already worked, where it can be worked and reworked by a new 
audience in infinitely new contexts.  This call from the other, from the self-as-other, 
must not be refused, even at the risk of the dissolution of the self.  Her gesture, in 
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other words, is to consider difference—"as such"—inevitable in the transmission of an 
inheritance, in the predication of some group of those no longer present or who will-
be-present as "ours."  The "work of dead time" denies the closure metaphor gestures 
toward.  It marks the spectral phenomenality of the dead, so that this specter is never 
merely the specter of a known and exhaustible past, but from an unknown past that has 
escaped determination, or from the future as that which has come back:  "The bones 
tell us what was, is, will be" (AP 4). 
Parks' second self-defined tendency runs alongside this encounter between 
memory and the present moment: an endeavor to "refigure the idea of forward 
progression" through the relative movements of time and overlapping temporalities as 
manipulated by a formal strategy she calls "repetition and revision" or "rep & rev."   
Rep & Rev is the "literal incorporation of the past," the letter of the past to be added to 
the body of an ongoing writing.  Parks privileges music in her formulation and 
practice of this strategy.  The overall effort is to defer narrative climax and examine 
"something larger than one moment" or one sexual encounter, challenging the actors 
and director (who are themselves readers) to create or imagine forms of life 
appropriate to the changing text, relating to a more fundamental question regarding the 
time of reading, or the time of "theatrical experience" (AP 9).   
Insofar as Parks' understanding of temporality is circular rather than linear, 
however, external referents or conflicts can lay no more claim to the status of absolute 
origin than the beginning of any individual play.  The constitutive failure to mark a 
clean break or origin functions thematically with plays that open onto scenes of 
waiting for deferred returns, or that begin after the last death.  Rep & Rev constructs 
more complicated narratives that show that "what really happened" cannot be 
contained by a single narrative or determination of the victors and victims.  As a 
means to call the "history of History" into question, including the histories of a 
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language and discourse, without the security of a self-identical subject, this means of 
pursuing history becomes less about revising this or that historical canon, but risks 
displacing the legitimating grounds of historical research.  There is an appeal to a 
future that may not arrive, and a responsiveness to those not or no longer present, 
those whose "presence" could not be acknowledged within the ideological limits of an 
era.  As with "phantom articulacy," rep & rev draws attention to that movement 
between—between two people, for example, or between the then that was and the then 
that will be.  Rep & Rev is a means of opening a question that is to stay open, 
maintaining the possibility of the unforeseeable event.  
 
Private Language and Chaotic Textuality in Imperceptible Mutabilities in the 
Third Kingdom 
 
Laughter as possibility threatens to destabilize or ironize the categories through 
which a subject can think or infer, that can unsettle the relation between word, 
supposed referent or object of the word, and subject of enunciation.  Laughter is 
neither articulate in the sense of a distinct utterance (discourse) nor as a combination 
of disparate elements; within a given system of signification, however, laughter 
threatens from within a discursive system as an externality, an externality to the 
discursive system and external to the self.  It answers 'yes' to what comes, even to the 
end.  Laughter, as a response that one cannot predict despite the presence of humor, is 
the possibility of an event in literature.   
Laughter shares in the structure of what I have called fugitive or phantom 
articulacy, but is also a literal component within the plays themselves.  One thinks, for 
example, of The Foundling Father as Abraham Lincoln's ritualistic "haw haw haw 
haw/ (rest)/ HAW HAW HAW HAW" in the America Play, or the inverted laughter—
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"gaw gaw gaw gaw" (a glottal stop or "strangulated articulation" of the word "gaw"—
a transition from laughing to choking) of Imperceptible Mutabilities in the Third 
Kingdom and Death of the Last Black Man in the Whole Entire World.  As a sign, it 
exceeds meaning not as a refusal of discourse but as an acceptance of all discourse.  
Charles, a character who figures prominently as the mysterious, deceased figure who 
haunts Aretha Saxon's dreams in the third part of  Imperceptible Mutabilities, for 
example, uses it as a means to conjure a collectivity, a "we" from which Aretha is 
explicitly excluded:  
 
Charles:  […] Chaos without correct records.  Chaos.  Aaah.  You know what 
chaos is don't you. 
Aretha: No suh.  I don't.   
Charles: He he he!  Aaaaah!  Ignorance is bliss!  They say ignorance is bliss—
only for the ignorant—for those who must endure them we find their ignorance 
anything but blissful.  Isn't that right. 
Aretha: Yes suh.  
Charles: "Yes suh.  Yes suh."  Heh heh heh heh.  Hold them [the children, 
Anglor and Blanca Saxon, who enter the scene during their conversation] up 
where I can see them.  Thaaaat's it.  You will look back on these times and 
know what was what.  Hold em up.  There.  Thaaaaaat's just fine.  Smile.  
Smile!  Smile?  Smiiiiiile— 
(Clicking of camera)  
(AP 48)94
                                                 
94 Parks' orthographical play is worth note here: the number of vowels in that and smile are all even.  
Recalling the previous chapter's discussion of words performing on the page, a notion Parks develops in 
her own critical commentary; this use of even numbers lends a very specific sense of timing to these 
words, carried out via the form.  At the end of the passage, the changing punctuation—"Smile.  Smile!  
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Imperceptible Mutabilities is separated into three main parts with two 
intermediary parts titled "Third Kingdom" and "Third Kingdom (Reprise)," which 
feature a chorus of five "seers" (Kin-Seer, Us-Seer, Shark-Seer, Soul-Seer and Over-
Seer).  The opening section, "Snails," concerns three female roommates—
Molly/Mona, Charlene/Chona, Veronica/Verona—dealing with an infestation 
problem: a mute robber Veronica/Verona has dubbed "Mokus," cockroaches, a 
Naturalist who also appears as Dr. Lutsky, an exterminator who also seems to be in the 
business of exterminating people.  "Open House," the middle section from which the 
above-quoted dialogue is taken, concerns a childcare worker named Aretha Saxon 
whose "expiration date"—simultaneously of lease and life (linking life and property to 
again pose a question of ipseity and the proper)—is approaching.  The last section, 
"The Greeks (or The Slugs)" concerns Mrs. Sergeant Smith and her children, Muffy, 
Buffy and Duffy, awaiting Mr. Sergeant Smith's return from war in a space verbally 
linked to the Third Kingdom.  The discrete sections together thematize the uses and 
meaning of history, the historical record, awaiting the absent or dead, generations, and 
the control of discourse and meaning.  Specifically, the Middle Passage and 
contemporary race relations are presented here as themes—pre-constituted objects of 
knowledge—rather than problems upon which the play symbolically "works."  Most 
reductively, one could say that the play's primary concern is language, the givenness 
of language and its mediality; neither reducing it to mere instrumentality or 
functionality as a conveyer of information or that which "reveals" Being, nor reducing 
it to a phenomenological "as such" or "in itself."  The focus here is on the structural 
possibility of meaning of expression, the limits of saying as "self-expression" or "self-
                                                                                                                                            
Smile?"—might therefore be thought to be a series of forms of address, but also notes on how to 
perform the words (i.e., staccato versus lilting diction, rising versus falling inflection). 
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knowledge" due to a priority granted to language as intermediate, working toward…, 
or passing between….95
In "Open House," a bureaucrat, Miss Faith, holds the Book that records the 
disparate times of the government, a dentist's office (which is linked to Nazi doctors 
and the Final Solution), history and the Book of Life, reads and enforces its words.  In 
the opening section, Aretha Saxon is leaving her job caring for someone else's 
children, Anglor and Blanca, who do not recognize her when they encounter her as 
adults looking to take over her lease and keep her on as a caretaker to some future 
children.  Charles, who only appears in "dreamtime" and in Miss Faith's book, has no 
stable past, and thus no stable identity beyond his name.  He appears as former lover 
and petty bureaucrat in his own right, analogous to The Naturalist/Dr. Lutsky of the 
play's first section.  Neither of his questions in the cited passage end with question 
marks, implying that what is at stake in his questions cannot be questioned, is the very 
substance of this particular discursive encounter he attempts to enforce through the 
violence of exclusion.  The "you" addressed, the only "you" worthy of address, knows 
what chaos is, knows that "their" ignorance is unendurable.  His staged laughter, 
accompanying his demand that Aretha smile for pictures
     
96
                                                 
95 Parks has said that the Third Kingdom is "that of fungi.  Small, overlooked, out of sight, of lesser 
consequence.  All of that.  And also: the space between."  Qtd, in Ben-Zvi, "'Aroun the Worl': 
Signifyin(g) Theater of Suzan-Lori Parks."  The Theatrical Gamut: Notes for a Post-Beckettian Stage.  
Ed. Enoch Brater.  (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995), 193. 
96 Such pictures are part of the explicit stage design—this section of the play begins with a slideshow of 
Aretha, Anglor and Blanca smiling successively wider as the actors read their lines. 
 that will become part of the 
records through which identity is preserved ("without it, we could be anybody.  We 
would be running around without identities"), maintains Aretha's position as the figure 
written in books, but not the figure who can write them, a conflict upon which this 
section turns.  As discourse, rather than that which disrupts discourse, Charles' 
"laughter" is no laughter at all: it exposes the laughing subject to nothing, tacitly 
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upholding the "scene" of which the laugher has always been a part, and of which he 
will always be a part.   
While language necessarily assumes responsibility to some imaginary 
collectivity, Charles' discourse here is addressed on behalf of, and to, only a particular 
collectivity—state or institutional power—without being in any way responsible, or 
responsive, to, for example, Aretha.  Far from resisting his discourse, Aretha's 
questions affirm it.  Charles' questions are rhetorical in the strictest sense—they are 
phatic utterances meant to affirm the existence of discourse.  His disposition recalls 
that of Molly/Mona who, despondent over having been expelled from school for her 
inability to pronounce words in perfect imitation of her instructors, says, "Once there 
was uh me named Mona who wondered what she'd talk like if no one listened."  The 
form of this statement—"once there was uh me…"—recurs throughout the play, 
almost like the set up to a joke.  One might be tempted to ask, "What do you mean?" 
or to laugh.  There can be no talking, no language, without the possibility of some 
other's response, some other's presumed hearing and interpretation, without an 
anticipated response, as in the case of Charles' speech cited above.  The notion of 
speech with no witness, with no other imagined or present to report or respond to what 
was said suggests the absurd situation of 'being alone being alone.'  Such solitude 
would be absolute, self-originating and self-sustaining, the utter impossibility of any 
community or betweenness; this radical solitude, or radical self-identity, is the 
condition of impossibility for any speech.  Unable to do away with the subjunctive 
grammar—once there was—even this singularity would be iterable, a revenant that 
returns, as it were, from the future.   
The threat—and fantasy—of utterly private "language" runs throughout Parks' 
oeuvre, most directly dramatized in Imperceptible Mutabilities by the five Seers, and 
the awaited letters from Mr. Smith in the last section, letters that his family may or 
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may not have received.  Insofar as the desire for, or fear of private language is 
motivated by a corresponding desire to control discourse, one also finds it in the figure 
of the mute Robber, the unseen bureaucrats who continually defer Mr. Smith's 
"distinction" and in Miss Faith's constant reference to the Borgesian "Book" as an 
inflexible, infallible authority.  The beginning of the second part of the third section 
finds Aretha counting an unknown entity that eventually reaches "Thirty-two and uh 
half," worrying that she must "know thuh size exact," worrying that she will have a 
"Hole house full" which becomes a "Whole hold full," a mix of strangers and kin.  
Hole becomes whole, house becomes hold becomes I: "how many kin kin I hold," the 
initial pun based on barely audible différance, which suggests that the fullness of the 
house is a function of its capacity to accept, especially to accept those of a kind.  In 
like manner, there is a highlighted homophonic relation between "kin" and "can," 
underscoring the subsumed metaphoric relation between Aretha Saxon and, 
apparently, the Africans transported across the Middle Passage, the short-circuited 
relationship whereby she moves from being like them to being descended from them, 
to being identical with them, regardless their place of origin or landing.  Miss Faith 
provides an extra-textual link, from the Book, with the following footnote that marks 
her initial appearance:  
Miss Faith: Footnote #1: The human cargo capacity of the English slaver, the 
Brookes, was about 3,250 square feet.  From James A. Rawley, The Transatlantic 
Slave Trade, G.J. McLeod Limited, 1981, page 283 (AP 43). 
This footnote is here performed as part of the main text (which features its own 
typographical footnotes).  It puts Miss Faith "on the scene," so to speak, before her 
character is formally introduced (her character must be "buzzed," and speaks as if on 
the telephone), providing an apparently self-interpreting answer to a question that has 
not been asked, while linking history and the Book from which she reads.  Miss Faith 
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is not speaking as a character in these moments but provides meta-discursive 
commentary; her lines momentarily suspend the text, apparently, introduce the subtext 
into the text.  When Aretha protests Miss Faith's calculation that "we'll fit six hundred 
people," Miss Faith follows with a second footnote—"600 slaves were transported on 
the Brookes, although it only had space for 451"—and the admonition "You give me 
the facts.  I draw from them, Maam.  I draw from them in accordance with the book" 
(AP 44).  "Drawing from" the facts—the instrumentalization of given historical 
facts—almost immediately becomes a dental extraction, which "the book says [Aretha 
is] due for."  That "book" again becomes the text of history with footnote three: "The 
average ratio of slaves per ship, male to female, was 2:1," a fact for which no use 
immediately presents itself.   
The play, especially in written form where, for example, the Hole/Whole/Hold 
transition and the play between extrapolation from "the facts" and the interpolation of 
extratextual material as essential is most immediately clear, stages a crisis of 
textuality.  Text understood as a mere conveyer of logos is both excessive—there are 
many overlapping texts, with only the "book" of ideology and existing interpretive 
practices (i.e., other texts) available as mediator or transcendent signifier—and 
inadequate, unable to interpret itself or signify without the mediation it attempts to 
cover over.  Textuality as thematized in Imperceptible Mutabilities only repeats a 
certain past, and continually fails to respect or determine context.  As "practiced" or 
staged, literature's strangeness and its tendency to interrupt or suspend discourse, to 
rewrite discourse according to "its own" terms, are active threats.   
The text of the footnotes we have been considering refers to a schematic image 
illustrating the Brookes' hold, which it happens was a central part of the iconography 
English abolitionists deployed as part of their arguments for the end of the 
transatlantic slave trade.  The ship, that is, prior to this play's footnotes was already a 
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heavily cited ship, perhaps having attained the status of metonym or symbol, so that its 
name alone was sufficient to invoke the conflicts in which it played a part.  In 
Imperceptible Mutabilities, the slave trade is rendered as a problem of the 
misallocation of space, which is then mixed with domestic space and the space of 
bodily cavities.  The Brookes becomes only one image among others, depending 
entirely on discursive context for meaning, without being reducible to that context or 
entirely constrained by it.  It is an example invoked from a book that is only an 
instantiation of the transcendent Book, and thus becomes indiscernible from the 
ambiguous images at the first part of the section, Aretha smiling along with Anglor 
and Blanca, or those of the first section, Molly and Charlene together.  It relates to the 
action on stage by juxtaposition, having no necessary relationship to them.  The 
Brookes can only function as an anachronistic anti-slavery protest, mixed up or 
confused with the mundane.  Domesticity, hospitality, dental work, and historical 
trauma more broadly—the nine million estimated (by Rawley) to have been taken 
from Africa is juxtaposed with the six million Jewish people killed during the 
Holocaust, a quantification that attempts to elide and reduce the singularity of each 
individual death, instrumentalizing death as the institutions referred to—the slave 
trade and the Holocaust—instrumentalized each life.  
As with Molly/Mona's fantasy of radically isolated discourse, the performed 
footnotes mime "private language" of a kind: they enact, in part, a critique of the 
ideologically circumscribed limits of a "black play" by staging an potential subtext in 
the form of context, delivered by a figure onstage who provides information from a 
textual margin.  The footnotes invite us to question the status of reference to an 
historically verifiable event—in this case, the operations and dimensions of the 
Brookes—since the event is invoked ambiguously.  If we disregard this question, the 
term "Middle Passage" seems to function as a transcendent signified, conjuring 
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without fail the same event or set of events each time, which among other things 
would attest to the historical record as perfectible, rendering the task of unearthing or 
"creating new events" ambiguous.   
The citations here encourage us to consider that, as Ludwig Wittgenstein 
argues in another context, there is only a "queer connection" [seltsam Verbindung] 
between name and named object—a relation of language convention rather than 
necessity, appearances notwithstanding.  Language refers to some "outside" world, but 
reference is not its sole function, nor does such reference function the same way in all 
instances.  Arguing there is a "queer connection" does not imply that there is no 
connection, only no natural connection.  What connection there is is an articulated 
connection, toward particular polemical and political ends.  Arguing against those 
philosophical traditions that claim an essential connection between name and named 
and that emphasize the necessity of stable referents, Wittgenstein emphasizes the 
capacity of a word to mean—to be useful within particular language games—even 
after the referent is no longer present, or its status within our forms of life has been 
altered.97
                                                 
97 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan 
Publishing, 1958), 19 (§38). 
  The particular "language games"—contingently codified ways of using 
language—within which the invocation of the name "Middle Passage" functions as 
though the peoples, social practices and institutions that temporally follow it therefore 
follow from it, and thus be said to participate in essentially the "changing same" 
ideologies, traditions or "cultural logics" of domination and subversion.  This tendency 
is troped by the invocation of the Brookes, which, as discussed above, had already 
functioned as a symbolic economy of protest, raising the question of its efficacy as 
encapsulating that historical event, and of capacity of the discrete practices and 
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institutions of and tangential to the Middle Passage to adequately account for 
contemporary "race relations." 
Rather than understand the footnotes as referring to the "hard rock" of 
historical specificity, one might think of them as invoking and partially staging 
another time, one that cannot be recovered "as it was" or on "its own terms," whatever 
such might mean.  The footnotes raise as question the relation of one time—one 
then—to another, disjoining the "Standard Time Line."  Both textual interruption and 
as a means to fill in gaps in the surreal movements of this third part, that moves from 
one domestic space to another in the shadow of Aretha's foreordained death, presented 
as explanatory, as the well-ordered historical facts that provide identities and prevent 
chaos, these notes represent a kind of gap-free and therefore empty knowledge.  
Requiring and presuming no such being, present or otherwise, who can adequately 
answer to the identity provided—"overlap's uh gap"—this well-ordered knowledge 
proves to be the most chaotic element of all.  The footnotes, rather than providing 
context, explanation or elaboration of the events on stage present another layer of 
information requiring interpretation in its own right, not reducible to or strictly 
delimited by a single text or Book.  But rather than think of this as another instance of 
the infamous "end of master narratives," or a "mere" "joyous encounter" with 
language, we might think of it as suggesting that such "master narratives" are simply 
another mode of discourse that operate through making this talking-to-oneself a 
legitimate means of producing knowledge and reproducing a given (ideological) order.  
They mark and enact a moment of incongruity, an interruption of the smooth running 
of the text.  Nonetheless, the other discourse from which the footnotes arrive is neither 
wholly 'outside' the play, nor inextricable from it.  The two form a complex unity, 
simultaneously assuming and undermining textual sovereignty. 
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"Once there was uh me": Laughter, Errantry, Betweenness 
 
I made up my mind to laugh until I choked [m'amuser jusqu'à étouffer], but 
laughter had become impossible. 
– Frantz Fanon, Black Skins, White Masks 
 
The laugh functions as an empty figuration, an unintelligible or radically open 
articulation: on the one hand, it refuses to mean on its own while on the other hand it 
reveals the metonymic nature of all subject positions and, to an extent, political action 
itself, in this case writing history as a political (or politically motivated) act.  Through 
the figure of laughter, both expressly represented on the page through Charles' stage 
laughter and the structural operation elaborated above, the text of history is thematized 
as text, as writing drawn "in accordance with the book," with the ideologies 
motivating the study and the other studies alongside which each new study must 
present itself.  This is one way in which "history is time that won't quit."  Miss Faith's 
faith in an unfailing book that contains records of the living and the dead is a fantasy 
of dead time, exhaustively realized and known time, time as present or once-present, 
such that one need only know what information—what record of past phenomena—
one seeks and then find it in the book.  Emphasizing the obligation to in a sense create 
the phenomena one seeks, the space between phenomenality and writing becomes the 
space of possible reorientation, of being surprised by some event thought passed.  Re-
interrogating Molly/Mona's questions from this point of view, we may now wonder 
not about the fantasy of discourse without interlocutor, and instead wonder about the 
grammatical structure within which she poses the fantasy: once there was uh me.   
There was a me—an object rather than subject pronoun—but there is no 
longer; the phrase announces neither the death nor the "decentering" of the ego, but 
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the ego's non-contemporaneity with the enunciating subject.  Further, the adverb there, 
which designates a place first in language, indicates the mediation of the ego in and by 
language, much as the indefinite article uh (a) suggests an openness to those things 
that might count or be counted as "mine."98  Molly/Mona calls into question, with both 
the form and sense of her questions, the structures that give the "me" to time or to 
being,99
The phrase "there is"/"there was" resounds, being used by Molly/Mona, The 
Naturalist/Dr. Lutsky ("There was a woman in Queens," "I hear there is one with 'bug 
bites all over'") and Charlene/Chona ("There once was a one Verona named 
'Mokus,'"
 the structures that simultaneously grant autonomy and make one vulnerable to 
the other, who is always assumed by the act of enunciation.  Within the play, the first 
invocation of Mona at the beginning of Sub-Division C in the opening section ("once 
there was a me named Mona who wondered what she'd be like if no one was watchin") 
creates Mona—a self separate from the one The Naturalist/Dr. Lutsky names Molly 
for an unknown audience—whose primary substance is a different name, a nickname.  
The "me named Mona," like subsequently renamed characters, occupy a different 
timeline, one where she "wanted tuh jump ship but didnt," "wondered what she'd be 
like if no one was watchin," and so on.   
100
                                                 
98 This structure is repeated in The Death of the Very Last Black Man in the Whole Entire World, 
especially in character names such as "Black Woman with Drumstick," and "Black Man with 
Watermelon."  This latter, refusing a necessary connection to the watermelons he is "with," asks 
"Melons mine?" complaining that the do not have his "mark" or answer to him the way his feet do.   
99 Derrida pursues this function of "there is" by way of a reading of Heidegger in Given Time I: 
Counterfeit Money trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp.16-24.  
Hereafter cited as GT. 
100 This character is the robber, rendered invisible on the page by his muteness.  He depends entirely on 
other characters or the stage directions to mark his presence. 
 "There once was a one name Verona who bit thuh hand that feeds her"), 
with progressively greater distance between the person speaking and the object of the 
speech: there was a me, a one, a lady in Queens.  In each case, the grammar of the 
statement invokes someone no longer present, absent save for the discourse that 
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remembers for some particular purpose, always in relation to the speaker.  In Mona's 
case, the person invoked but now absent is "a me," pointing most directly to the 
temporal gap between the rote repetition of the narrative impulse and, for example, the 
disciplinary techniques through which one is "naturally" taught to express oneself in 
"one's own" mother tongue.   
Most fundamentally at stake is not subjectivity or saying "I," speaking in one's 
own name, but intersubjectivity.  The repeated "there was a me" suggests that there is 
no subjectivity "as such" without intersubjectivity, which is both the condition of 
possibility for any subjectivity, and its condition of impossibility if it be imagined that 
authentic subjectivity require radical sovereignty—the ability to freely act or speak in 
the absence of any other.   
This implied relation should not be mistaken for any immanent face-to-face 
relationship or encounter between subjects.  That the uneven, conflictual sharing of 
language figures prominently in this play as an explicit theme, however, will have to 
serve as a caution before claims of the liberatory or resistant capacity of the anarchic 
play of language discussed above and in what is to follow.  It would also be 
problematic to abstract from this uneven sharing of language the history of exclusions 
or elisions of the historical record that then return on the model of the 'return of the 
repressed' to disrupt the three domestic scenes.  At best, there would be a tendentious 
or "queer connection" between the historical "facts" of the Middle Passage presented 
throughout those scenes.  There is no single locus of concern or target of critique, but 
an openness to—and demand for—reading, including reading that could splinter or 
fragment certainty, displace knowledge needed for the coherence of certain 
philosophical or political statements.  Insofar as this play's most fundamental stance to 
openness to interruption, to digression, to contradiction, our understanding of it as a 
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political work in the everyday sense depends on a prepossessing standpoint the play 
does not fully support.   
This betweenness, thematized through lines of dialogue that circulate among 
characters in different, seemingly unrelated scenes, is not simply to be affirmed or 
championed as a good in itself.  It is at once the condition of possibility for the ego, 
and a limit, a point of the ego's undoing, insofar as it motivates a consideration of the 
"givenness" of objects, of the self as the object an enunciating subject "gives" herself, 
only to "give" that self almost immediately to any Other through discourse, to lose this 
"gift" through temporalization (e.g., "once there was a me").  One might re-write 
Mona's question: what would she be, outside of any economy or auto-affection, if no 
one listened, if none could be imagined who anticipated her coming and prepared a 
place for it in discourse or knowledge?  Would she "be" present, and in what sense 
would she "be" present outside of any structure or temporalization that would allow 
her giving also to be a retention that could return her to herself?  Such being is 
impossible, or impossible to say.  Mona's question, too, is thus itself an instance of 
parabasis, a figure that systematically interrupts the expectations of a present moment, 
the trajectory of the play. 
What remains, then, is to think the role of parabasis or choral effects, the 
systematic undoing of understanding that operates extravagantly here and other 
instances of dialogue throughout the play (one thinks of Mr. Sergeant Smith's 
soliloquies).  One interruption that I have privileged so far is the instantiated rift 
between an "internal" experience of subjectivity—the capacity to talk of a "me" that 
has been—and the proper name or persona thought to secure identity across time.  Yet 
the most direct moments of parabasis are in the choral "Third Kingdom" sections, 
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which feature the five seers, who first come onto the scene by announcing what one 
takes to be names, each presumably announcing his or her own name:101
The two long dashes occupy the place of the "spell," a temporalized "place 
where characters experience their pure true simple state," ordinarily marked on the 
page by the repetition of one or two names with no dialog or action stipulated (AP 16).  
Here, all names here omitted.  The recitation of names repeats following the spell, 
followed by a similar, three-line spell, the last of which is rendered "——…"  The 
ellipsis makes clear the relation of the spell to "the work of dead time," the gap 
between present phenomena "as such" and writing, implicitly calling such purity, truth 
and simplicity into question.  The enabling ambiguity of this stage direction is 
typographically marked by the implication that that some element has been removed, 
or that something continues on that cannot be contained by characters in their impure 
 
 
Kin-Seer: Kin-Seer 
Us-Seer: Us-Seer 
Shark-Seer: Shark-Seer 
Soul-Seer: Soul-Seer 
Over-Seer: Over-Seer 
——. 
——.  (AP 37). 
 
                                                 
101 The original cast for this play consists of five actors who play all the roles of the play, irrespective of 
gender.  For simplicity's sake, when pronoun use requires that the Seers' genders be specified, I will do 
so in accord with the opening-night actors: Over-Seer/Naturalist/Dr. Lutsky/Charles/Duffy – Peter 
Schmitz; Us-Seer/Veronica/Verona/Aretha Saxon/Mrs. Smith – Pamela Tyson; Soul-Seer/Robber/Miss 
Faith/Mr. Smith – Jasper McGruder; Kin-Seer/Molly/Mona/Blanca/Muffy – Kenya Scott; Shark-
Seer/Charlene/Chona/Anglor/Buffy – Shona Tucker.  The reader will note that in some instances of 
repetition or anticipation of lines from other scenes, the same actor repeats the lines, suggesting a 
deeper thinking about the nature of personage that I will develop further in relation to other works. 
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state.  Something will have been removed or will have been added in the future (the 
agency responsible for this removal or addition—e.g., the author, the playwright, the 
actors—remains unclear); some omission or future arrival will haunt the appearance of 
bodies on stage, beyond any simple invocation of lack or claims to supplementation by 
sub- or con-text.  The ellipsis figures the "mutability" of the play's title, the room for 
and imperative to change, to extend this moment of performance, of reading, longer 
than one might be inclined.  It figures a paradoxical moment of "free" time within the 
structure of the play. 
The first and third parts gesture toward this indeterminate interval via 
photography: large photographs and the actors in character accompany or stand in for 
the "live" actors performing their lines.  Within the diegesis of the play, photography 
is linked with the "good records" that secure identity across time.  The unknown time 
of the photograph—an interval that, unknown, is not in any meaningful sense 
represented by the plays—is another mode of temporality of the play, what we might 
call an "indexical trace."102
                                                 
102 I am borrowing this term from Philip Rosen's discussion of temporality in cinema.  See Change 
Mummified: Cinema, Historicity, Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001). 
  As index, it points to the profilmic event itself, the 
having-been-there if some thing or event to which the photograph points, irrespective 
of the "content" of the image.  As trace, it is that "part" of the image that does not 
belong to it, that which exceeds the narratives within which it may come to have a 
place, the past events for which it is supposed to serve as proof or testimony.  The 
photograph's value may be in its testamentary capacity, but that capacity does not 
"belong" to the photograph, much as the photographs in Imperceptible Mutabilities 
properly belong to neither character nor actor, nor to this performance or some 
performance in the future.  The non-possessed time of photography implicitly draws 
attention the "queer connection" between the actor and role, image and subject, 
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naturalist theater and history's presumption of continuity across time by dint of the 
staged disjunction between the overlapping times of photo, stage (including all the 
time of rehearsal and so on), and writing in general.  The photographs show figments 
rather than characters; contrary to the documentary role ascribed to them within the 
play and their implicit function maintaining order and stability, they prove to be one 
ambiguous reference among others, gestural but inconclusive if we ask what they 
mean.103
In the choral sections, the questions raised by photography in the first and third 
and letters in the fifth are approached via the name.  Despite the apparent reflexivity 
(especially in the written text) of the recitation of names, there is no immediate link 
between the spoken name and the name's speaker; the two are associated by 
convention—we assume that the characters introduce themselves by self-reference, 
despite the fact that these names are not used within the play as reference.  Indeed, 
Over-Seer asks Kin-Seer and Soul-Seer, respectively, "Who're you again?" prompting 
a response from Soul-Seer that anticipates the final section: "Duhdduhnt-he-know-my-
name?"  We might ask, then, what the names in this intermediate section mean, if 
meaning is at issue.  What does this act of (self-)naming promise or portend, since it is 
not obvious that one is justified in reading them as an example of agency or self-
assertion?  What relation, if any, do these figures have to the scenario that that 
precedes them or that which will follow?  Taken together, the recitation of names at 
the beginning of this first choral section and the repeated or anticipatory dialogue 
along with the ambiguous role of photography within the play's dialogue and stage 
   
                                                 
103 Speaking of the use of photography in this play, Parks refers to the gap between "preconceived 
images of African Americans and real people," the latter category being unmarked, analogous perhaps 
to Althusser's "concrete individuals."  The term "real people," that is, performs a particular discursive 
function within a given polemic; how can one point to the "realness" of the real person and, within the 
domain traced by the use of photography in general, is the "real person" a function of the character, or 
vice-versa? 
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instructions amount to a critique, in the philosophical sense, of reference itself—both 
reference in the everyday linguistic sense where language is thought to "point" to its 
object and in the broader historical sense suggested, for example, by the word "recall" 
or "re-member."   
After the second repetition and the ellipsis within which anything could happen 
or be excluded from happening, Kin-Seer relates a dream:  
 
Kin-Seer: Last night I dreamed of where I comed from.  But where I comed 
from diduhnt look like nowhere like I been. 
Soul-Seer: There were 2 cliffs? 
Kin-Seer: There were. 
Us-Seer: Uh huhn. 
Shark-Seer: 2 cliffs? 
Kin-Seer: 2 cliffs: one on each other side thuh world. 
Shark-Seer: 2 cliffs? 
Kin-Seer: 2 cliffs where the world had cleaved intuh 2.  
Over-Seer: The 2nd part comes apart in 2 parts. 
Shark-Seer: But we are not in uh boat!  (AP 37, emphasis added).   
 
This dream of uncanny origin is apparently a repetition: either Kin-Seer has 
had and has discussed this dream with Soul-Seer at some point in the past, or Soul-
Seer has had the same dream (or origin).  As the dialogue proceeds, references to 
boats, "Bleached Bones Man," and, retrospectively, the question "how many kin kin I 
hold" suggest a loosely allegorical reading whereby the two cliffs they represent the 
shores of western Africa and the Americas respectively, and that this interstitial space 
is the Atlantic Ocean as overwritten by memory.  On such a reading, this uncanny 
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origin—Kin-Seer recognizes a place that looks like nothing she's seen—or traumatic 
originary event is claimed as her own, and the transatlantic slave trade is the event that 
creates in one stroke "each other side thuh world."  The choral sections, then, would 
be something like the play's structural unconscious, a dream space literalized in part 
three by Charles' appearance during "dreamtime."  
The dialogue recalls the earlier scene (Should I jump?  Shouldijumporwhat?—
Kin-Seer echoing Mona/Molly) and anticipates later scenes (Duhdunt-he-know-my-
name?, Soul-Seer anticipating Muffy in the final section, who is told her name may be 
code, and thus unspeakable in Mr. Smith's correspondence with the family).  The 
potential simultaneity of references from the past and future within the context of this 
play reaches its apotheosis in "Third Kingdom (Reprise)," when two or four characters 
speak at once.  In the latter case, two invoke dialogue of the first and last sections of 
the play, a third invoking a pop song ("Rock the Boat"), and the fourth speaking 
without relation to other events in the play: 
Kin-Seer 
Wavin wavin 
wavin wavin wavin 
wavin wavin wavin 
wavin waving 
Soul-Seer 
Rock.  Thuh Boat.  
Rock.  Thuh Boat.  
Rock.  Thuh Boat.  
Rock. Thuh Boat 
 
Shark-Seer 
Shouldijump 
shouldijump or 
whut?  
Shouldijump 
shouldijump or 
whut?  
Us-Seer 
Thuh sky was just 
as blue!  
THUP! 
Thuh sky was just 
as blue! 
(AP 57).104
Taken together, these are an instance of "uh speech in uh language of codes[,]  
Secret signs and secret symbols" that fail as immediately meaningful because they 
 
                                                 
104 According to Parks' glossary of "foreign words and phrases," "thup" is "(Air intake with sound 
placed in mouth; liberal use of the tongue.)  Slurping."  (AP 17). 
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disrupt the straight line implied by referentiality as horizon of meaning in order to 
highlight language's capacity to create over and against its (instrumental) capacity to 
refer or mean (AP 56).  Such temporal play makes it difficult to uphold the apparent 
references to the Middle Passage as exclusive references or to make such references 
determinant "in the last instance" of the play's meaning or political value, taming the 
strangeness of the language, or reducing it to a simple matter of style.  I want to 
propose a reading of these choral sections that lays accent on the chorus' intermediate 
position, which corresponds to the "betweenness" cited within the text of this section, 
and in Parks' accounts of this play.  This chorus literally belongs to another time, able 
to look back and forward through the time of the play, and thus serves as a kind of 
oblique commentary.  Like photography, that is, the chorus might be thought of as a 
kind of "indexical trace," a reference to past events and, unlike photography, a 
pointing forward to some future event, without being reducible to this pointing 
function.  Whereas a photograph or historical reference might function as a kind of 
documentary substrate thought to guarantee the link between the narrative being told 
and the text of history, this chorus marks a systematic disruption of the work, 
especially the work of character, and a distillation of time so that, figuratively, any 
element can interact with any other element.   
Of special note is the language itself, with its tortured syntax and functionally 
needless repetitions and appositions, and the references to fractured subjectivity—Kin-
Seer: "And then my Self came up between us [her me and her "uther me," as distinct 
from her self].  Rose up out of thuh water and standin on them waves my self was 
standin" (AP 39).  Subject and object pronouns interact with the abstract noun implied 
by both of them, yoked to them by the possessive pronoun "my," which is the only 
link.  That the dreamed originary site "diduhnt look like anywhere like [she had] 
been," suggests, on the one hand, that the primary means of authenticating this site is 
 164 
through visual comparison, in this case with an un-remembered space, while, on the 
other hand, it makes explicit that the site only has to be like some place where she has 
been.  In this instance, doubling "like" suggests that the articulated origin is a 
repetition, that is, non-originary.  One gets an elaborated sense of this "sharing" in the 
trebled "part" ("The 2nd part comes apart in 2 parts), a partition we find elaborated 
later in this section: "Half the world had fallen away making 2 worlds and a sea 
between.  Those two worlds inscribe the Third Kingdom" (AP 38, my emphasis).  This 
"cleavage," which creates the two worlds, goes a step further to claim that a certain 
time has ended: "half the world had fallen away."  Insofar as the two worlds "inscribe" 
the Third Kingdom, history is again rendered as a textual problem, a problem of 
demarcation made explicit by the revised repetition in "Third Kingdom (Reprise)", 
where "Word" takes the place of "World," and "were" becomes "are":   
 
Soul-Seer: There are 2 cliffs.  2 Cliffs where the Word has cleaved.  Half the 
Word has fallen away making 2 Words and a space between (AP 55-56).    
 
Within the context of the play's play with spacing and referentiality, or the 
referential fallacy (the assumption of a necessary relation between signifier and 
signified in a written work), the space between the "2 Words" suggests that a certain 
play, which undergirds language's creative capacity—its capacity to create new events, 
perhaps—as against its function to describe them.  But what is this "space," emerging 
as it does to mark the distinction of the two Words created after the falling off of "half 
the Word"?  And what of this abyssal Word, out of which comes two spaced—and 
thus potentially meaningful (but not meaning-full)—Words, analogous in some 
manner to Worlds?  Does the assertion that every Word carries within itself or 
accompanies a World, or vice-versa, have any sense?  And what relation would these 
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have to one another without the operation of a system of language or cartography to 
link them, to provide them with provisional identities?  What is ultimately put at issue 
by this particular revision, following on the fantasy of private language, a language of 
one's "own" interiority—sharing, the non-owned, im-proper space "between" is the 
condition of any such ownership.  This betweenness, invoking the work of Édouard 
Glissant, is a figure of errantry, "the knowledge that identity is no longer in the root," 
that is, in the originating or intending consciousness or a particular experience, "but 
also in Relation."105
This errantry, "which always implies [sous-entends] that at some moment it is 
told," amounts to a poetics, in the context of this play a literal "poetics of relation," 
considering commonality not of history, humanity, nor even accomplished (that is, 
existing or successfully meaningful) language, but of a wanting-to-say that is the 
condition of every written text (PR 18, translation modified).  From such a vantage 
point, we might find in the chorus' temporal suspension, its intermediacy, its 
repetitions and anticipations, a gesturing toward such wanting-to-say as that which 
subtends relation.  We can then read the Third Kingdom as an inoculation against the 
speaking-to-itself staged via the footnotes: this "space"—the uninhabitable space 
"between" that connects space to space, the then that was to the then that will be—is 
not proper to the play.  The echoes with other sections, other times of the play are 
moments wherein the five "seers" are caught up in the language of the Other—present, 
no-longer-present and not-yet-present—implicated in the Other's wanting-to-say, and 
in the obligation to make sense of the Other in a way that does not reduce her 
otherness.  Thus, those moments of simultaneous dialogue, the repetition in rapid 
 
                                                 
105 Édouard Glissant, The Poetics of Relation trans. Betsy Wing (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1997), 18.  Hereafter cited parenthetically in the text as PR. 
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succession of lines just uttered, the synchronous choked "utterance"106
                                                 
106 E.g., Soul-Seer, Us-Seer, Shark-Seer, Kin-Seer and Over-Seer: Gaw gaw gaw gaw gaw gaw gaw 
gaw gaw gaw gaw gaw gaw gaw gaw gaw— 
 that cannot be 
reduced to the condition of voicelessness all suggest a precarious relation, informed 
by, but not reducible to, wanting-to-say—language and communicability as temporal 
concerns whose effects are felt as disruptions in the flow of time.  The scenes of 
waiting—intermediary scenes involving characters after a scene of humiliation or 
awaiting an uncertain arrival, of a foretold "expiration" ambiguously linked to several 
incompatible pasts, the patriarch at war awaiting his distinction, whose family waits 
for him—are part of a generative project that dissimulates the one who waits and the 
one present for the arrival.  In a word, the plays make place for the time of the Event, 
or thinking the event. 
"Third Kingdom (Reprise)" stages a wanting-to-say with its opening gesture, 
which revises the recitation of names that begins "Third Kingdom."  Now, each figure 
refers to his or her own saying (e.g., Kin-Seer sez), which becomes increasingly 
referential (e.g., "Sez Kin-Seer sez," "Sezin Shark-seer sez," "Sezin Soul-Seer sezin 
sez," and so on), increasingly declined before the recitation of the dream, this time 
conjugated in the present tense ("Tonight I dream of where I be-camin from").  There 
is a more other critical revision, however, of the notion of "betweenness," which now 
extends beyond errantry, the complex relation through which relative difference 
emerges.  Two figures speak before the recitation and declension of names and seeing:  
 
Over-Seer: What are you doing? 
Us-Seer: Throw-ing.  Up (AP 54). 
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Without an object (e.g., "throw up my hands"), to throw up generally connotes 
vomit, although it seems unlikely that Over-Seer would be unable to see that 
immeditately, and that Us-Seer would pause to respond.  Most fundamentally at stake 
is Over-Seer's implicit right and obligation to ask, to demand an account from Us-
Seer.  Thus, one might understand Us-Seer's response to be a sarcastic but indirect 
protest, or, a metonymic expression of disgust.  However, following on the previous 
section where Aretha Saxon is forced to have her teeth extracted, one might do well to 
focus on the mouth as centrally involved in the act of throwing up.  Such focus 
suggests that the aim here, as with laughter, is not expression as the expression of 
some interiority, a speaking and hearing oneself speak, but breaking the economy of 
auto-affection.  From this perspective, we might be moved toward an alternative 
reading of the simultaneous choking sounds or the choral dialogue cited above, during 
which individual voices would be hard to discern, as the reader is unable to read them 
simultaneously.  Toward the end of this section, Over-Seer demands such an account 
again, with increasing intensity bordering on hysteria:  
 
Over-Seer: What are you doing?  What'reya doin.  What'reya-doeeeeee!  
WHAT ARE YOU DO-EEE-NUH???! 
Kin-Seer: —.  —: Throw-ing.  Kisses (AP 57). 
 
The kiss keeps focus on the mouth, specifically on that which leaves the mouth 
and does not come back.  One gives a kiss to another, but the recipient of the kiss 
cannot be said then to have that kiss.  Even if the kiss is reciprocated, one could not 
sensibly say that one received back his or her own kiss, the one initially given to the 
other.  Like the vomit to which it is rhetorically linked, one cannot immediately and 
without ambiguity say what the kiss "means" or "expresses"; neither is immediately 
 168 
recuperable within an economy of signification.  Note, too, the pause, represented by 
dashes rather than an ellipsis in the instant Kin-Seer takes before she responds, time 
enough to throw a kiss, time enough, perhaps, to think.  Figures for this caesura—
laughter, vomiting, kissing—cannot immediately or without ambiguity be said to 
"resist" Over-Seer's questioning, nor to pose a counter-question of his right to 
question.  Alongside the Rep & Rev technique, these moments of bodily excess, of 
unlimited jouissance, tend to make sublime the boundaries of selfhood or personage 
into by suspending its determining limit, that is, point to the limits of the language 
games within which agency or selfhood is articulated, the interpellative norms through 
which subjectivity emerges.  Ultimately, the name and the pre-name—"you"—prove 
to be a part the more general critique of reference this play engages in, and the 
question becomes not "what would I talk like if no one listened," but rather "what 
happens when my response, whether I will it or not, does not satisfy the question?"  
Yet this failure to satisfy cannot be comprehended as a simple refusal or saying "no," 
but must be considered as a yes, for example to the trace of the other in the self, to 
what makes selfhood, personage, saying or wanting-to-say impossible.   
 
Venus and the Affirmation of the End 
 
The butt is the past, the posterior; posterity.  She's a woman with a big past—
History.  —Suzan-Lori Parks 
 
If for Parks the figures in her plays might be thought of as "another person's 
pulse," perhaps for no other figure is that true than the title character of her 1996 play, 
Venus, inspired by the life of a Khosian woman known as Saartjie Baartman.  Perhaps 
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better known as the "Hottentot Venus,"107 she was taken from present-day South 
Africa to Europe in the early Nineteenth Century and put on spectacular display until 
her death in 1816.  Questions of her agency, or even how to address her, if one can 
address her, inform the structure of the play, which works backwards from the 
moment she does not appear because she is dead, to another moment she does not 
appear because she has died.  This character, like Lincoln and Booth in 
Topdog/Underdog drifts from the person with whom she shares a name, becoming 
more personage than person.108
                                                 
107 "Hottentot" was the colonial name given to the Khiokhoi people of present-day South Africa. 
108 Though the figures named Lincoln and Booth in Topdog/Underdog, or the Foundling Father as 
Abraham Lincoln in The America Play refer to important historical personages, the imperfect 
imitation—the reference to the historical personage—is at issue in both works.  In Venus, that 
distance—underscored by the preposition "as" or the insistence that the names are given as a joke—is 
greatly lessened, though not without controversy. 
  Rather than compare the figure in the play—variously 
called Miss Saartjie Baartman/The Girl/The Venus Hottentot—to the historical person 
whose story inspired the play's narrative, my interest here is development of reference 
itself as a problem for and of the play, whose concerns Parks characterizes as "History, 
Memory, Dis-Memory, Remembering, Dismembering, Love, Distance, Time, a 
Show."  As with Imperceptible Mutabilities, which Venus broadly revises, the mere 
presence of an historical figure or, again, the use of historically accurate data (i.e., data 
verifiable according to the prevailing norms of knowledge production) surrounding the 
incidents of her life amounts either to a recuperation of or "giving voice" to this 
woman, redeeming her from the system that oppressed her.  Rather than staking 
similitude or likeness to the original as the legitimizing ground of imagining this story, 
the genius of Parks' play is its play with and on surrender, as both subject and 
structuring principle.  On the other hand, there is always the risk that faithfully 
reproducing the historical context "as it was" will emboldens that regime.  That 
regime, after all, can then proclaim its magnanimity.  It countenances these challenges 
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to its authority and establishes its greatness: it has overcome its past to produce this 
glorious present where the truth can finally been revealed ("it is very much to the 
credit of our great country/ that even a female Hottentot can find a court to review her 
status").109
Venus' scenes proceed in reverse ordinal order, starting with an unnumbered 
"Overture" and then counting down from Scene 30, "May I Present to You 'The 
African Dancing Princess'/She'd Make a Splendid Freak" to Scene 1, "Final Chorus," 
with most scenes introduced by The Negro Resurrectionist, who also provides the 
footnotes.  In the play, The Man convinces The Girl/The Venus to "say yes" to a trip 
to England as a dancing girl, partially financed by The Brother who has backed The 
Man in a previous scheme (Scheme #1: Marriage with the Hottentot) involving the 
  Thus, Venus sounds an important caution regarding the limits of the 
presumption that mere information or the presentation of facts can serve the function 
of politico-theoretical work insofar as it underscores the prominent role science plays 
in determining the fate—in life and in death—of its protagonist and title character.  A 
literary work's appeals to facts must be considered in light of both its positing of a 
documentary substrate (the verifiability that something analogous to events of the 
work happened), and the particular institutions from which the particular information 
originates, and within which it functions (its ideological value, that which arbitrates 
claims for the relevance of two pieces of information).  In the case of Saartjie 
Baartman, whose very name is an open question, one such horizon of knowledge—the 
domain within which Baartman might have a "voice" of her own—is the racist, 
colonialist system that called her "Little Sarah" ("Saartjie" translated from the 
Afrikaans) in the first place. 
                                                 
109 Suzan-Lori Parks, Venus (New York: Theater Communications Group, 1997), 78.  Hereafter cited 
parenthetically in the text as Venus.  This claim, made by the Chorus of the Court, is followed by a peal 
of laughter: 
"HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHHAHAHAHAHHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAH
AHHAHAHHAHAHA." 
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same Girl.  After The Man and The Brother skip town, The Girl comes into the care of 
The Mother-Showman, who displays her in his menagerie, the "9 Human Wonders," 
the "9 Lowest Links on Gods Great Chain of Being" (invoking the other eight serve as 
the Chorus, about which more below).  During her stint with The Mother-Showman 
she becomes "The Venus," whose "big bottoms will put us [The Mother-Showman 
and the 8 Human Wonders] safely in the black," i.e., financial solvency.  After an out-
of-sequence court hearing and "A Scene of Love (?)," the Baron Docteur buys her 
freedom from The Mother-Showman and takes her to Paris with her agreement, where 
they have an affair and she encourages him to be the "Columbus of anatomy."  The 
affair causes controversy with his wife and "A Grade School Chum," and leads to 
several aborted pregnancies.  Eventually, The Venus is arrested and held on indecency 
charges.  Before she dies, the Negro Resurrectionist, who gets his name from his 
occupation exhuming corpses for scientific study, agrees to exhume The Venus' corpse 
for science's sake.   
Interspersed with this narrative are five scenes from the play-within-a-play, 
"For The Love of the Venus," performed only for The Baron Docteur (who watches 
"almost as if he's watching TV" and), who is in turn watched by The Venus.  That play 
tells a parallel story of a Young Man and his Bride-To-Be, the former concerned to 
find his "true I," his "place in the Great Chain of Being" (Venus 26).110
                                                 
110 "For Love of the Venus" ultimately resolves itself by the bride-to-be dressing herself up to look like 
The Venus in order to capture the young man's heart.  This recourse to trickery recalls Parks' general 
interest in con games, and further complicates questions of historical narrative I have been trying to 
elaborate. 
  The Negro 
Resurrectionist also periodically performs footnotes drawn from The Baron Docteur's 
notebook, Robert Chambers' 1863 Book of Days, Daniel Lysons' Collectanea, a 
fictional autobiography called The Life of One Called the Venus Hottentot as Told By 
Herself (whose title mocks titling conventions of slave narratives).   In addition, Venus 
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features specially written songs ("The Circus and the Allied Arts" and "The Song of 
Jack Higgenbottom") a proleptic a scene performed during the Intermission (during 
which the "audience should be encouraged to walk out of the theatre, take their 
intermission break, and then return") featuring the Baron Docteur reading from his 
notebook while the Bride-to-Be from "For Love of the Venus" performs lines from 
Venus, and a brief history of chocolate (performed by The Venus).     
As in Mutabilities, the footnotes thematize knowledge production and the 
weight of factuality, incorporating a margin into the main body of the text.  They are 
accompanied in the published play by a glossary whose necessity is hinted at by the 
dry recitation of antiquated anatomical description from The Baron Docteur's 
notebook (e.g., "steatopygia—an excessive development of fat on the buttocks 
especially of females, which is common among the so-called Hottentots and some 
Negro peoples").  Unlike Mutabilities, however, there is no single Book presumed to 
contain all necessary facts, but a plurality of texts, both real and fabricated; dry 
recitations of measurements and dates that, failing to add up to anything concrete, only 
points to an elusive facticity.  These data, in other words, only make the 
reader/spectator aware of the inadequacy of mere knowledge or narrative to account 
for the desire for presence or full knowledge one might imagine a presentation of the 
real should satisfy, amounting to little more than babble.  Thus, where in Mutabilities 
the presentation of data masquerades as a super-adequate context that supplies the 
meaning of all things that appear or the spontaneous irruption of the subtext into the 
text of the play, in Venus the presentation of data has the opposite effect.  It engenders 
a greater mystery, a greater sense "great hole of history": "listening to ghosts" involves 
an active conjuring and an active translation, a movement towards the other that is also 
a surrender to the other, an openness to being changed by that other.  One does not 
merely expose the historical object or person for another without also exposing oneself 
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to that object, without desiring that object.  Thus, we can say that this play is about 
(again in the spatial sense) the desire for and of The Venus on multiple levels.  We 
might say, in this regard, that the play concerns an erotics of information. 
Information is eroticized, making of it both an object of desire and a pre-
condition of desire, a pseudo-drive that creates and annuls desire with reference to a 
fantasy of exhaustive completion of its work.  It has as its flipside all the implications 
of power that attend to uneven access to data, or to knowledge.  This flipside—the 
absence of knowledge which is at once both a means of control and a gap in the 
functioning of the rule that makes the rule visible—most clearly announces itself at 
those moments where necessity is expressed in the form of a question—"do I have a 
choice?"—and especially in exhortations from one character to another that if s/he will 
only "say yes" s/he will receive some reward in the dimly conceived future, opposing 
a certain, undesired fate in the immediate future.  This "saying yes" is neither fully 
free nor unfree when it is "given."  In this way, erotics in Venus marks the opening of 
an alternative timeline, one that can turn in ways none can envision.  This is neither a 
valorization of "romance" nor a sentimental positing of love or desire as an 
exclusively redemptive, healing force.  Instead, the erotic marks the unbridgeable 
distance between two people, the gap that necessarily allows messages to be mis-
delivered, misremembered, systematically ignored.  The moment of saying "yes" 
never appears, strictly speaking, as a constrained choice—her consent is always 
required and always "freely" given.  In the scene's thirty-first scene (which appears 
after the opening overture), The Man and The Brother attempt to convince The Girl 
(as The Venus is called before she is claimed by The Mother-Showman) to move to 
London with them as the "African Dancing Princess."  Though seemingly excited at 
the prospect of being a princess, The Girl is nonetheless ambivalent: 
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The Brother  
Say yes111
                                                 
111 Though I won't pursue this thought here, such "saying yes" also figures prominently in The Death of 
the Last Black Man in the Whole Entire World, both in the form of unison replies in the choral sections 
and in self-response: Old Man River: […] Do drop be dripted?  I say "yes" (AP 112), affirming even 
this "yes" as a citation. 
 and we'll go tomorrow! 
The Girl  
Will I be the only one? 
The Brother 
Oh no, therell be a whole street full. 
The Girl 
Im shy. 
The Brother 
Think of it: Gold! 
The Girl 
Gold! 
The Brother 
2 years of work and yd come back rich! 
The Girl 
Id come back rich! 
The Brother 
Yd make a mint! 
The Girl 
A mint!  A "mint."  
How much is that? 
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[The Brother glosses the concept of a "mint" as a sum that would allow her to 
stop working, which she understands as buying a house and hiring help: "Big 
bags of money!"] 
The Girl 
I like it. 
The Brother 
It's settled then! 
The Man 
Yr a rascal, Brother. 
The Girl 
Do I have a choice?  I'd like to think on it.  (Venus 16-17). 
 
After two spells, and two rests, The Girl laughs "strangely,"112
                                                 
112 And one should ask how "strange laughter" might be staged—whether it is strange because it 
happens at all in this moment, or there is something odd about it, as if it were in another language, or 
from some place other than the body of the one who laughs. 
 and then 
assents, asking "when do we go?" (Venus 18).  This laughter is both as an allegory for 
the punctual destabilization of categories and for irreducible and excessive 
embodiment.  As an ambiguous yes-saying, this laughter here is at once an openness 
toward the future and an illimitable break with its context—at once a surprise to the 
self and a limning of its borders, which are simultaneously rendered stable and porous.  
We are left with the fundamental unknowability of The Venus' desire, whether it is the 
servant, the bags of money, the travel, the idea of reuniting with The Man whom she 
recognizes from the past scam (despite his having shaved his beard), some 
combination of these, or something else that she claims to like.  We know that the 
brothers are attempting a con, but we cannot know what her relationship to that con is, 
or whether she might intend a counter-con, which could very well be implied by her 
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laugh.  To raise the question of The Venus' intentions or agency, the disruptive-
productive force of her desire is to open the question of memory/dis-memory, the 
spoken or unspoken desire of the one who remembers to remember for…, the 
inevitable interest implicit in narration and narrative that calls into question a naïvely 
recuperable historical object outside of all desire.  The inevitability of this interest 
underscores one aspect of what I have here called the erotics of information, the 
libidinal investments one has in certain facts or understanding of factuality as an 
immovable "bottom line" that implies many exclusions, including that which cannot 
be known, such as desire.  The strange laugh—"Hahahaha!"—invites us to reconsider 
the question "do I have a choice?" along different lines, not for their meaning or 
wanting-to-say but as the more primal question of desire itself.  If one can say that, in 
a certain sense, the scene presents a fateful situation from the point of view of the 
historical record, and thus for motivated reference to that record, this laugh introduces 
another, impossible time—the unrecorded, unknowable time of the decision—any 
decision—itself.  The laugh gestures toward an unknowable interval between a subject 
(as intending subject) and the not-yet undetermined objects of its desire, of the 
unknowable moment prior to the production of self-identical intentionality, alerting us 
to the centrality of particular subject predications in historico-ethical judgment.  It is 
not accidental that in the next scene The Girl becomes The Venus, a different kind of 
subject, inserted into another set of historical relations and horizon of possibility, just 
as it is not accidental that "The Venus" is not quite a proper name, but part of some 
series, a chain of substitutions and displacements.   
Intentionality, the very capacity to intend or meaningfully have a choice, 
emerges as heterogeneous, divided, an effect—in a word, graphematic rather than 
logocentric.  This "strange laughter" is a "sign" of that which is suppressed in order to 
produce knowledge, internalized in the structure of the play as its "structural 
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unconscious."  The analogous ultimatums faced by other characters and their similar 
questioning whether they have a choice might serve as a helpful reminder of the 
several conflicting, more or less inarticulate desires, more or less recognized 
constraints that come together to make the story of The Venus, as distinct from the 
historical person for whom we lack even a proper name.  Most notable among these 
other characters are The Mother-Showman, the Baron Docteur and the Negro 
Resurrectionist, each of whom is forced to choose between an immediate desire—e.g., 
continuing to eke out a living, an unsanctioned love, a conditioned freedom—and 
some future-directed wish—e.g., long-term financial security, fame, respectability, 
avoiding incarceration or censure.  Each of these figures, whose "names" are also 
introduced with a definite article, might best be thought of as allegorical figures that 
help to raise the question the kinds of choices possible to people inscribed within a 
relatively immobile social network.  As Wonder #7 sings in his/her song "on behalf of 
myself and The Hottentot Venus, to the Ladies of New York": "we appear comme il 
faut ["as we must," "as we ought to," "as it is necessary"]" (Venus 99, Parks' 
emphasis).  In this song, The Venus and Wonder #7 appear as "Priest of the Sun" and 
"Peruvian Nun," respectively, The Venus "to guard against any possible scandal 
tonite" having been "conjurd…white."  An imperative, beyond what can be addressed 
in terms of will, conditions all appearance in advance as part of a strategy, conscious 
or unconscious, of delineation and containment.  Indeed, the will itself appears only in 
response to a demand—for narrative or witnessing—as a retrospective imputation.   
The Venus' appearance under names that do not belong to her (only in the 
playbill is The Venus referred to as "Miss Saartjie Baartman," and once in the play 
she's referred to as "Little Sarah") suggests her appearing under the conditioned il 
faut—the dense social texture of a ethico-legal system that must consider her actions 
as an act of will, or intention, and thus cannot countenance the question "do I have a 
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choice?"  Contrary to any possibility, this il faut prepares in advance a place for the 
arrivant, there, so that she can only appear on certain terms, as known, is to appear as 
something already known, as a repetition, comme il faut, of some being that has 
previously appeared, either as the same, in a lineage, or simply "like" that prior 
appearance.  The arrivant must appear, that is, as an inscribable, inscribed surface, 
with no depth, held rigorously within boundaries.  One can therefore read the 
impersonality of the play, characterized in part by the lack of proper names, as a 
gesture toward impropriety, an attempt to negotiate the dichotomy of 
appearance/disappearance, speech/silence, the il faut of any appearance.  Going 
further, one can see the play as "saying yes" to a economy of substitution that both 
allows and demands one woman—voided of all but her name and a few narrative 
details—stand in for all of the "Hottentots," for all women of African descent, for a 
history of exploitation, subjugation and racism, implying a co-implication of poison 
and cure.  By opening the question of desire, however, Venus moves to particularize 
The Venus, violates the il faut not through her desire for this or that person, but by her 
desire at all, by raising the question of her desire as a legitimate question.  Such 
violation recalls the "founding noise" at the origins of the world or word as it appears, 
here conveyed by the destructive-productive force of desire and time.  The Venus—
Parks' figure or "platform" for thought—is at once unique and exemplary, marked by 
an iterability that disrupts her singularity.  This iterability marks every level of her 
figure: the play begins with her heralding by The Negro Resurrectionist, an interlude 
wherein the characters and choruses name themselves and are named, then:  
 
The Negro Resurrectionist 
I regret to inform you that the Venus Hottentot iz dead. 
All [includes The Venus] 
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Dead? 
The Mans Brother, later the Mother-Showman, later the Grade School 
Chum 
There wont b inny show tonite. 
The Chorus 
Dead! 
 
This death, the exchangeability of beginning and end (a similar dialogue recurs 
in the first scene, inscribing circularity if not circulation into the structure of the play), 
before the beginning, is at once a literal statement of fact and a challenge to audiences 
and readers to consider the meaning of this death, her continued circulation, her 
continued appearance.  The declaration that there "wont b inny show tonite" and the 
staged outrage implicate readers and audience members who might hope simply to 
have her appear according to a different rule, but that cannot have her appear 
according to no rule whatsoever, without the limitation of economy, of work, without 
putting The Venus to work in a predetermined political discourse.  If she were not 
invented, conjured or called to arrive to this place for this purpose, without the 
possibility of surprise or deviation, she might exist, not as a newly liberated 
"unsilenced" voice, present-to-itself and willful, but in some other way for which there 
may yet be no model.  No speech, but a strange laugh.   
Structurally speaking, whereas Mutabilities presents the five Seers as the play's 
"unconscious," a stylized performance of bricolage that repeats and anticipates 
dialogue and conflicts suggesting both a timelessness of conflict and a limited freedom 
with respect to time, here the role of the Chorus is more or less generalized, extending 
beyond those eight figures who can properly claim that name.  The generalization of 
the choral function is especially marked in the opening and concluding sections where 
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the figures name themselves according to their changing roles.  The group of eight 
who serve variously as the Chorus of the 8 Human Wonders, the Spectators, the Court 
and the 8 Anatomists have serve as an explicit intertext or textual supplement, 
marking the insufficiency of simply dramatizing the historical record and  letting the 
"facts speak for themselves."  What is labeled "chorus" in Venus, moreover, does not 
exclusively address the audience as in classical Greek theater, but interacts with the 
principle characters at crucial moments.  If the chorus traditionally represents a 
temporary suspension or interruption of the play's forward momentum, the body that 
goes by that name suggests openness to such interruption, hospitality toward what may 
come or what may be brought to the play and its unknown performances or readings of 
the future.  I say "suggest" because this openness is incorporated, that is internalized; 
the play anticipates a particular interruption, a predicted, pre-scripted arrival, and thus 
no interruption at all.  The parodic chorus is of the order of The Brother's "rascability."  
It is the inscribed place of the rabble, the common, the vulgar; it is precisely that 
which a respectable or well-heeled "political" (that is, concerned with re-introducing 
the formerly excluded Venus into a common store of now-vindicated figures) 
representation would exclude—either literally not countenance or exclude through 
staged abjection.   
The traditional role of the chorus, then, is distributed among all the characters, 
either directly in the case of The Venus and The Negro Resurrectionist, or indirectly 
insofar as The Baron Docteur's notebook provides an important staged intertext.  
Indeed, the staged intertexts shift the ethical locus of the play from the determination, 
meaning and motivation of individual acts to the principle of selection in 
reconstituting an historical event, an act of reading that corresponds to the sense of 
"creating new historical events."  Against a backdrop of data, readers and spectators 
confront the discrepancy between the times The Venus might have imagined, with The 
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Man/The Baron Docteur, and the post-expectant outcomes of those encounters.  
Though, as one of the play's epigraphs states, "le travail humain ressuscite les choses 
d'entre les mortes" ("human labor resurrects things from the dead"), the play 
rigorously invokes the limitations of such resurrection, both of our capacity to 
resurrect and of the uses to which we put that which we have literally or 
metaphorically unearthed.  The Venus' imagined psychological interiority is one such 
limit, hinted at via reference to her autobiography, The Life of One Called the Venus 
Hottentot as Told By Herself, and the penultimate scene, "The Venus Hottentot Tells 
the Story of Her Life," where in she allows that while being part of the Mother-
Showman's Menagerie "was a shitty shitty life but oh I miss it."113
                                                 
113 This repetition is both amplification of point and multiplication of referent: referring to her family 
and homeland in an earlier scene (Scene 14), she says "I dont wanna go back inny more.  / I like your 
company too much.  / Besides, it was a shitty life" (105).  
  Her ambivalence 
reverberates in her command to the Negro Resurrectionist, serving as jail watchman 
"don't let them [the crowds she believes to be outside] in," and in her "last words," that 
is the words she speaks before she "dies," though her figure is marked—even 
enframed—by death from the opening overture to the Final Chorus: "Dont look at me / 
dont look…" (Venus 159, Parks' emphasis).  Upon the event of her death, The Negro 
Resurrectionist recites the following: 
 
The Negro Resurrectionist 
(Rest) 
"Early in the 19th Century a poor wretched woman was exhibited in England 
under the appellation of The Hottentot Venus.  With an intensely ugly figure, 
distorted beyond all European standards of beauty, she was said to possess 
precisely the kind of shape which is most admired among her countrymen, the 
Hottentots" 
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The year was 1810, three years after the Bill for the Abolition of the Slave-
Trade had been passed in Parliament, and among protests and denials, horror 
and fascination her show went on.  She died in Paris 5 years later: A plaster 
cast of her body was once displayed, along with her skeleton, in the Musee 
[sic] de L'Homme. 
(Rest)  
(Venus 159). 
 
This text occurs, verbatim, as "Footnote #3: Historical Extract.  Category: 
Literary.  From Robert Chambers's Book of Days" at the end of Scene 27: Presenting 
the Mother-Showman and her Great Chain of Being.  Coming right after The Venus' 
dying demand "dont look at me," one can read this moment as inquiring into the 
relation between the look and the look back.  The first part of the Negro 
Resurrectionist's recitation is in quotation marks, invoking Chambers' 1863 text, 
whereas the second part is a revised repetition and elaboration of the same narrative, 
informed by different political concerns and sympathies.  This critical re-orientation 
emphasizes the ambivalence that underwrites The Venus' spectacularized body, by 
generalizing it to a broader historic-political context.  In the same gesture, it performs 
the presumed documentary substrate against which one might measure this narrative 
as "accurate," as satisfactorily completing the turn suggested by The Negro 
Resurrectionist's revision.  The repetition changes the status of these summary 
statements so that, rather than serving as an adequate vantage point from which to 
measure the dramatization against the "original" event, it is instead an ambiguous 
statement of context/revised context, at once powerful in its own right and ambiguous 
with regard to its relation to the play.  In isolation, the footnote is analogous to the role 
canned laughter plays in televised sitcoms (and in other Parks plays, especially in the 
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365 Plays/365 Days), ostensibly serving as emotional cues for an inattentive audience 
to accord itself with or perversely transgress.  The repetition marks more clearly the 
ideological argument over the framing of facts as one of the play's central questions, 
so that, as with canned laughter itself, it presents itself as having done something for 
the audience, while simultaneously making an implicit demand upon, or challenge to, 
that same audience.  It is an uninflected alienating device: a syncope.  
In the first instance, Footnote #3 appears in connection with the Mother-
Showman's putting The Venus on display to the horror and fascination of spectators 
and the other Wonders.  The Chorus of 8 Human Wonders has introduced itself, its 
members stated their properties ("The Wonders pull out all the stops, then they pose in 
a freakish tableau"), and the newly re-named Venus catches the Negro Resurrectionist 
watching her.  Upon her introduction, there is a spell with The Venus encountering 
The Chorus of Spectators, at the end of which The Venus declares, "Oh God.  
Unloved," echoing the Bride-To-Be from "For Love of the Venus," then the Negro 
Resurrectionist reads the footnote.  Alongside the internally produced text, the 
footnote from Chambers is part of an elaborate, reflexive structure of reference, one 
that simultaneously provides stability and instability.  The effect is a kind of 
uncanniness, a generative uncertainty, casting readers and spectators between the 
generality of context and the specificity of this text, opening the larger question of 
referentiality within the work of literature—the more or less self-conscious citation (as 
evocation or conjuring) of "real" events as a kind of internal limit, a staged limit that 
the literature necessarily transgresses, no matter how faithfully it cleaves to actuality 
as alibi.   
Venus invites its readers/spectators to consider what work the unreflexive 
citation of facts does and what role literature might have as a platform for challenging, 
utilizing or refuting those facts.  Thus, the triple citation serves less to suggest a 
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plurality of facts or the proliferation of mere interpretation than to highlight the 
interest that inflects aesthetics in its broadest sense: the sensible and its study.  
Looking may change its object, but it too is changed by what looks are presumed to 
monitor it—for example, the "sensus communus" or community standards.  When The 
Venus asks The Negro Resurrectionist, "What you lookin at," he replies, "You. / (Rest) 
/ Yr lovely," a view directly challenged by The Mother-Showman who calls her 
"STEPSISTER-MONKEY TO THE GREAT VENAL/ LOVE /GODDESS," 
presumably by the Chorus of Spectators (one of whom screams), and of course by 
Chambers' text.  Rather than understanding the conflict to be exclusively one of 
"European standards of beauty," as in the footnote, the question that emerges is of the 
ways of seeing—of taste—most broadly.   
The context for Footnote #3's uncited repetition, referenced above, is "Scene 2: 
The Venus Hottentot Tells the Story of Her Life," addressed briefly above.  Still 
worrying about crowds, hers is a "post-expectant" attitude, near death: 
 
The Venus 
I was born near the coast, Watchman. 
Journeyed some worked some 
ended up here. 
I would live here I thought but only for uh minute! 
Make a mint. 
Had plans to. 
He had a beard. 
Big bags of money! 
Where wuz I? 
Fell in love.  Hhh. 
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Tried my hand at French. 
Gave me a haircut 
and thuh claps. 
You get thuh picture, huh? 
Dont look at me 
dont look… 
(Rest)  
        She dies. 
(Venus 159) 
 
Save the more personalized detail, The Venus' account varies little from the 
other two; like the fabricated autobiography, The Life of One Called the Venus 
Hottentot as Told by Herself, this scant summary proves to be another text to interpret 
rather than an authoritative account.  Her testimony here is a kind of parodic 
disclosure of spectator/reader desire, the final "don't look at me" meant to chastise all 
those prurient gazes that shaped her predicament, and chastise the spectator/reader for 
wanting to "see" The Venus unveiled even at this moment, aligning such desire 
implicitly with that of Baron Docteur and the anatomist community.  Such a reading, 
sticking closely to The Venus as character, and character as representation of historical 
personage, would condense all the disparate levels of time—e.g., the unrepresented 
times prior to her encounter with The Man and The Brother, transit from South Africa 
to England to France, and transition from The Man to The Mother-Showman; the 
disparate times of the other Wonders, the insistently referenced time after The Venus' 
death, and so on—into one, enabling an indictment of something like "the Western 
gaze" by drawing out continuities between imperial, neo-imperial, and empiricist 
gazes.  Such a characterological interpretation, which is the necessary underpinning of 
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the reading of colonizing and pseudo- or proto-colonizing looks, requires a 
simplifying resolution of the complex interweaving of those disparate times and the 
work's structural instability courted by the play's articulation of its present time 
(undeclared, but presumably the early Nineteenth Century and thus the past) with the 
imagined present time of its audiences and readers.  This interweaving of disparate 
times, accomplished through citation, proleptic pronouncements of events from the 
future (from the point of view of the play's articulated present) might better be thought 
of as an attempt to articulate two epochs, neither of which is fully present to itself or 
complete, in order to figure time as a circle rather than as a line.  This circularity, an 
effect of non-contemporaneity, suggests a limited redemptive power underscoring the 
archaeological project previously discussed: the bones sing, and through the 
translation of that song one encounters not the Word but a familiar word desedimented 
and inscribed anew.   
This struggle of the play to articulate its staged present with the contemporary 
present, and the unknown past with the known, can be considered part of a more 
general project of considering the place of individual memory and lives in the face of 
history that runs throughout Parks' work and the projects of the writers considered in 
this dissertation.  From this perspective, The Venus' testimony, which breaks off with 
an incomplete command just before her death, is given the impossible task of bearing 
witness to the end, one's own end, and even of affirming it.  Her dialogue with The 
Negro Resurrectionist (a figure marked a by death, even in the euphemism that is his 
name) marks the only instance in the play that The Venus uses the past tense, a shift in 
temporal register especially noteworthy due to its proximity to the death that has been 
ceaselessly foretold.  With this shift, it is as though The Venus has finally joined that 
other narrative perspective, or as if the several levels of time have all come together at 
the endlessly anticipated, endlessly repeated moment of her death.  This temporal 
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register, though, suggests a greater perspectival shift, which might account for the two 
commands: "don't look at me," then "don't look."  At this moment, there has been a 
transition, a becoming-specter—announced by her wry "you get thuh picture"—before 
she literally dies: she takes her self as an object for the first time.  "Don't look at me" 
is both as an anxious attempt to assert control over her appearing, and, in the larger 
context of the play and its strategic withholding of all proper names, a retroactive call 
for hospitality, for welcoming her as arrivant or who is also, unavoidably, a revenant, 
one who has left but who comes back.  Look to see, not to pity; do not to take measure 
but welcome without qualification or reserve; remain open to the strangeness of the 
stranger, the otherness of the other.  The protest of this moment is a pre-emptive 
challenge to the strategy of exteriorization—that is, of figuration or symbolization—
that marks her circulation in one moment as an object of fear and desire, and in 
another as an emblem of suffering, humiliation and dehumanization.  There no 
privileged way of looking—empathic, sympathetic, loving—excluded from her 
general demand "don't look at me"; the understood "you" of her imperative address 
extends without reserve: don't just look, welcome.  The end is affirmed as opening 
unto another beginning, posterity a call out onto future generations. 
The Negro Resurrectionist, for his part, also speaks in the past tense—"the year 
was…," "…her show went on," and so on—the grammar of his statements implying 
the vantage of historical distance from the events he describes, including those that his 
persona is directly responsible for.  I have already suggested that he serves the choral 
role, highlighting the dead time that joins and disjoins the overlapping, repeating and 
otherwise structured times of the play, the dead time that underwrites and nullifies, for 
example, the articulation of the times of the play with another.  The Negro 
Resurrectionist, split between the time of the play and the time of its reception, is the 
figure of the relative free movement between the play's temporal levels, the one who 
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relates without belonging to any of them.  This freedom is not exclusive: The Baron 
Docteur enjoys a similar freedom—parts of his notebooks are from the future with 
regard to present time of the play, he is usually the sole audience member for "For the 
Love of the Venus" (The Negro Resurrectionist fills in once), and he interrupts the 
Negro Resurrectionist reading his notebooks—and we have just seen The Venus' 
moment of stepping outside of her time line into this spectral every-time.  Only The 
Negro Resurrectionist, however, is charged with reading the supplementary texts, 
which is usually freighted with the foreboding of the means and outcomes of The 
Venus' death.  The information he provides—in the form of data, especially weights, 
measures, and narrative biography—becomes eroticized in its own right to the extent 
that it supplements an impossible desire, one called The Venus.   
This eroticization is most obvious in the written play in Scene 19: "A Scene of 
Love(?)," which consists entirely of a nine-part spell between The Venus and The 
Baron Docteur (beginning and ending with The Venus) wherein anything could or 
could not happen.  The play repeatedly stages bilateral, dyadic desire being 
subordinated or sublimated into a unilateral desire for her, while at the same time 
reminding us via the Negro Resurrectionist that she is dead.  The other structural 
desire (and there are more than these two) the play points to, for which the recitation 
from contemporary texts and the show itself is symptomatic, might amount to the 
desire of The Venus, and the implicit question whether any now living might be her 
desire, or whatever there might be that can be called "her own" desire. 
The challenge of The Venus' "interiority"—her desire or mental world 
broadly—sounds a caution against what I have called the "exteriorizing" projects of 
knowledge or political filiation (e.g., the ways this childless women is constructed as 
an ancestor for contemporary black women in societies whose superficial relation to 
one another is elevated to a relation of essence).  Thinking this interiority not as an 
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emblem of The Venus' being for-herself, or "if no one listened" but as a demand for 
hospitality, as a lever through which the specificity of this play's historical concept, 
and its shaping and re-shaping of political identities are most directly worked out.  
Indeed, one way of understanding the fixation on The Venus' anatomy, including her 
skeletal remains is as the search not only for the mystery of her beguiling charm but 
also of her fundamental difference.  Venus leaves us to question the mechanism for 
relating generalities (e.g., women, race, "the body" as a symbol of embodiment) and 
specificities (e.g., The Venus, this body).  The play challenges us to recognize that 
though we cannot think without categories we must remain alert to the historical 
determination and sedimentation of our categories, alert to those things that escape 
determination, the radically new.   
Considering the play's countdown structure, beginning with the Overture and 
ending with Scene One, the Final Chorus, inscribing the end in the beginning and 
vice-verse, we get a sense of the difficult passage marked between known history as 
fatefully known and the attempt to think the new via what-has-been.  Numbered in 
reverse but moving temporally forward, the play's structure highlights the fatefulness 
that attends The Venus as character, simultaneously suggesting a paring down, a 
gradual stripping away of "extraneous detail," only to find the final unveiling 
impossible, short circuited by death.  There can be imagined no simple appearing in a 
play that has made the complications and hidden imperatives of appearing its topic.  
As I have pointed out, the play begins and ends with announcements that The Venus is 
dead, and that "there wont b inny show tonite," a claim repeated at the end of the play.  
In the concluding scene, The Venus takes over the Negro Resurrectionist's role from 
the opening Overture, providing the "Tail end of the tale for there must be uh end" 
summarizing her sins or supposed ignorance of "Godfearin ways," then adding "When 
Death met Love Death deathd Love/ and left Love to rot" (Venus 161).  She adds two 
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demands: "Miss me Miss me Miss me Miss me" and, the words that conclude the play, 
"Kiss me Kiss me Kiss me Kiss me" (Venus 162).   
The former—Miss me—appears for the first time, in response to the 
announcement of the death of "thuh Venus Hottentot" and the cancellation of the 
show, the latter—Kiss me—appears in both the first and last scenes of the play, in 
response to the Negro Resurrectionist's announcement of "A Scene of Love (?)"  
Rather than reading The Venus' living on after death as marking her passage into the 
stillness of symbolization I propose we understand the emphasis on her death and 
especially on her speaking from beyond the grave, as engendering the time of the 
revenant.  I propose that she be read as allegory, rather than denying the split between 
subject and object, between self and non-self in the moment  
The Venus encounters herself as an object in the final scene.  This ironic 
fissure becomes the locus for thinking a truly ethical re-membering, one that does not 
attempt to exclude the dead time between present phenomena and writing, one that 
does not wholly exteriorize The Venus by negating her interiority or difference from 
the figure that represents her in discourse.  The Venus' reiterated death (as against the 
non-repeatable death of this figure or of the actual historical person upon whom she is 
based) colludes with the other incessantly cited figures and historical data to suggest 
the marking of time in fundamentally linguistic structures.  Though the "one called the 
Hottentot Venus" is made famous for her body, and especially her posterior, The 
Venus in the play is the embodiment of anteriority and posteriority, of difference and 
deferral, and of course finitude.  The ending is sublime: the impossible, 
unrepresentable union of all the staged times of The Venus and Venus into a 
singularity that cathects so much desire and so much longing via the call and imagined 
consummation of a kiss, the aneconomic passage from the mouth never to return.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
WORDS TO REFASHION FUTURES: ICONICITY, FRAGMENTATION AND 
THE PLURAL INSTANT  
 
For on this ground 
trampled with the bull's swathe of whips 
where the slave at the crossroads was a red anthill 
eaten by moonbeams, by the holy ghosts of his wounds 
the Word becomes 
again a god and walks among us; 
look, here are his rags, 
here is his crutch and his satchel 
of dreams; here is his hoe and his rude implements 
 
on this ground 
on this broken ground 
--Kamau Brathwaite, Vévé 
 
Imaging Enjambments: The Ground of the Letter 
To this point, I have stressed the materiality of writing and poetics, considering 
genre, phonetics, grammar and referentiality to argue for the forms of politics—and 
modes of thinking—that come available when one focuses on how—rather than 
what—writing is.  This distinction between how and what, however, is not fully 
tenable, as becomes obvious when one wants to say that what is at issue is how rather 
than what.  One cannot simply praise the former against the latter without giving the 
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how ontological priority—its own 'whatness'—that treats it outside of its own 
embeddedness in the metaphysics of presence grammar makes almost inevitable.114
SVS emerges as part of Brathwaite's explicit effort to respond to "a kind of 
RIFT VALLEY in my senscape after the psychic disasters of Mexican (86) Shar (88) 
TTR (90)."
  
There is no avoiding the dead time of inscription without attempting to foreclose the 
question, the thinking such a question might invite.  Focusing on Bajan scholar-poet 
Kamau Brathwaite's recent writing, rendered in a combination of shifting margins, 
variable typefaces and orthography he calls "Sycorax Video Style" (SVS), this chapter 
will consider the graphic itself as part of poetry's working to unfix meanings and 
categories, to inscribe or generate "words to refashion futures."  This tremendous 
work, which has received little critical attention, questions such categories as national 
and community belonging, and the specificity of postcolonial space.  Attending to its 
insistent graphicity, the formal presentation of writing allows us to consider the ways 
in which poetry integrates the "being" and function of the letter precisely through the 
formation and deformation of semiotic networks.  In SVS, we might think of these 
icons that attempt to catch the spontaneous moment of the birth of sense, and through 
the invocation of video, the transitions and relays of sense.  This effort involves a 
quasi-allegorical privileging of the fragmentary at the level of the representation of the 
word, and the plurality of any instant, such that any 'now' carries within itself the 
potentiality to branch into other futures that nonetheless "speak" in the present, 
previously discussed as "fugitive articulacy." 
115
                                                 
114 I am indebted to Zac Zimmer, who suggested this line of argumentation. 
115 Letter between Kamau Brathwaite and Gordon Rohlehr, cited in DreamStories (London: Longman 
Group Limited 1994), iii.  Hereafter cited parenthetically in the text as DS.  In a later account of his 
attack in Jamaica, Brathwaite claims his assailants shot him with a 'ghost bullet,' going so far as to 
narrate his own death in "I Cristobel Colon."  
  Here, he refers to his 'Time of Salt,' a series of personal and 
interpersonal calamities addressed in books documenting the passing of his wife (Zea 
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Mexican Diary), the destruction of his home and archives in Jamaica by Hurricane 
Gilbert (Shar: Hurricane Poem), and his near death at the hands of unknown 
assailants in Jamaica (Trench Town Rock).  Emphasizing this “senscape,” I argue for a 
reading of his work starting from the basis of the icon—a term I am repurposing from 
Charles Sanders Peirce's semiotics—I will draw attention to the immediate sensory 
experience of writing or of language, and especially that transition from "mere matter" 
to sensible sign.116
A pre- or partially sensible sign, the icon rests near that minimal spacing or 
differing a semiotic system presumes and suppresses in order to function: the icon 
does not mean, but always potentially means.  Its materiality has not yet been 
incorporated into any semiotic network.  It overflows its frame and exceeds itself, and 
enters cycles or series wherein it finds itself joined to cycles or series—e.g., the 
personal, the political, the historical, and so on—which are themselves the products of 
the more primary inter-subjective relation.  Emphasizing the iconicity of words, 
Sycorax Video Style complicates and extends Brathwaite's celebrated notion of 
"nation language," conceived as a counter-mimesis and the slavish adherence to 
iambic pentameter with an attempt to develop "the syllables/syllabic intelligence to 
describe the hurricane, which is our own experience," rather than, in his example, 
  Privileging this sensory element of the work in the form of the 
manipulated page layouts and typographies, I argue that what I call the plural instant 
in Brathwaite's work, which among other things invokes the formation and 
deformation of semiotics, lends itself to a politics of renewal alongside a poetics of 
revitalization. 
                                                 
116 In Peirce's tripartite semiotic schema, the field of the semiotic is divided into the Icon, which 
represents through resemblance or a relation of reason between sign and signified; the Index, which 
represents its objects through conventional association, such that one sign points to another; and the 
Symbol, which operates according to habits.  Though space prohibits me from developing this more 
fully, the important trait for my purposes is that the Icon is that it is any object whatever that can be 
substituted for any other, outside of an established set of norms through which the relation has been 
naturalized or made conventional.   
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snow falling on the sugarcane fields.117
Both nation language and dialect necessarily begin with an externalizing 
operation that produces language as the object of thought and practice.  Dialect treats 
such language as wholly evocative of the people as a constituted whole (i.e., it is a 
synecdoche).  It is concerned extensities (the phenomenal world insofar as it is known 
or rationalized within a hegemonic way of organizing knowledge or looks) and takes 
social divisions that obtain in concrete states of things as real by fundamentally 
denying time.  "The people" is the people, now and forever.  Thus, the social milieu 
invoked by a particular language community as figured by dialect is granted 
permanence; this mode of representation repeats a static image and maintains distance 
between performer and performed, even as it may draw the conflicts of a given state of 
things to a point of crisis.  Nation language, by contrast treats such language as its own 
semiotic system that marks the absence of its putative referent (i.e., it is a metonym or 
allegorical figuration).  It concerns itself with the generative, intensive qualities of a 
living culture, holding "a broken mirror up to broken nature."
  "Nation language," favored over dialect, 
refers to "the submerged area of that dialect which is much more closely allied to the 
African aspect of experience" (ibid., Brathwaite's emphasis).  In practice, this 
submerged "aspect" might produce "English which is like a howl, or a shout or a 
machine-gun or the wind or a wave."  Dialect, by contrast, is externalizing or othering 
"language used when you want to make fun of someone," belonging primarily to the 
province of caricature (HV 13).  This "submerged area" is thus an index of looking or 
looks, valued for the new thinking and possibilities it points toward.   
118
                                                 
117 Kamau Brathwaite, History of the Voice: The Development of Nation Language in Anglophone 
Caribbean Poetry (London: New Beacon Books, 1984), 8.  Hereafter cited parenthetically in the text as 
HV.  Here as in much of his poetry, the graphic slash (/) appears on the page and the line is unbroken.  
For sake of clarity, I will use a back slash (\) to represent line breaks where I cite his poetry within my 
own text, and all forward slashes will be Brathwaite's. 
118 Brathwaite, ConVERSations with Nathaniel Mackey (Staten Island and Minneapolis: WE Press and 
XCP: Cross Cultural Poetics, 1999), 104.  Hereafter cited parenthetically in the text as CNM. 
  As Brathwaite argues 
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in another context, "as a Caribbean person, we must start with the ruins and our 
responsibility is to rebuild those fragments into a whole society," to enact a 
"revitalization of origins."119  In addition to the ambiguous relation between individual 
and collective action in this formulation, there is the ambiguous status of this "origin": 
the paradoxical task is to rebuild what has not existed, to revitalize what has neither 
died nor existed as such.  The allegorical breakdown or freeing of the icon from extant 
relations to other signs is not the beginning; one always begins again, in the wake of 
what has gone before.  There is no recovery of an origin that is not in a certain sense a 
conjuration or conjugation of origin—a reiteration for new goals, new structures of 
thought and feeling.  The specifically literary task he pronounces for writing and 
reading is "to try to see the fragments/whole."120
If fragmentation is a constitutive state that must nonetheless continually be 
produced, the response to this constitutive condition is an active breaking of frames, 
actively challenging of those schema or frames of knowledge through which 
differences are perceived and maintained, preserving the heterogeneity of individual 
and collective bodies.  The notion of "breakage" privileges the active differing, and 
thereby marks those places where a system of knowledge or givens proceeds too 
quickly to universals (e.g., the Black Experience) to cover over ignorance or short-
circuit lines of thought.  The mirror and nature in Brathwaite's metaphor are both 
broken, but those breaks are not related to one another; the break in the mirror or 
visualizing apparatus do not “express” or “reflect” in any straightforward way the 
breaks in nature, whose “breaks” are ultimately breaks or breakdowns of knowledge.  
The breaks mark those dissimilarities that must be disavowed o create a fantasy of 
   
                                                 
119 Nathaniel Mackey, "An Interview with Kamau Brathwaite" in The Art of Kamau Brathwaite, ed. 
Stewart Brown (Mid Glamorgan [Wales]: seren, 1995), 23, my emphasis.   
120 Brathwaite, Contradictory Omens (Kingston, Jamaica: Savacou Publications, 1974), 7.  
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adequate knowledge; as such, their being broken suggests and an opening, an 
invitation for reconfiguration.   
Sycorax Video Style, produced on an obsolete Macintosh computer using two 
different font types, one of which preserves the ragged edges of letters and words 
when printed, is a key to Brathwaite's project.  Through it, modern, albeit “obsolete,” 
technology blends history—the specific political history of a space or political 
formation (one that often receives technology later and second-hand, for example) and 
the history of writing—with a pan-diasporic system of mythology and religion.  This 
mixture articulates an aspirant call towards a notion of community that maintains the 
fragmentation necessary to avoid acceding too quickly to a presumed universality of 
experience or desire.  History, myth, and concrete states of affairs in the present each 
in turn become icons: an order of figuration that treats nature and history as ordered 
and made available within time, and the structures that shape its experience.   
 
Into the Image of Sycorax  
Through Sycorax, Brathwaite embraces what he calls a genuine "alterNative," 
a notion of "wholeness" as a genetic element predicated upon difference and 
differentiation, and to Sycorax Video Style as a procedure related to the hope for a 
new world, to a non-transcendental "blindness" related to what he calls "trans-
liminalness, trans-limitness erasure of xpectant boundar(ies)."121
                                                 
121 MR/1: Magical Realism (New York: Savacou North, 1998), 97.  Hereafter cited parenthetically in 
the text as MR/1.   
  The absence of a 
transcendental signified or universal introduces a situation wherein "meaning"—the 
unactualized potentiality that overflows the conceptual frameworks through which 
meaning is assigned—saturates everything (including "silence").  Indeed, the subject 
itself as the phenomenological intending subject whose integrity rests on an a priori 
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negation that makes all it encounters into objects of perception gives way to a "self 
without ego, without I, without arrogance."  The abstract universality of the I and the 
Self yields to a fluid conception of individuation that does not rest with the self or 
ego.122
“Erasure of xpectant boundaries” links with “blindness” to accent expectation, 
pointing to a procedure for "seeing" or "looking out for" by not seeing in advance, a 
thinking beyond, through and across margins and marginalization, that retains the 
power of surprise as the force of intensity, of the virtual or potential that opposes the 
actual or calculated possibility.  Brathwaite’s turn “into the image of Sycorax”—
Caliban's "hidden," submerged or unknown mother—makes new possibilities "visible" 
through non-naturalist, non-mimetic presentation.  This “return” to Sycorax, in other 
words, is not about the maternal (or Glissant’s matrice as a way of imagining history) 
but the "origins" of creativity, the “submarine” aspects of writing always "coming into 
being" but not actualized (CNM 177).  Though the sense of the past as potentiality and 
the past as actuality overlap—like icon in the semiotic sense and the everyday sense 
  Privileging individuation as a process of differentiation, the positive power of 
individuation is retained, beyond the conditions in extant states of things.  Further, the 
individual is no longer abstract but concrete, no longer static but truly dynamic, 
allowing fragments to be conceived as open singularities, multiplicities bound by 
systems of Relation.  For the poet, there is a tentative unity in the artwork as an 
artificially closed form, but the desire for the all-encompassing Book, like the 
concerns of the artist speaking to or for a people, no longer has a place.  Instead, the 
poet has the task of establishing new metaphors and new connections, of discovering 
"What kinds of new words are formable?  become formidable?  What form(s) become 
possible?" (CNM 274).   
                                                 
122 "Timehri," Is Massa Day Dead: Black Moods in the Caribbean, ed. Orde Coombs.  (Garden City 
(NY): Anchor Bay Books, 1974), p. 33.  Published as Edward Brathwaite.  Hereafter parenthetically in 
the text as "Timehri."   
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referring to an object used in religious observance—in Brathwaite's writings, it is 
important separate them analytically in order better to trace the moments of their 
coming into purposeful confusion.  Through an insistence on technology, from the 
Timehri or Amerindian petroglyphs ("glimpses of a language, glitters of a vision of a 
world, scattered utterals of a remote Gestalt; but still there, near, potentially 
communicative") to the computer itself, Brathwaite works after multiplicities that 
escape the binaries that tend to occupy most critics (e.g., speech/silence, 
Prospero/Caliban) ("Timehri" 40).  
More than Sycorax, however, I am interested here in the emphases on video, 
which I will address below, and style.  Within poetry, to emphasize the iconicity of 
words and letters in this way amounts to privileging style.  Such privilege de-
emphasizes the indexical or symbolic uses of language—related to the historically 
specific conditions under which a sign signifies (and thus those conditions under 
which literature “expresses,” “reflects” or “responds to” social contradictions)—in 
favor of idiosyncratic style—those sensual qualities of language and novel usages 
through which language changes or evolves.  Style, the medium through which 
language is encountered, is the possibility of the new in language.  Though one can 
speak of an “historical style” as a set of general tendencies or conventions, style is not 
strictly determined by historical laws or development, and is not exhaustible in 
considerations of what a work means.  Rather, style marks and exploits gaps in 
signifying structures whereby meaning can be unfixed, in this case articulating the pre-
modern with the modern, and insisting on words’ capacities to "live off—away 
from—the page."  Already, this ‘living’ suggests an orientation to the literary text 
beyond or apart from the level of its language, understood as so many references, 
connotative or denotative meanings, and a role for reading apart from the mechanical 
reassembly of the author’s, or language's, intention.  If this living is possible, it is only 
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thinkable by imagining writing as oriented towards a future, or better, future anterior 
audience, rather than a given audience, and imagining a constitutively unfinished text 
as a challenge or corrective to notions of the literary work as whole, or sufficient onto 
itself.  The word that lives on, that outlives or survives its mis- or disuse, is the 
intensive word, its non- or not-yet significant aspect: its iconicity.  Living—in this 
case centered on and always returning to the page, the material letter and its spacing—
is effected at once by 'taking us back' to textual practices of the Middle Ages and the 
integration of those with the new possibilities for writing and publishing of 
contemporary print technology.  SVS’s insistence on writing and process, alongside its 
incorporation of other texts further emphasize writing's mediality, while as a result de-
emphasizing the unity of the artwork in favor of a revived notion of reading.  To 
borrow a metaphor from video, the possibility of noise, including visual noise, points 
less to the non-signifying aspects of language than to the overabundance of 
signification in language, and the means through which convention acts to 
predetermine and suppress the "non-essential."   
This noise is that element of language that persists and insists in all 
circumstances wherein meaning must be determined, that 'information' that appears to 
be irrelevant, precisely by, when attended to, illustrating the ways relevance is always 
relevance for particular aims.  Thus, while Brathwaite claims that SVS is part of an 
attempt to “release the pen from my broeken [sic] hand,” and return to the "world of 
ILLUMINATED MANUSCRIPTS when the written word could still hear itself 
speak, as it were," this "hearing" is not the same thing as self-understanding or self-
possession (CNM 167, emphasis in original).  Hearing here connects difference with 
difference in a kind of feedback loop, the "voice alight with echo . w/ the birth of 
sound."  Unlike those medieval manuscripts or “scrolls,” what would have been 
didactic, marginal drawings in those earlier texts are incorporated into the writing 
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itself, typeface becoming an ambiguous element of prosody, or style.  SVS marks a 
threshold separating the experience of poetry—the “performance” of words on the 
page—and the experience in poetry—the system of (symbolic) references and 
presumed relations between historically determined peoples discussed or implied.   
 
From Curse to Cursor 
The self-referential use of the computer and older printer technology literalizes 
his arguments, for example, in History of the Voice, where he argues that rhythm and 
syllables are "the very software, in a way, of the language" (HV 9, emphasis added).  
The hardware, in this analogy, is the syntagmatic forms into which language is used, 
which shape its expressivity, which runs underneath anything expressed.  In this 
earlier argument, he privileges music, whose structures he argues he links to native 
language as "the surest threshold to the language," and noise, or phonic elements of 
language as performed, both phonetics and timbre, volume, and so on.  The 
innovations of SVS continue—and showcase—his longstanding attention to the 
slippages and slipperiness of language, and his commitment to neologism (e.g., 
"stammaments," "skeletone") and variable, internally variant orthography as tools to 
unfix meanings and desediment thoughts, by introducing semantic and orthographic 
movement into the text.  This movement is augmented by a visual presentation that 
draws attention to itself as constructed, both futuristic and outmoded, retaining some 
of the dynamism of the spoken or performed word.   
His poem "Letter SycoraX" (fig. 1), revised and re-printed as "X self xth letter \ 
from the thirteenth colonies" (fig. 2) dramatizes these concerns.  Here are the opening 
lines:  
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Figure 1, detail of "Letter Sycorax" 
 
Figure 2, detail of "X self xth letter \ from 
the thirteenth colonies"123
 
 
Though the poem's title calls it a letter, its dialogic structure (between X/Self 
and his mother, whom Brathwaite occasionally identifies as Caliban and Sycorax) is 
perhaps its most striking feature, drawn out more clearly in the revision where the 
second speaker is given her own line rather than typographical distinction alone.  
                                                 
123 "Letter SycoraX" is in Middle Passages (New York: New Directions Books, 1993), 95-116.  "X/Self 
xth letter from the thirteenth provinces" is in Ancestors: A Revision of Mother Poem, Sun Poem, and 
X/Self (New York: New Direction Books, 2001), 444-456.  Both revise "X/Self's Xth Letters from the 
Thirteen Provinces," collected in the first publication of X/Self (London: Oxford University Press, 
1987), 80-87.  These three volumes hereafter cited parenthetically in the text as MP, Ancestors and 
X/Self, respectively.  For SVS passages, I provide images wherever possible, especially when I cannot 
produce a facsimile.   
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Formally, the letter of the poems' titles gestures toward an iconic sense of the Word, 
underscoring its use, or misuse, apart from its origination.  Further, the poem enacts a 
series of dilations and contractions of time, on a number of semantic levels.  The delay 
between the epistle's being sent and received, for example, is annulled, creating a pun 
in the title—the letter invoked is both alphabetic character and missive.  "Letter" also 
refers to the mark of education (in the sense "person of letters") insofar as X/Self 
suggests that his use of the computer co-opts the "mercantilist" culture, mirroring that 
culture's own practice, for which his mother rebukes him: "say \ wha? get on wid de 
same ole \ story?"  Her criticism is two-fold: one the one hand, his rehearsal of the 
mercantilist's history of exploitation and appropriation, however accurate, is pat.  
Merely knowing of and restating past ills, even if they shape present conditions, is 
inadequate to the task of justifying or explaining the present, much less changing it.  
On the other hand, the rest of the poem (and in retrospect, the number of versions of 
this poem) calls into question the idea that one's actions merely repeat some actions in 
the past.  Along these lines, the poem raises a new question not of the representation 
of "experience" to some unknowable audience, but leaning to live—and write—in the 
present, despite the disasters of the past.   
The vacillation between the first two senses of "letter"—alphabetic mark and 
missive—is drawn out in the title, and in the Ancestors revision by the enlarged, 
capital "o" that ends the fourth line, dividing the word "o/kay."  The separation of this 
large O, like the lower-case "o" separated from "kay" by a forward slash in the Middle 
Passages and X/Self versions, redistributes its function so that graphically it is 
polysemous.  The letter "o," the number zero, a bubble with which to breathe under 
water (in the context of the trilogy as a long poem), or an open set—a cipher—
suspending the sense of the poem, however briefly.  The enlargement of the "o" 
repeats, once again as part of the word "okay" ("but is one a de bess tings since cicero 
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O \ kay?") and again in the middle of a word ("& a whole rash a de so-call creole 
econOmiss"), as do three enlarged, stylized "x"-es and the character π to replace the 
letters "pi" in "π \ -san cantos," a reference to Ezra Pound (who "deals in what I call 
real fragments," without being able to "reconstitute elements").  In the latter case, the 
hyphen explicitly marks the word's breakage but only after the line break, retroactively 
creating both the "whole" word and its fragments.   
The effects of this partial separation—this fragmentation or mobilization of the 
word—are not only semantic or rhythmic, however, but also phonetic.  In the case of 
"okay," the pause in reading, however momentary, emphasizes the vowel's sound, the 
long "o" (/oʊ/), meaning it is not only part of the semantic rearrangement of the poem, 
but also part of the phonetic rearrangement of the Ancestors version.  This version 
replaces the long "i" (/aɪ/) of the first person pronoun and broad "a" (/ɑ/) of mama 
with the lower short "u" (/ə/), isolating the /aɪ/ of "writin" and "jine," forcing a 
phonetic link between the two practices that reinforces the link X/Self suggests.  
Similarly, changing the word "quite" to "quit," in addition to changing the vowel 
sound from a long "i" (/aɪ/) to a short "i" (/ɪ/), changes the line's meaning.  The link 
between joining the mercantilists and writing remains, but now the respondent 
encourages more writing rather than disparaging X/Self's supposed mimicry, or 
celebrating a "natural" difference in the activity of writing because of the identities of 
the writers (i.e., his use of these "tools" will be different because of his socio-historical 
identity).  The revision also stages X/Self's uncertainty regarding this link ("like a jine 
the mercantilists?"), and replaces the first-person pronoun (I) with an indefinite article 
(a) or rhyming syllable (uh), suggesting at once realist fidelity to language use and 
morphology and a shift away the self or the ego as that around which all impressions 
and perceptions must be organized.  The use of two words to mark the place of the 
speaking/writing subject introduces a multiple identification. 
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However, this multiplicity achieves its fullest expression in the verb forms, 
which become visible only when one looks past the first-person pronoun, and thus the 
narrative thrust of the poem.  As with many of Brathwaite's poetic techniques, 
however, this particular aspect is masked if one only pays attention to the modes of 
subjectivity within the poem, as opposed to the forms of individuation that extend to 
the pre- or sub-subject—acts, hungers, desires, all of the intervals around which 
subjectivity must constantly be reconstituted.  Through the verb forms, which blend 
present action with past or subjunctive action, the poem structures time internally apart 
from the caesurae already discussed, which take the form of momentary hesitations 
between lexical or orthographic values.   
Because of the poem's dialogic nature, which emphasizes the instantaneous 
relation between sender and recipient, I read the phrase "i writin" or "uh writin" as a 
nation language rendering of the present progressive "I am writing."  Brathwaite in all 
versions of this poem omits the auxiliary verb to be, thereby connecting the 
grammatical subject directly to the participle.  The effect of this collapse is to broaden 
the specific, narrow time of an ongoing act by removing the implicit index or deictic 
of the act (I am writing now).  Instead, because the time becomes aporetic (I am 
writing? I was writing?  I will be writing?  I will have been writing?  and so on), the 
time of the action moves from a definite, though blank now to an indefinite time, as in 
the simple present tense (now I write, I can write, I tend to write, I will write…).  Put 
differently, the distinction between writing as habit and writing as memorializing is 
suspended to the degree that it is no longer entirely clear whether X/Self refers to the 
specific act recorded by the poem, or to the general act of recording events through 
writing.  Through this collapse, the poem draws attention to the formal presentation of 
time, creating the sense of an "externally" static time —that is, as poetry it adheres to 
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certain norms of temporal representation—and an equally "internally" dynamic time—
that is, within the poems' use of those norms, new temporal relationships proliferate. 
The further effect of Brathwaite's play here is a collapse between the indicative 
and subjunctive moods, which one sees in such phrases as "like i jine de 
mercantilists," which itself no longer refers to a specific state of affairs because of the 
temporal suspension of the initial act upon which it depends.  As if I joined, or had 
joined, or were to join, and so on.  I will return below to this indifference of temporal 
levels, which raises the question of time most generally.  Here we see an example of 
the plural instant: "anticipatory, interlinked & contradictory images," which retain all 
of the possibilities outlined above, along with a number of other reformulations (MR/1 
272).  In this syntactic arrangement to change one necessitates a change in the other, 
or not.  Thus, we see concretely the difference between dialect and nation language.  
For dialect, as Brathwaite defines it, the written word is an "essential section" that 
indicates the Other as much as it indicates the writer or speaker.  Each becomes terms 
in the larger dialectic of the form of the work taken as a whole, which will tend toward 
reconciliation of Self and Other into the Same, or to a rejection of this or that 
representation without rejecting or commenting upon the system itself.  Dialect, that 
is, operates with the idea of "literal" development, the progression of the letter as 
development of some other problem that that envelops it.124
The mother's impatience with X/self's pat complaint about mercantilist culture 
("de same way dem tief/in gun \ -power from sheena & taken we blues & \ gone") 
advances the poem's distancing from worries that have become commonplace, but also 
  Nation language, by 
contrast, remains concerned with potentiality, and with expressivity as capacity and 
the implication of that capacity in the field it envelops.   
                                                 
124 Here, we should contrast Brathwaite's view of dialect with Suzan-Lori Parks', for example, where 
dialect has a dynamic, generative function not related to accurate or perspicuous representation. 
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delays the rest of the poem if one considers it from the point of view of narrative: 
X/Self repeats "okay \ okay \ okay \ okay" and forcefully rejects his mother's taunt 
(made more obviously a taunt by a question mark the Middle Passages version 
omits)—"if yu cyaan beat prospero \ whistle?" \\ "no \ mumma!"—before finally 
returning to a description of the device rather than its sedimented meanings or values 
(Ancestors 444).  Apart from the narrative or theatrical points of view, the columnar 
repetition, centered on the page, functions as a rhythmic interlude, echoing the initial 
broken "okay" now without line break.  Contrary to the functions typically served by 
repetition—assisting memorization or drawing attention to particularly important 
passages, for example—the repetition of this word obscures sense.  The word does not 
clearly express or ask for concession, enact endorsement or agreement, or introduce 
what the speaker is about to say.  It at once a performative "about to say" and refusal 
to say; beneath that, it is two syllables and four letters in the center of the page, 
conjoining negative space on either side: graphic marks apart from their meaning 
function, a moment that expresses expressivity:  
okay 
okay 
okay 
okay 
(Ancestors  444)125
                                                 
125 The version of this poem in X/Self separates the four "okays" into two couplets separated by a stanza 
break, enacting a slightly different distribution of space and a seemingly more conversational form: 
okay 
okay 
 
okay 
okay 
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This moment of the poem is a spatial division of the poem, whether we 
consider it as emphasizing the lines that came before it or those that follow it.  As 
caesura, one of several throughout the poem, it is an errant or "nomadic" distribution 
of words, a moment of drawing attention to the rules that govern the organization of 
the poem and the practice of reading, expanding the "territory" of the poem and 
introducing an element of play.  This errantry or nomadism is one of the precise senses 
in which Brathwaite's work enacts the "trans-liminalness" to which I now turn.   
 
The Word that is Our Threshold to the World 
Most of Brathwaite's post 'Time of Salt' publications (e.g., Shar: Hurricane 
Poem, Barabajan Poems, ConVERSations with Nathaniel Mackey, Golokwati 2000, 
MR/) have included either as appendix or as part of the main text a piece co-authored 
by Carolivia Herron, entitled "Saving the Word."  This piece, largely unrevised 
between printings, is the transcript of Herron's introduction of Brathwaite at a 
conference on epic poetry 22 September 1988, after Hurricane Gilbert had destroyed 
his home and archive in Jamaica, and his response to both the hurricane and Herron's 
introduction.  Herron (according to the transcript) breaks off from her prepared 
comments to invoke "lost words," the Library of Alexandria, and "the long attempt to 
keep the words of a people from being destroyed."126
                                                 
126 Shar: Hurricane Poem (Mona, Kingston (Jamaica): Savacou Publications, 1990).  Like Golokwati 
2000, Shar does not provide page numbers.  Assuming the first page of "Saving the Word" to be page 
one, this definition is on page 2.  I will use this method for pagination whenever I refer to this work. 
  She then reads a note 
Brathwaite "wrote when he heard of the hurricane" wherein he repeats and responds to 
the question—"what can I tell you?"—that serves as the refrain of Shar, where 
"Saving the Word" was first published.  Echoing Herron's concern over lost words, 
Brathwaite asserts, "You have to be concerned with the sources of a poet's life a 
people's \ inspiration…the archives – that written mem \ orialized recorded record of 
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his/her life/hope/history/art," proceeding to a condemnation of "our Caribb culture" as 
"too much a reaction – if not reactionary – plantation culture" (Shar 4).   
The poem itself (although it is not clear that "Saving the Word" is not part of 
the poem) begins with a partial catalog of the destruction ("wood \ has become so 
useless. stripped. wet. \ fragile. broken. totally uninhabitable \ with what we must still 
build"), alternating such staccato lines with repetitions (e.g. "wasted wasted wasted all 
all all wasted wasted wasted" or "And what. what. what . what more. what more 
can I tell you") that transition from despair to defiant or more directly incantatory 
(figs. 3-5):  
 
Figure 3, detail of Shar: Hurricane Poem 
 
Figure 4, detail of Shar: Hurricane Poem 
 
  
Figure 5, detail of Shar: Hurricane Poem 127
                                                 
127 Shar: Hurricane Poem, 23-25.  Figures 3, 4 and 5 each occupy an entire page. 
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The poem generally tends towards such enlargement, which increases the 
amount of negative space, and serves to "raise the volume" on the words, single them 
out as words.  One page, for example, simply has a repetition of the phrase "& \ sing. \ 
ing" printed large enough that the period used in the place of a hyphen to break up 
"singing" appears as a large filled-in circle (fig. 6):  
 
Figure 6, detail of Shar: Hurricane Poem 
Corresponding to this change of typeface is a change of letting (space between 
lines) and kerning (space between letters), which, like tense, pluralizes the readings of 
the poem by changing the means through which words are encountered.  This 
alteration, does more than draw out more decisively the graphic elements of writing; it 
offers a greater sense of motion, both by making words appear closer together or 
further apart, and by changing the rate and distance eyes must move as they pass over 
the page.  The reader who proceeds too rapidly, for example, will miss the transition 
from the imperative "sing" to the adjective "singular."  Through SVS Brathwaite 
creates a situation where the reading must begin and return to letters, both as signs 
within a signifying chain that produce reading and as sensible signs in their own right, 
most evident with the "Old English" 's' and the large period/circle.  If the enlarged 
capital "O" above is part of a set of elements which act on a center (the 
technologically mediated scene of writing) and vary in relation to it by evacuating its 
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temporal specificity to produce a saturated moment, here the recurrent closed "●" 
designates an unbound graphicity, the differential power or force of the mark.  At 
stake, then, is a semiotics whose horizon or is not strictly linguistic. 
Shar emphasizes the concrete word, the word "reduced to all this \\ reduced to 
so little.  this \ to so almost nothing like this in the shattered cess of the storm" (Shar 
11).  This intensive word, which has partially abdicated its function as name and its 
place within an established system of discourse, becomes a different kind of sign.  
Though it be "useless. stripped. wet. \ fragile. broken," the word, which rhymes with 
"wood" in Brathwaite's original line, is "uninhabitable" but inhabiting, not as the 
continued presence of a unity on a transcendent plane, but the proleptic figure of what 
can be built, of "what we still must build."  Through the individuating, differentiating 
forces of repetition, typesetting, juxtaposition that alters or changes syntax, alternate 
spellings, neologism and so on, the word itself marks a caesura of an historically 
determined milieu and the nascence of another, presenting origin as discontinuity.  
Brathwaite's name for the "originary" or virtual world, which is neither a 
"there" nor a "property," is nam, an "in-dwelling, man-inhabiting (not hibiting) 
organic force" of any concrete cultural milieu.128  It is a genetic element and a 
differential force that has no parts, cannot divide or be partitioned or parceled without 
changing its nature.  Elsewhere, he identifies nam with "grit sand pebble seed safe 
secret \ – unquestioned not necessarily visible – \ out of which strength comes, where 
the heart of the culture resides in its otherness,"129
                                                 
128 Brathwaite, Gods of the Middle Passage (Mona, Kingston (Jamaica): Savacou Working Papers, 
1982), 1. 
129 Brathwaite, Golokwati 2000 (New York: Savacou North 2002), 238. 
  or again as "capsule, space capsule, 
seamless container, seed, egg, atom, atomic space within the atom space, its A or 
Alpha of beginnings/origen. protected by the two most powerfully intransigent 
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consonantals in the (English) language N&M."130
Brathwaite links nam to "dynamism," "dynamite," "magnaminity" (sic), "man," 
"immanence" and the "yam" (Golokwati 238).  Given his reference to the atom and 
atomic space, I would add the clinamen of pre-Socratic philosophy, and with it atomic 
movement and the multiple and non-localizable relations between atoms.  Though the 
name, one of the places where nam is actualized be "eaten," the nam is an 
indestructible kernel that belongs neither to that name nor to the person or thing called 
by that name.  In his poetry, nam features most prominently in Ancestors' 
"Nam(e)tracks," which revises Mother Poem's "Nametracks."  The poem is centered 
on the page and begins with another enigmatic, black circle followed by the 
  Without pursuing his linguistic 
argument, it is clear that part of the value of nam is its graphic form—its µtopic 
reach—not simply its meaning. 
Emphasized in both of these definitions is a notion of discontinuity—a seed 
may germinate and become a tree, but it does not resemble the tree it becomes; a stone 
may erode into pebbles, sand or grit, but those three do not have any essential relation 
or "stoneness" that binds them together.  Nam refers to genetic or originary fragments 
that are part of a conflictual—let us not say dialectical—process of becoming.  These 
fragments are relational, differential elements, immanent but non-actual.  The 
situations or objects in which nam persists and insists are not the "truth" or 
"development" of nam, which of course cannot be developed or cultivated.  Thus, 
"origen," a Spanish word for origin but also home, bottom, source, provenance, and so 
on, does not refer to Brathwaite's celebrated 'discovery' of African origins in the 
Caribbean, but a more profound movement related to his famous declaration that "the 
unity is submarine."  Nam's immanence is neither reducible to a simple presence, 
"haunting," nor to heritage or history, though it may subtend all those categories.   
                                                 
130 Brathwaite, Barabajan Poems (New York and Kingston (Jamaica): Savacou, 1994), 96.  
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conjunction "but," signaling a continuation of the previous poem, "Valient," that 
becomes explicit later when "Nam(e)tracks" repeats the line "the man who possesses 
us all," the first line of that previous poem, there also preceded by the conjunction 
"but."131
Phonetically, this passage is remarkable for its restraint, limiting itself mostly 
to bilabial or nasal plosives ('b' and 'm,' respectively), labiodental or dental fricatives 
or ('f' and 'd,' respectively), and a low vowel sound muh (/ə/).  The effect is of a 
speaker fumbling to find words, creating a sense of dramatic tension through the first 
four lines rhythmically released through the phrase "black fat \ -soft fat man- \ ure," 
but semantically heightened through the compound modifier "fat-soft" that only refers 
to "fat man-\ure," itself a misdirection moving from "man" to "manure" through 
enjambment.  The repeating soft low sounds broken occasionally by the clacking 
consonants of "black fat" and "kukoo \ -cook –" in the following stanza phonetically 
resemble a train arriving or departing, gaining or losing momentum—the sense of 
  Phonetically, the beginning of the poem deploys a similar strategy to his 
famous "Negus" in The Arrivants, though here the refusal to develop a stable syntactic 
structure marks the movement between those two trilogies from the stammer to the 
"stammament," a blocked or misrecognized movement of genesis: 
● 
 
but 
 
muh 
muh 
muh 
me mudda 
mud 
black fat 
-soft fat man- 
ure 
                                                 
131 Many of the poems of the revised Mother Poem begin with either the conjunction "but" or "so," 
making a syntactic argument for reading it as a continuous long poem, as Brathwaite insists.   
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locomotion hinted at in the poem's title—graphically literalized when the poem splits 
into two relatively independent columns at the start of the fourth stanza, following a 
second ●:  
muh 
muh 
me mudda 
mud 
 
doan like wha she see 
she doan like e 
she doan like e 
at all 
she doan like e 
 
(Ancestors 86) 
This parallel movement occurs in the earlier version of the poem, but begins 
later.  In that version, the five lines presented here are sequential, with the three lines 
on the right following the two lines on the left.  The Ancestors version makes it more 
difficult to decide which "track" to give priority, making one seem to echo the other 
without being reducible to it.  As the poem develops, the right-hand column read 
speaks of an encounter between the poem's speaker, the mother and a man identified 
as "ogrady" (O'Grady) who attempts to teach the speaker standard diction while the 
left-hand column tells of an unspecified time (the past? simultaneous with O'Grady's 
lessons?  just after them?) and the mother's dislike of a man (the same man?) who has 
tormented the family:  
● 
 
the man who possesses us all 
 
who break de heart a she 
husband hann 
who wreck de lann a me 
Say man 
she is tell muh 
say man 
 
she is tell muh 
say man say manding say 
mandingo 
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faddah 
doan possess we at all 
 
she is tell muh 
 
● 
e di go 
e go di 
e go dead 
 
● 
but 
ogrady says 
 
say I 
say I 
 
not me 
not man 
 
(Ancestors 87) 
 
Though one may out of habit read this poem down the left hand side then down 
the right, such habit by no means exhausts the possibilities of reading, or even 
suggests that the only or best way to read is dutifully down the left side then down the 
right as with a newspaper.  The poem can be read that way, but other ways of 
reading—one stanza or more or less arbitrary grouping of lines at a time, first left then 
right, for example—present themselves and cannot be ruled out absolutely as bad.  
This is another "plural instant," now deliberately mixing two different relationships to, 
or "syntheses" of, time.  On the one hand, there is the "passive" synthesis of habit.  
Here, the arrangement of words is a matter of indifference because of the ways one 
has learned to read and norms of sense-making that appear to us as automatic or 
natural.  If one says that this graphic arrangement is de-naturalizing, it is in the precise 
sense that this patterning at its limit suggests a situation wherein one no longer knows 
how to read.  On the other hand, there is the active synthesis of memory, a willful act 
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of seeing the "fragments/whole."  The arrangement draws out and suggests very 
precise relationships and echoes between different parts of the page (e.g., the repeated 
"she is tell muh"), which may then be read as divided into montagic units by the 
repeated black circles that are not mistakable for punctuation marks of the normal 
kind.  Rather, they mark what Gilles Deleuze calls "dividual" sets, sets themselves 
made up of smaller sets that nonetheless cannot be divided into other parts without 
qualitatively changing each time.  This is not to be confused with the indivisible 
intensive originary space or nam: these sets are divided and re-articulated, and the 
difference or differentiation that breaks apart the unity of a singular moment—a 
moment for memory—is made thinkable, and those habits of thought through which 
one imagines a subject are revealed to be disjunctive.  
Within the drama of the poem, a similar encounter between habit and memory 
as two modalities of time repeats, where the pedagogue O'Grady teaches by alienating 
his pupil from his habits of speech, and impressing new habits through rote repetition 
as a simple negation of previous habits: "say i \ say i."  The pupil, however, recalls his 
mother's previous lessons of how to speak—or what to say—that contradict O'Grady's 
lesson.  Read from left to right, the mother's lessons align with her memory of—and 
hatred for—the man "who break de heart of she \ husband hann," suggesting her 
husband had had similar encounters which themselves produced an interaction 
between habit and memory, and so on.  The memory of the mother's lesson ("say man 
\ she is tell muh \ say man") posits a past instance as a dividual "cut" of time that has 
anticipated this present, the time of the poem, itself presented as another particular 
moment to be remembered (by the poem's speaker and, perhaps, by its reader) for 
some other event it now anticipates.  Whereas the mother attempts a reverse discourse 
that would simply celebrate a certain difference for its own sake, the poem's structure 
suggests a more profound repetition.  Rather than being overwhelmed by a world that 
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overpowers him (that of the husband) the self is instead excluded or broken down so 
that a new world or state of affairs may be brought about. 
Cardinal temporal markers (e.g., temporal deictics, verb tenses, and so on) by 
which one might be able to tell the direction of time become ordinal markers through 
which discrete moments are distinguished, and counted, though their relationship is 
not fully determined.  Time here is not strictly organized into a past which yields to a 
present which will produce a future from which both past and present-become-past 
can be recollected, but a fragmentation of linearity, a movement of and in time that 
makes moments echo each other: time as circle or arrow are both disrupted.  The ● 
becomes the index of this disjuncture, but also a conduit of conjuncture.  One notes the 
passage—"e di go \ e go di \ e go dead"—the last phrase resonant with the phrase "ego 
dead."  This ego death (also a simple statement that someone has died) names the 
situation threatened by O'Grady's claiming for himself the absolute right to name 
objects and people, although he discovers that his possession is incomplete, that those 
names are simply the husk in whose wake one does not find the thing in itself, but the 
seed.  The converging and diverging of time, then, does not organize itself around a 
particular subject, but around the empty form of memory as capacity invoked by nam. 
The two tracks of the poem converge around a final scene of pedagogy ("say 
hit say hot say pot \ say rot ogrady says say rat") that ends with a threat ("i come \ 
ogrady says \\ to strangle you maim \ in de grounn"), and a partial repetition of the 
opening of the poem, from the ● and opening conjunction through to the first "mudda" 
(Ancestors 90).  Finally, O'Grady's source of power and control—naming—becomes 
the sign of his impotence.  His pretense to power fails because of an ignorance of nam, 
of the limits of his own power:  
e 
nomminit 
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nomminit 
nomminit 
an 
e 
nomminit 
nomminit 
nomminit 
but e nevva maim what me mudda me name 
an e nevva nyam what me mane 
 
■ 
(Ancestors 94)  
After beginning again, there is a return to the mother's initial scene of 
pedagogy, the mother reveals the poem's speaker's nam: "dem is nomminit different an 
\ nan so mandingo she yessper you nam" (Ancestors 91).  To name or "nomminit," a 
neologism that invokes both "nominate" and anagrammatic "mt (empty) minion," is 
here a limit-situation of the conception of time as straight line.  The name "Mandingo" 
is itself polysemous, referring to a novel and film of that name (and thus to a certain 
African American history bound by stereotypes of the oversexed hyper-virile black 
male), and indirectly to the Mandinka people of western Africa and thus again to the 
figure of slavery, although nominally "redeemed" through the invocation of a once 
glorious past.  While the mother provides an uplifting historical counter-balance to 
O'Grady's imperial condescension, she no more "gives" the nam than O'Grady 
destroys it.  Both of them, through the name, indicate it without being able to claim it.  
The names O'Grady and the mother insist on, the names the poem's speaker learns, are 
not the real nam.  The poem identifies an impulse to name, to protect or reject the 
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name, while simultaneously drawing out naming's limits through a formal presentation 
that fragments linear time to inaugurate a play of temporalities around an inexplicable 
secret whose meaning rests in its remaining "submerged." 
The transition from circles to squares—the squaring of the circle—by the end 
of the poem marks an implicit call for action as much as the final lines, taken from 
Conrad Eugene Mauge, Jr.'s "Zombie Jamboree":  
back to back belly to belly 
uh doan give a damn 
uh dun dead already 
 
back to back 
belly to belly 
 
dun dung dead in de grounn ■ 
(Ancestors 95) 
Those lyrics, putatively based on a lyric or "theme" by Goethe,132
                                                 
132 On their 1959 recording of the song, on the album Stereo Concert Plus! The Kingston 3 claims the 
connection to Goethe, and that Lord Invader changed Goethe's theme from the "dance of the dead" to 
zombism to suit his experience.   
 
commemorate Carnival.  Wrenched from the context of the popular original song, the 
words are simultaneously defiant and resigned, caught between repetition and the 
bringing about of the new, which comes at the expense of the self in the present, 
raising as question the unknowable nature of survival, or living-on.  It is in this sense 
that the poem invokes a third "synthesis" of time beyond habit and memory (both of 
which are invoked here), a repetition in which both the event and the actions 
themselves are left behind in favor of a future that shatters the self without 
reconstituting it in a higher form.  This is not the end or "death" of "the subject" but of 
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"the subject" as an unsurpassable horizon of time.  Simultaneously, and for the same 
reasons, it is not a "negation" or "transcendence" of the recorded history of the people 
or the region, but on the contrary a return to that history as if stripped of the 
sedimented associations and schemata of value in order to, as it were, "revitalize" it.  
Thus one can read Brathwaite's giving over of his poem to the language of another 
precisely such a shattering or surrender of the self, a look beyond the given world or 
words ("what kinds of new words are formable?  become formidable?") to the 
question "What form(s) become possible?"  This question emerges as the more general 
call for reformation, a "revitalization" that proceeds from the originary, not to be 
confused with an origin or the received images of the past.  It shatters the direct link in 
the imagination between the past and the present in order to welcome the coming of 
the new. 
 
"Tryin to Ghost Words to Holla This Tale"  
The privileging of the new stands in tension with the news media's—and 
video's—memorializing function.  Video, an iconic instance of modernity (and 
surveillance culture)—the “art form par excellence of late capital”—is a sign of 
transmission or imparting itself.  Suspending arguments about video’s implication in 
the privatization of experience and the supposed difficulties it institutes for imagining 
collective political mobilization, my interest lies in video’s iconic status, and its 
relation to iconicity.  Video makes possible a magnification of the everyday, 
memorializes the quotidian and the insignificant, and in the same gesture produces an 
anxiety that this time, these moments, will be erased, or lost from the more general 
flows of space-time or modernity. Contrary to the traditional memorializing functions 
of lyric or the plastic arts, video preserves sights and sounds indifferently, making 
each moment available as potential spectacle, potential landmark.  Video forces us to 
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ask about the time of an event, the time of a little girl lost or the “time of the Haitian 
refugees” or the times of Haiti, for example, the time of life in death, the "haunted," 
"cursed" place that is Haiti.  
The two most direct literary equivalents for video in Brathwaite's writing are 
the journalistic chronicle, and the "DreamStories."  This latter, like SVS more 
generally, invokes another medieval writing practice: the dream vision, situating the 
traditions of the troubadour or griot alongside such works as Augustine’s Soliloquia or 
Dante’s Divina Commedia.  As in the medieval dream visions, the DreamStories—
which blend dreams, history, prophesy, current events, the private and the public—
typically feature a narrator making a journey.  Breaking with that earlier genre, 
however, the moment of falling asleep is suppressed, and the narrator of the 
DreamStories (identified with Brathwaite himself, linking the medieval dream vision 
to the modern dream work) typically does not have a guide through the dreamscape, 
making the journey itself directly the political or philosophical commentary.  Better 
stated, the mediality of the presented tale becomes part of the tale.   
These writings, often concerned with the everydayness of the everyday and 
closer to prose than verse, suggest a confrontation with potentiality itself, with what is 
objectively sick or "out of joint" in the world as given and the possibilities thinkable, 
in short with a situation requiring new metaphors.  They create dilated or inflated 
instants that, as distinct from plural instances, suspend the division of time into 
discrete, autonomous events, creating a sense of days running together or materially 
repeating one another.  The ultimate effect is one of the ceaseless passage of time 
simultaneous with its stasis: time replays as if on a loop.  In these poems, time itself 
appears worn out; the links between the empty form of time and habit, which 
determines the direction of time, have frayed.  There is thus a sense of moving merely 
from event from event, of repetition of the same event, linked only spatially through 
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occurring in the same place, which is not specific but any space.  These events, too, 
arrive already shot through with meanings, already known, without the capacity to 
produce any new links; they heap atop one another with neither rhyme nor reason.   
These writings also tend to thematize the circulation of tales through gossip 
(expressed by the refrain "say the Cattlewash boys" in "Noom"), interpolated 
newspaper articles, and transcripts from television news (e.g., especially "Pixie" and 
"Heartbreak Hotel" in Ancestors and the DreamStorie "Dream Haiti").  Such 
interpolations mark the imposition of an elsewhere that breaks up and re-inscribes the 
"here and now" of everyday actuality without acceding either to the grand scale of 
epic or to the direct representation of a speaker's thoughts and emotion from the 
vantage point of reflection.  The news media metaphorize language's function as a 
medium that simultaneously conjoins addresser and addressee by first dividing them 
into those poles, with special emphasis on the interval of transmission.  On the one 
hand, Brathwaite's poetry rejects a dyadic relationship between author and reader 
where the former imprints his/her experiences on the artwork that is then transparently 
transmitted to a reader as a new impression, immediately shared.  On the other hand, it 
suggests a more robust sense of relation, drawing out the limits of the social order "as 
such" by gesturing toward the surplus drive or movement excluded in order to produce 
the artwork as merely a meaningful sign.  Especially in the SVS poems, the 
fragmentary, figural, sub-signifying qualities of language—the presentation of letter 
on page—is allowed a relative autonomy, drawing together new possible assemblages 
and pathways of meaning or desire.  This medial aspect of language is hinted at 
through the insistent marking of the poem as an intertextual field; authorship itself is 
made into an open question through the insistent recitation of the resources.  The 
question of "the sources of a poet's life" returns and the poem becomes the product of 
the flow of daily life not as the bare recounting of the experiences that, taken together, 
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account for subjectivity, but of a more generalized flow.  Mediality, as the image of a 
fragile sub-individual relation, refers to that in and through which data must pass, the 
interval of that passage, and the impossibility of a full or transparent use of language.  
"Pixie," and its direct companion poem "The Heartbreak Hotel," added to the 
revision of Mother Poem in Ancestors, relates in the present tense the story of a young 
runaway named Stephanie/Pixie.  The latter poem is "one long letter forom Pixie iout 
here in the dark & transcribe by the poem from a real Bajan radio program of this 
name [Heartbreak Hotel] midnight nov 1997," presented prosaically, mostly in twenty-
four-syllable lines.  In "Heartbreak," the poem shifts between the represented speech 
of her mother crippled by stroke and her sister who cares for their mother, both as 
reported in Barbados newspapers, contrasting the immediacy of newspaper reportage 
to the supposed reflective time of the poet, time of generational time, or "murthered 
motherhood."  The poem is not content to remain at the level of the sociological, 
imputing a photograph and other reconstituted images, interweaving lyrical excursus 
within a single long sentence (fig. 7), the two modes graphically separated by variable 
left margin: 
 
 
Figure 7, detail of "Pixie" (Ancestors 58-59) 
 
In addition to mixing registers (e.g., the prosaic and the lyrical), this poem begins by 
also mixing pronouns (my sister, her mother, your yard), and timeframes both through 
 225 
deictics on the one hand (both "300 years" and this moment where she stands), and 
orthography on the other (the old-fashioned murthered" and contemporary "chile").  
The lyrical interlude comments on this single protracted act, a lingering at the 
threshold, which does not reach its conclusion until the twenty-eighth line ("but she's 
back safe home this one more morning time \ missing the musing mother"—).  This 
conclusion is in turn followed by fifteen more lines of free indirect discourse 
conveying a sense of the mother's helplessness, which is then ironized by a printed 
outburst (fig. 8) apparently from another time, before or after Stephanie's return:  
 
Figure 8, detail of "Pixie" (Ancestors 60)133
Directly following this interlude, there is a separate box with a single, solid-
line border, describing Stephanie in the first person ("in the black/white photo that i 
have she's all in white"), a description that becomes more interactive: "brown or black 
sandals i suppose (the \ picture don't forget is black&white)."  This moment of 
interaction marks a general tendency of Brathwaite's later writing to address the reader 
directly and here helps to establish a thematic concern for memory, and the inherent 
perils of speaking for another: to speak for another is also to speak as another.  The 
use of newspaper reportage as poetic medium here, too, extends the indeterminacy of 
address.  The "I," for instance, is variably the mother, the sister Jennifer, 
Stephanie/Pixie, and the pluralized authorial voice of the poem (which blends with 
 
                                                 
133 The corresponding asterisk on page 65 credits "Natasha Adams, Weekend Investigator (Btown 
Barbados) 29 Aug 97)" adding that "This and (3) below = verbitime adaptations from the poem."  There 
is slight ambiguity regarding this citation, as there is no third section.  Thus, despite the attribution, the 
source, if any, for this outburst remains unclear, especially since no article title is listed.  At any rate, 
the documentary or journalistic form seems to be most pertinent, and the attribution itself creates the 
effect of research.  
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two other named authors credited with authoring the "original" news stories).  The 
language of the poem qua poem must pass through this field of indetermination, 
upholding a fiction of intertext that has Karia Dear write under the headline "Missing 
teenager book in arms \ of mother," the kind of parapraxis (slips of the tongue) that 
proliferates throughout SVS writing, a figure of what is lost in video's archivization.  
This poem ends with the repetition "promises \ promises \ promises," which follows 
the display of another plea from an indeterminate time (fig. 9), presumably from 
Pixie's mother, this time without border:  
 
Figure 9, detail of "Pixie" (Ancestors 67) 
 
"Heartbreak Hotel" takes up the same call for help, this time from the apparent 
point of view of Pixie, who wants "somebody to care & to direct my life & tell me \ 
what to do."  That transcript (putatively of a radio broadcast) ends when "she sign the 
letter w/ her name," and gives way to a second or third "voice" of the poem 
(depending whether the hand that tells of the transcription is taken to be identical with 
what follows), written in a different font.  The poem thus draws attention to the 
various discursive registers through which the text passes, has already passed on the 
way to transcription and to producing poetry as a call to poetry.  The lines at the end of 
the poem adopt a similar tone to those lyrical lines that dilate the moment of Pixie 
standing at the threshold of her mother's house.  Here they bemoan "the lives so 
broken \ w/ inglorious \ sounds o broken & incongruous \\ woods" crying out against 
"words so shoved about so worn & coil we cannot slip \ yr sandals on and wear them 
comfortable out into the \ bleeding streets of chance."  Language becomes a 
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specifically bodily extension.  The poem ends (fig. 10) with an allusive question, 
rendered in nation language, which introduces a similar point of incongruity that 
suspends the poem:  
 
Figure 10, detail of "Heartbreak Hotel" (Ancestors 72) 
There is a directly self-referential moment—"the edges of this poem"—which 
becomes the metaphorical desert or littoral space ("sands") upon which the words 
progress.  Through the invocation of a "midday angelus" and the recitation of the 
names of poets and texts, a ritual function is ascribed to poetry, ultimately related to a 
devotional of the renewable words of which poetry is made.  Finally, the links 
between embodiment and its "inscriptions" through movements such as the dance get 
effaced when all graphicity is subsumed under the notion of the representation of 
speech is called into question.  It is not enough to assign to language or writing an 
exclusive instrumental task of conveying meaning, a notion through which the word is 
through exhausted by its function.  The emphasis on language as medium, through 
invocation of other media and through parapraxis, highlights the ineluctable failed 
transmission, those codes or signs that cannot be transmitted "as such" that are the 
possibilities of renewing the word.  Through analogizing the task of the poet to that of 
the dancer, indistinguishable from his or her work, Brathwaite offers the means to 
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change the units of analysis to other units of sense-making, including those moments, 
such as the paralinguistic "at" sign, paradigmatic symbol of a world "connected" by 
information technology.   
"Dream Haiti" turns on similar moments of indistinction, and similarly fraught 
"connections."  Its journey begins at sea “where the US Coast Guard cutter was 
patrolling / along the borders of the Mexicans & my brothers – / the what was called 
'the Haitian Refugees'” (DS 95).  In the subsequent version (fig 11),134 subtitled "in a 
strange land," this beginning reads:  
 
Figure 11, detail of "DreamHaiti" 
In both instances, brotherhood is emphasized alongside the intervention of the U.S. 
Coast Guard (which becomes typographically important later), but the addition of “in 
the dream” adds an additional layer of mediation to "what was call(ed)," and a further 
refusal of the name "Haitian Refugees."  Further, both instances follow this 
identification with the immediate question rendered (figs 12 and 13): 
 
Figure 12, detail of "DreamHaiti" 
                                                 
134 DS(2) dreamstories (New York: New Directions Books, 2007), 159.  Hereafter cited as DS2. 
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Figure 13, detail of "DreamHaiti" 
 (DS 95/DS2 160)   
This question, which the narrator proposes to write to Shante Chakmul/Shanté 
Chacmoul is set off by four unpronounceable forward slashes, ////, an intrusion of the 
frame of the tale into the tale, simultaneously setting the question apart and aside in 
advance.  Along with the use of nation language, these slashes create a ‘tense 
continuum’: “I write” or “mi write” could equally mean “I write” or am writing, “I 
will write” or “I wrote”.  The unknown times of his future/past writing with similarly 
overlapping time within the narrative create an "ontology of dream," wherein one 
moment affects and has been affected by other moments, including ghosts or versions 
of itself.  This "ontology" is rooted in the materiality of video itself, whose frames are 
not single or discrete as in film, but mutually constituted or interlaced.  Each video 
"frame," a catachrestic term, is not its own, but contains and is contained by part of the 
frame before and after, which in part accounts for glitches during playback, and makes 
video editing difficult.  One cannot get to a singular instance – time, instead, is 
differential, moving from A to A' rather than A to B.  In Brathwaite's hands, this 
becomes a technique for making “visible” anew that which exceeds the frames 
through which the given world is given by insisting on the interrelation between things 
and times.  Here, the tense continuum sets adrift a dynamic shard of time from and 
within the general flow of narrative time.   
In DS(2), the words “Haitian Refugees,” distorted, presented in outlines with a 
heavy drop shadow, are nearly illegible, suggesting yet a further refusal or deferral of 
 230 
the name, the exchange of one sense of icon—an emblem of suffering or Western 
imperialism going back to the Revolution—for another.  The illegible letters echo the 
epigraph, apostrophizing Haiti: “one day we turn our head \ and look inside you.”  
This “look inside” is not simply a look of recognition or identity, but identification—
an instance of critical naming.  The iconicity of the letters themselves, of the very 
word, suggests that we have not looked, or that “Haitian Refugees” mark that which 
we cannot or, due to the distortions of our apparatuses and norms of perception, of 
production and reproduction, of narrative emplotment, can no longer “read.”  The 
“Haitian Refugees” are illegible but we nonetheless must attempt to read them, find 
some way to meet or acknowledge in this time, which is not known or given in 
advance.  The category—the words—is “renewed”; the refugees again become 
Arrivants, unknown in their singularity.  This “look inside” does not refer to a 
redeemed version of the past, but an affirmation of that past, and this present.  In light 
of the specification of the “Time of the 'Haitian Refugees'” in the newer version, we 
are invited to ask, and implicated in the question, what are the times of the Haitian 
Refugees?  What, in the aftermath of the earthquake of 2010, are the times of the 
dead? 
Formally, these blended times generate a “plural instant.”  Through such 
devices as repetition, and shifts of narrative perspective—from first-person singular to 
first-person plural acknowledging many dead (the twenty-five on board the boat built 
to carry only “13 or 14 or 15” and the “many more thousands gone” of the dedication), 
time doubles back on itself like the movement of a wave which is also the movement 
of reading (“as if I was already turning the leaves of the \ waves”).  The journey itself, 
at sea for an unspecified period, re-inscribes both “Cristophe on La Ferrièrre walking 
that sloe corridor of water” and “Toussaint Legba all the way out on Napoleons 
joyless eyeless island of \ torture on the glacial seas of the Jura,” linking them both to 
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“the dungeons of guinée & goréee”: infamous sites in west Africa visited by tourists 
drawn to the iconic holding spaces of the Middle Passage.  “Dream Haiti” insists on 
the implication of  the spectator with the spectacle, both through techniques of self-
reference (the repeated “as I say” or “as you can see”) and in the form of a capacious 
first-person that links the author with the so-called “Haitian Refugees,” even onto the 
point of death: “& there was so much goin on all above us \ what w/the ferrymen 
shoutin for survivors tho we was all quite dead & \ bloated by this time” (DS2 189).   
The deictic “this time” becomes another suspended moment, one located as 
much in the preventable future as in the preventable past.  It is at this moment that the 
narrative shifts the time to an unnarrativizable time: that of one's own death, a moment 
that, as the annihilation of any possible subjectivity cannot properly be called 
traumatic but might be thought to mark the “possibility of establishing certain 
synchronisms, American, recurrent timeless / relating this to that, yesterday to toda / 
(y)” (MR/1 77).  The figure of prosopopeia, giving voice (or literal face) to one absent 
or dead, here also marks a renewal, an opening onto a frame of a more fundamental 
universality: that of desire as a mode of striving to persist in one's own being.  Beyond 
memorializing or speaking for those who cannot, invoking Marx, represent 
themselves, beyond attempting to give “authentic voice” to the experiences or 
suffering of others, prosopopeia draws attention to an absent or broken link, aided by 
SVS which centers the announcement along the vertical but not horizontal axis, 
smaller in size than the “cul-de-sac” that describes the movement of the waves, 
another figure of restrained or proscribed movement: “'endless purgatorial passages' – 
if you can call it that –” (DS2 192). 
The shift of point of view at the end of “Dream Haiti” opens onto another 
question of naming (fig. 14), of permission to name or rename: 
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Figure 14, detail of "DreamHaiti" 
“Them” here apparently refers to the drowned Haitians, making “poem” their activity.  
At the same time, the syntactic unit could be “them poem,” those poems, such that the 
dead themselves become poems, poetry, the work of the poets that they are: “we was 
all artists & strangers to each / other & not soldiers or sailors or dwarfs as i have to / 
go on insistin” (DS2 175).  The word “impeccable,” repeats throughout “Dream Haiti” 
referring to the movement of the sea (“the sea was also movin impeccable” and “the 
impeccable surge & breathe of the seas out there”), and by implication the death of a 
“likkle bwoy” you have seen on tv: “juss this glimpse juss this shot dripping w/history 
– \ clear out the water for all our howls to see” (DS2 161 177, 193, emphasis in 
original).  This child, like the narrator to whom he is linked by the name “likkle 
bwoy,” is singled out from the dead, responsibility resting upon a failure to recognize 
that “we are they broders & fellow writers bound to them by all \ kinds of travelers 
cheques & the content of our character” (DS2 197).  The invocation of Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr.'s "I Have a Dream" speech serves as a caution about the responsibility 
of dreaming, and the impossibility of any dream being fulfilled in its time, a caution to 
pause and ask which dream is to be fulfilled.   
 The boy's passage is doubled by an implied televisual display that prompts a 
sustained address to the reader (figs. 15-18): 
 
Figure 15, detail of "DreamHaiti" 
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Figure 16, detail of "DreamHaiti" 
 
Figure 17, detail of "DreamHaiti" 
  
Figure 18, detail of "DreamHaiti" 
(DS2 193-196) 
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I read this “tryin to ghost words” as a direct invocation of video’s differentiation of 
time as relates to poetics.  The attempt to make the words 'live off the page' (which in 
the case of the line "that e nvr deserve that e nvr nvr nvr \ deserve" renders them 
illegible) is accomplished by deferring their sense to some future time.  Only those 
elements considered secondary to meaning—sound, rhythm, the form on the page, the 
iconicity of the letters—remain.  Rhetorically, this direct address to the reader, from a 
right-justified textual margin, punctures and punctuates the narrative unfolding, 
making the inadequacy of mere reference palpable at a moment where it most seems 
necessary.  We are reminded, in other words, that one speaks only of the ones called 
‘the Haitian Refugees,’ and that such reference is overdetermined by other discourses, 
an ongoing ‘perpetual pogrom’ that informs their existence “as such.”  A third 
difference, the editorial or authorial I responding to a critic, cuts the shifts between 
first-person singular and plural, and the valences of that plural perspective, linking the 
narrator now with the Haitian refugees, now with the Coast Guard.  Enjambing lines 
by separating the gerund endings, and using the equal sign rather than the 
conventional hyphen (which, in any case, is not on the standard side of the break) 
further the point, marking the ongoing nature of this scene, its repetition throughout 
history, throughout the Times of Haiti.  The referenced chant itself, punctuated again 
by an unpronounceable symbol that recurs throughout “Dream Haiti,” inscribes this 
telling within an aspirant community much as the invocation of television does, 
insisting on the distance of the call over and against the proximity of longed-for 
response.   
Neither outburst nor symbols appear in the previous version(s) of “Dream 
Haiti,” however, which highlights another important feature of SVS as related to 
video: unlike film, video can be directly erased and reinscribed.  If film's relationship 
to the profilmic object or event is, as has been frequently argued, fundamentally 
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indexical, implying always a relationship with something that has appeared before the 
lens, the video of Sycorax Video Style is primarily iconic.  It draws our attention to 
that for which we do not yet have concepts or corresponding ideas and thus to what 
did not and could not appear.  We are reminded of the impermanence of our concepts 
despite appearances, and of our capacity to revise or overwrite them.  In this sense, 
impeccable sea and implicitly impeccable “likkle bwoy” are literally without sin—
without a relation with the world except, as we will see, as a mode of the world—and 
become iconic in two senses.  On the one hand, they are solid images that hold a place 
in devotional practices, but on the other hand they are signs for which a relation must 
be (re-)imagined, restored, or created.   
This story in particular, and the DreamStories more generally demand attention 
to the liminal spaces and crossed boundaries—between life and death, between nations 
in the ambiguous terrain of international water and after the would-be refugees land, 
between a praise song and a gesture that comes too late, between would-be saviour 
and would-be saved.  However, “Dream Haiti” makes a deeper ontological claim 
through one of its moments of apparent parapraxis, linking the hands that grasp and 
the ropes and lifebuoys themselves.  "[T]he railings / or stations & stanchions […] was 
like mode of the same material or metal as our / fingers & the palms of our hands" and 
"we were trying to reach the lifelines that were made of the same material as / the 
thongs of our fingers & the webs of our skin” (DS2 185, 189).   
The slippage between “mode” and “made” is no mere solecism but points to 
the “ontology of dream,” the permeability and changeability of identities within the 
dream, and a common substance within the dream's theater, in distinction from a logic 
or logos of the dream.  To say the railings were “mode of the same material” suggests, 
that is, a single underlying substance, and suggests a possibility within the “senscape” 
of the dream space of re-imagining connections between people and objects in the 
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waking world by dissolving the frames through which objects are apprehended or 
ordered, including the singular ego as the locus of possible experience.  Thus, “trans-
liminalness” gestures toward a sense of inter-individuation, of differentiation rooted in 
a common substance suspending the atomistic division in order to think of community 
or Relation not on the basis of the recognition of common traits from individual to 
individual but despite there being no adequate frame through which such community 
as a political project might be thought.  We imagine community because of—not 
despite—difference, as the product of a common striving.  There is neither a singular 
experience nor transcendental truth to the deaths at sea in the Middle Passage that 
brought the Africans to the New World, nor to the ongoing deaths and dislocations of 
Haitian and other refugees.  There is only a common striving to survive, to live on, and 
a common demand that the Arrivants, whoever they are, be welcomed as guests on 
whatever shores upon which they land.  Through SVS and its motivation of icons 
rather than symbols, Brathwaite's DreamStorie offers one means through which such 
welcome might be thought, or sounded: we stand, watching them poem, watching 
them make, and we make, with them, something new.   
 
"So Hopefully New Each Time-Beginning Poem" 
Many of the works previously considered move from the everyday to articulate 
connections and misconnections between that time and global time.  Their 
counterparts are those poems that start with the Event or global rupture that marks a 
transition point between epochs and whose resonances spread throughout the world, 
often known only by a date as in one of Brathwaite's early poems, "Caliban":  
It was December second, nineteen fifty-six. 
It was the first of August eighteen thirty-eight. 
It was the twelfth of October fourteen ninety-two. 
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How many bangs how many revolutions? 
(The Arrivants 192) 
One is tempted to read these lines as the contraction of world-historical events into 
singular points related to the development of a particular space (the Caribbean), 
organizing time along a reverse trajectory whose line extends from Castro back to 
Columbus135
There remains a more profound movement in these lines, beyond the 
immediate definitions of these dates, which draw their importance from a discourse of 
history that precedes them, proceeding in reverse as if seeking the phantasmatic 
 (and in X/Self will ultimately extend to Rome through the motif "Rome 
burns \ and our slavery begins").  Indeed, these lines read as if they seek some original 
moment or explanation, for the state of the world from the beginning to the end of 
history, the two ends made to meet at that vanishing point.  However, this litany of 
dates follows an account of what was in the newspapers at an indeterminate moment 
that may have been the morning of Castro's revolution, and an account of the weather 
at what may be yet another time: "The sky was cloudy, a strong breeze; \ maximum 
temperature eighty-two degrees."  Taken together, these dates and data are reduced to 
a single plane, to instances of analepsis or "flashback" within the unfolding historical 
narrative of the Caribbean, looking from an indeterminate moment that grammatically 
must follow these events to an overdetermined past.  This is another example of the 
plural instant, achieved by tense.  The instant is stretched to maximum elasticity; 
world historical events have become only so many recited moments, worn out by 
repetition, retaining only their own monumentality, which serves as the sign of 
explanation through the circulation of these dates as so many clichés.   
                                                 
135 Of course, Trinidadian historian and statesman Eric Williams unapologetically—and 
magnificently—traces that line in his grand From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean 
1492-1969 (New York: Vintage, 1984). 
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moment of origin.  Though there is a continuum of tense that, in the absence of 
deictics, places them grammatically on a single temporal plane, organized under the 
sign of History, each of the moments themselves inscribes a discrete plane of time.  In 
the place of a particular recollection or memory belonging to a person or a people, the 
poem presents a world-memory, time as always already "there."  In this way, a depth 
of time is returned to these Events as a both plurality and density, as an anticipation of 
recollection when the actual will be broken up and reconstituted as recollection.  The 
newspaper printed on any-day-whatever, the weather of some unknown time or place, 
again, are on the same grammatical plane as those other dates, returning to the latter 
their virtual—that is, unactualized—capacity, the still unfulfilled potential of those 
days and the historical events by which they come to be defined.  In this sense, time is 
revealed within the Event itself, apart from its punctual arrival.  The indiscernibility of 
times, the indiscernible relationship between those events and some particular present 
suspends the poem at a consideration of time itself, its movement and division into a 
past and a future, the operation by which time makes the present pass and preserves 
the past within itself.  The past, the empty form of "it was," can no longer be confused 
with the mental existence of memories through which it is actualized in individuals or 
peoples; for the same reason, it can no longer be confused with the archives or 
narratives through which it is actualized.  The structural emptiness of the past becomes 
the basis on which "bangs and revolutions" can happen, not strictly modeled on the 
revolutions and cataclysms of the past.   
Ark, one of Brathwaite's most recent poems, takes a specific world-historical 
event (the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in the United States on 
September, 11 2001) as its point of departure.  Like "Caliban," it pursues the plural 
instant to the point that time breaks with localizable connection, producing a 
continuity of duration defined by interacting planes of time rather than the ready-made 
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links of historical narrative.  As with many of the SVS poems, this one has been 
printed twice: first in Born to Slow Horses under the title "Hawk" and then again in 
revised form as a stand-alone volume re-titled Ark: A 9/11 Continuation Poem.  Both 
versions begin with initial text whose function as subtitle or invocation is unclear: 
"Hawk's Last Body _Soul Ronnie Scott's in London 11 Sept 1967 _ Counting," the 
underscore taking the place of the ampersand, graphically suggesting a "submerged" 
linkage if not unity.136
From the outset, the poem brings into contiguity several disparate times: the 
famous recording of "Body and Soul" from 1939, a concert from 1967 or 1968, and 
the terrorist attacks that have (so far) lead to two U.S.-led wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan with their untold thousands.  But apart from gesturing toward those other 
times, the uniqueness of each uncounted, subsequent death—from Hawkins' to those 
who died in the attacks or would later die in the wars (the poem adds other sites and 
"air beyond what we call age")—the poem insists on the correspondence between 
these two moments which are made to reflect each other.  It is therefore not accidental 
that one encounters in the initial lines "Hawk \ shrouded in mirrors.  showers.  haunted 
by twins," a direct reference to the reduplicated moment—the date September 11—
  "Body and Soul," among other things, refers to the jazz 
standard composed by Johnny Green, Frank Eyton, Edward Heyman, and Robert Sour, 
which Coleman Hawkins, nicknamed Hawk, famously recorded with his orchestra in 
1939, almost exactly twenty-eight (or twenty-seven) years prior to the date of this 
supposed last performance with a different ensemble on a different continent.  
Pertinent to my present consideration of, Hawkins recorded a famous two-chorus solo, 
since preserved by the National Recording Registry of the Library of Congress.   
                                                 
136 Ark: A 9/11 Continuation Poem (New York: Savacou North 2004) changes the year from 1967 to 
1968.  Hereafter cited as Ark. 
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being brought together to a point that again risks indiscernibility, such that one 
becomes (fig. 19) actual and the other virtual:  
 
Figure 19, detail of Ark 
(Ark 9)  
 
The attacks in Manhattan and Washington, D.C. become the dream or 
nightmare already inscribed in Hawkins' performance, his signature song literalizing 
in "the body body body bod- \ ies pour- \\ ing from this dark Manhattan strom- \ boli 
into dim catacombs of dis-" (Ark 9).  One is confronted at once with a recorded 
moment (the world-historical event) inscribed dimly in a previous recorded moment 
(the 1968 performance, inscribed in memory as a recollection-image) which refers 
back to an earlier moment (the 1939 recording) and so on.  These lines generalize the 
process of inscription itself, invoking graphics not linked exclusively to speech, but 
also to sound more generally, to light, to the airplane that inscribes an iconic cross, all 
of which are brought together by the coalescence of these moments into one moment.  
A "force, a flow of power, an impetus that carries with it word, image, and 
consciousness" without belonging to any of those, which is always overflows transects 
that moment, which I will too quickly term improvisation.137
                                                 
137 Brathwaite, "Jazz and the West Indian Novel" Roots (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1993), 70. 
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Brathwaite identifies jazz, specifically its privileging of improvisation, as a 
music "expressive… of the problems of the whole civilized complex of living in the 
post-Faustian, post-Freudian world" is no longer valued not for its expressive capacity 
as a reflection of protest or resilience.  Instead, it becomes that which transects the 
discontinuous time of Coleman Hawkins' performance and the attacks in New York 
and Washington D.C. where the former grammatically predicts the latter, and those 
discrete inscriptions of the past related to one another only from the point of view of a 
passing present to which they exist linearly as former presents.  Like the command to 
sing in Shar, improvisation reintroduces a vigorous conception of freedom, an opening 
to the future.  Ark includes the transcript of a woman who lost her firefighter husband, 
a plea ("so let me \ my belovèd \ love you love you love you love you") and reiteration 
of the scene of the performance of "Body and Soul," now labeled a cadenza (an 
unaccompanied flourish of indefinite form typically given to a solo musician at the 
close of a movement or transition between movements) that sees "the volution of 
HAWK into HARK (vibration of sound into song) into ARK."  The poem concludes 
with a prayer for deliverance, the revelation of the poem as a psalm, ending with a call 
to "think think think of the space & peace of tomorrow" (Ark 42). 
This improvisation supplements "the blues of these ragged font edges and the 
call&response dread contralto tenorsax delivery" by adding an implicit question 
regarding the shaping of time, the orientation toward an uncertain future.  
Improvisation is not identical with "freedom"; indeed, its freedom is only a relative 
freedom.  Its value comes from its residing "in the moment," a present haunted by both 
past and future, whose outcome is not known in advance, and whose direction is not 
fully pre-determined by either past experiences or training, and so on.  If the poem 
dramatizes "time out of joint," temporality as itself in crisis—literally divided—
improvisation becomes a force of vitality, the breaking through of the future insofar as 
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it offers the thought of an utterance or inscription not yet made.  Hence the pun "the 
axe + àxé saxophone" early on in the poem.138
                                                 
138 For more on the concept of àxé please see Carol Boyce Davies' article "Ashé" in Encyclopedia of the 
African Diaspora: Origins, Experiences, and Culture vol. 1, ed. Carol Boyce Davies (Oxford (UK): 
ABC-CLIO, 2008), 119.  She writes "As a cultural definition, then, àxé moves across two large 
discursive fields: that of spirituality, and that of creativity, with its meanings and associations of what it 
is to be human in the world, questions of existence, the power to be, dynamic force in all things."  
  Through the alignment of 
improvisation with unbound potential capable of illuminating new possibilities, it 
emerges as a new kind of sign through which the fissures and saturations of the 
moment can be thought apart from the ideology of "immediate" perception.  
Improvisation necessarily entails anticipation, but it need not be the anticipation of this 
or that particular event, but unpredicated anticipation—'time in its pure state.'  
Improvisation is a non-exclusive sign of genesis, a function shared in other 
poems by the lwa or deities of African and Diasporic religion (e.g., Oya, Xangô, 
Legba, Ananse, and so on) and the notion of nam itself.  In his poetics, Brathwaite is a 
stunning thinker of time, its asymmetries and internal differentiation, its multi-
directionality.  But he is also a profound thinker of the future as what breaks through, 
what arrives and has not been predicted.  Fully aware of the sway of tradition(s) and 
the vexed political questions of our times, he nonetheless never stops inscribing in his 
work figures or signs of the genetic, opposing the merely new, crafting "words to 
refashion futures," to reawaken or revitalize the unactualized potential in letters left 
for dead.   
 243 
 
REFERENCES 
Boyce Davies, Carol.  "Ashé."  Encyclopedia of the African Diaspora: Origins, 
Experiences, and Culture, vol. 1.  Ed. Carol Boyce Davies.  Oxford (UK): 
ABC-CLIO.  2008. 
Brathwaite, Kamau.  Ancestors: A Reinvention of Mother Poem, Sun Poem, and 
X/Self.  New York: New Directions Publishing Company.  2001. 
_______.  Ark: A 9/11 Continuation Poem.  New York: Savacou North.  2004.   
_______.  The Arrivants: A New World Trilogy.  London: Oxford University Press.  
1973. 
_______.  Barabajan Poems.  New York and Kingston (Jamaica): Savacou.  1994. 
_______.  "Caribbean Man in Space and Time."  Savacou 11/12 (Sept. 1975), pp. 1-
11. 
_______.  Contradictory Omens.  Kingston, Jamaica: Savacou Publications.  1974. 
_______.  ConVERSations with Nathaniel Mackey.  Staten Island and Minneapolis: 
WE Press and XCP: Cross Cultural Poetics.  1999. 
_______.  Gods of the Middle Passage.  Mona, Kingston (Jamaica): Savacou Working 
Papers.  1982. 
_______.  Golokwati 2000.  New York: Savacou North.  2002 
_______.  History of the Voice: The Development of Nation Language in Anglophone 
Caribbean Poetry.  London: New Beacon Books.  1984. 
_______.  Middle Passages.  New York: New Directions Books.  1993. 
_______.  Mother Poem.  London: Oxford University Press.  1977 
_______.  MR/1: Magical Realism.  New York: Savacou North.  1998. 
_______.  MR/2: Magical Realism.  New York: Savacou North.  1998. 
_______.  Roots.  Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.  1993. 
 244 
_______.  Shar: Hurricane Poem.  Mona, Kingston (Jamaica): Savacou Publications.  
1990. 
_______.  "Timehri," Is Massa Day Dead: Black Moods in the Caribbean, ed. Orde 
Coombs.  Garden City (NY): Anchor Bay Books.  1974. 
_______.  Sun Poem.  London: Oxford University Press.  1982. 
_______.  Trench Town Rock.  Providence (RI): Lost Road Publishers.  1994. 
_______.  X/Self.  London: Oxford University Press.  1987. 
 245 
CONCLUSION 
 
POSTSCRIPT: AFTER THE END 
 
To end by returning to the beginning:  two prepositional phrases after the end 
and of the world.  This end, the world, cannot be thought in themselves, cannot be 
thought immediately.  Too quickly, the question becomes one of life, of the living or, 
simply, living.  What living or survival—what being—is invoked in this phrase, which 
has dogged the readings and the literature of this study, where time and again 
certainties break down, the categories of thinking called into question to suggest we 
have not yet begun to think.  Don't you know that yet?  What kind of address is this, 
transmitted by whom to whom; the situation is possible without accepting that the 
proposition—(it is) after the end of the world—and the implicit challenge to go on.  
What speech, what writing can go on, and toward what future?   
My questions here, which I ask directly for the first time, come after the end—
not of the world, but of a writing, and I mean by them to suggest not the end of life but 
of forms of life.  Repeating an earlier point, it is not necessarily the end of the world 
but of the world, and thus a challenge to conceive the world differently.  Here, I begin 
from the impossible situation of writing about my own writing and the possibilities of 
writing, and the responsibilities of reading, so far only touching upon the questions of 
literature that concern my dissertation.  This present writing, after the end, has as its 
end defending a piece of writing that is in its turn a defense of literature—a 
vindication, writing in favor or in praise of literature, and an effort to work from that 
which is specific to literature.  Experimental writing, exemplified by Sun Ra's 
paradoxical phrase, is similarly a demand to think the end, and to think beyond the end 
but retaining it, needing to mark oneself temporally vis-à-vis this break or rupture.   
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Methodologically, my attention to the specificity of writing—its progress from 
sentence to sentence, say, or occasionally from word to word—often meant putting 
aside or deferring questions of literature's “ends,” especially its supposed political 
ends.  How do we think literature after those ends—often sought in the symbolic value 
of the signatory or themes, its reference to “external” political concerns or its 
marshaling of specific references—are suspended, deferred by literature's means, its 
mode of assembling or producing: its poetics?  The debates between "mere" formalism 
and "committed" political readings, I have tried to demonstrate, turn on a similar 
moment of non-thought, an artificial delimiting of what is "proper" to literature, and to 
literary analysis.  A "pure" formalism that cannot consider the historical conditions of 
emergence for genres and literary conventions, which often involve colonial or 
pseudo-colonial encounters is no more or less valid than a "pure" political reading that 
considers a certain account of history or the political as the transcendent horizon of 
meaning and value.  The two must be thought in their mutual relation and 
estrangement, which entails an understanding of poetics as improper, as that through 
which literature's effects always "slide away from the proposed" in Amiri Baraka's 
phrase.   
Let me address this point more concretely with a pair of questions: does 
literature end, that is to say, is there no writing after its end such that we might 
conclude all reading and all writing with the phrase “The End”?  Similarly, where 
would we locate that end?  Would it be in the final propitious moment of the 
fulfillment of the transcendent Word or Book?  That is, wouldn't it have to be the case 
that once whatever political concern to which literature was supposed to respond had 
been resolved, would the literary text simply become a mere historical curiosity, the 
task of writing exhausted so that now we could get on to the “real business” of living?  
Let me risk a third question that insists here: without literature, without writing, how 
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can we live?    What life is there without writing?  This question, finally motivates my 
concerns throughout this project for thinking literature processually, as open-ended 
and inexhaustible.  I do not yet ask the question of how to live, but instead ask of the 
necessity of writing, of thinking, to life, and the ways in which literature overflows or 
exceeds itself and the narrowly construed questions one may pose to it.  My way of 
reading seeks to find those moments where logos hesitates, where meaning can only 
be assigned if one makes an active decision, that is to say stops reading, that is to say 
commits a certain violence to the text, which one must do to read at all.  There is, there 
can be, no absolutely non-violent reading of a text, no absolutely faithful or 
perspicuous interpretation.  What I move to is not literature's “ownmost being” or 
relation to Dasein.  The need to address literature "as such" only through examples of 
literature and the literary, quite apart from the politics of that selection, suggest the 
difficulty of describing what is most properly literary.  My interest, at any rate, lies in 
literature's fundamental impropriety, its non-self-possession, typically glossed 
throughout my analyses as moments of ecstasy or fugitive articulacy rooted in a 
process of writing, which inevitably draws on what I term the µtopic.  This in turn 
becomes a way for thematizing literature's “living on” after the end. 
Throughout, I remain interested in literature's relationship to politics.  Though 
I would defer the question of literature's relationship to, say, the relations of 
production or the mechanisms through which certain texts, authors or subjects come to 
be freighted with "cultural capital, my interest in writing by racialized figures, 
especially of the African diaspora, keeps those concerns nearby.  As does my interest 
in experimental writing, which names as much moments within texts as much as 
modes of writing, and as such risks falling into the same void Barthes does, for 
example, in his definition of the text.  At this stage of my thinking, I thought it was 
important to anchor the discussion in the history of the discipline of African American 
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studies and literary studies, and a certain history of thinking about black writing in 
America, broadly conceived.  I do not argue, as the discipline has often required, that 
there is a fundamental or absolute distinction between black writing and other 
writings, or an absolutely or rigorously insular network of authorship and readership 
on the old model of "for us, by us."  In part this is historical and material: the word 
"black" does not uniformly signify one people or invoke one experience, if it ever did, 
at the turn of the twenty-first century in America.  Through the term "black," hope to 
keep open the heterogeneity of that writing and the experiences it is often taken to 
“express” or “represent.”   
My polemic against representation as a mode of reading that takes racialization 
as some sort of “primal scene” (often assuming as its tacit counterpart some ideal non-
racial existence) marks an effort to distance myself from such thinking, to move 
beyond what has not—and perhaps could not be—thought in the formation of the 
discipline as discipline.  I find in Du Bois an early figure who did think carefully about 
the heterogeneous experiences of black people and “the darker peoples of the world,” 
who never stopped insisting on differences between the peoples and experiences black 
people in the United States, the Caribbean and Africa.  More specifically, in narrating 
his supposed moment of racialization—which has always already happened before the 
narration and, as I argue, before the supposed instance of the Event—Du Bois puts the 
question of correspondence before me, which resounds throughout the texts of the 
other authors explicitly in epistolary form and implicitly in stray or “foreign” bits of 
text.  Through such attention, I try to keep open the specificity—and the strangeness—
of literature itself, what one might say is its self-differentiation from its imputed 
“ends.”  As one of its furthest ambitions, the dissertation endeavors to rethink the 
places and mechanisms of politics within literary texts by beginning from the 
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specificity of the literary work, holding in abeyance the political conditions under 
which literature becomes literature, or comes to be valorized under that name.  
Without wanting to attach a necessary “emancipatory” or politically 
progressive  power to literature's production alienating effects, I do claim for 
literatures prowess at extending complexities, with or without respect to the author's 
will (indeed often against the author's will) something of the power of thinking.  All of 
these reflections lead to the question of the experience of—rather than expressed in or 
reflected by—the literary text.  This almost immediately opens onto notions involving 
the specificity of the literary object, the specificity of the instant, the time of reading, 
and the time of thinking, that is, the times of thinking, of what in thinking can awaits 
animation in some other time as in the expression "an idea whose time has come."  
Methodologically, then, there is no reading that is not a re-reading, a re-tracing of the 
literary text to discover those places where it either undoes itself, or undoes its 
categories. 
In turn, re-introducing time into consideration as one of literature's media, the 
notion of the literary text as a bound, strictly delimited object, exhaustively knowable 
in all rigor, ends up being called into question.  I have no interest in upholding an 
ontology of the literary text as this configuration of sentences, words, or concepts.  
The attention to the literary object, that is to say, reveals that there is not one.  This is 
to say that reading multiplies it; cast out, it does not return to itself as itself, it does not 
maintain itself, is not perfectly stable.  It is not a question here of reading 
“completing” literature, or of its adding a temporal element: time is not a supplement 
that undoes the solid literary object, but is internal to it as the risk of its self-undoing 
and the chance of its self-transcendence.  
Let me say a concluding word about the authors here, and about the category 
of the experimental.  I have touched on Du Bois, whose notion of beauty becomes 
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important to the extent that I read it as gesturing towards a horizon of time not fully 
held within extant norms or understandings of Truth and Right or Justice, touched on 
by the artwork and the community it inscribes.  The poetry of Nathaniel Mackey—
individual poems, the ongoing series Song of the Andoumboulou and the related From 
A Broken Perfume Bottle Traces Still Emanate—offer a tremendous resource for 
thinking of a transnational moment prior to the formation of nation that persists and 
insists within national formations, while also producing a poetics that remains 
attentive to language.  Suzan-Lori Parks, in a similar vein, makes the use of language 
into a theme, while in my reading she also problematizes thematic readings rooted in 
reference, in part by showing the ubiquity of referentiality within any use of language.  
With Kamau Brathwaite, finally, I find an occasion to reflect on the media of literature 
more generally, especially its graphic presentation.  In all cases, these authors pay 
attention to the circulation of texts, ideas, and bodies, and each can be read as offering 
a defense of literature, a vindication and celebration. 
 
